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1A b stra ct
The chapters of this thesis analyse elements of households’ consumption, labour supply 
and saving decisions within the life cycle framework. The focus is on three main issues 
arising in this context. The first considers modelling both a durable good (housing) 
and labour supply choices together with life cycle choices over consumption and sav­
ings. The importance of modelling these features together comes from the existence of 
explicit earnings-related borrowing constraints when taking out a mortgage. Empiri­
cal evidence is provided for the UK and the modelling exercise, although not aimed to 
reproduce the evidence of a single country, is calibrated to the UK.
The second issue concerns incorporating expectations into the model. Two ap­
proaches are followed in the different chapters. One approach infers expectations from 
past realisations. The alternative approach uses expectations elicited in survey inter­
views.
The third issue relates to whether individuals save enough for their retirement. This 
question is addressed by using expectations on retirement outcomes, elicited directly 
in accordance with the approach mentioned above, and collected for a representative 
sample of the Italian working population. Data of interest to our exercise is for the 
years before and after a series of major pension reforms.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The chapters of this thesis analyse elements of households’ consumption, labour supply 
and saving decisions within the life cycle framework. The idea underlying this frame­
work is of rational consumers aiming to maximise utility by allocating their resources 
optimally between consumption and leisure and over time. The life cycle framework 
has been developed and refined in a stream of research that has followed the semi­
nal contributions of Modigliani and Brumberg (Life Cycle Hypothesis, 1954) and of 
Friedman (Permanent Income Hypothesis, 1957).1 In standard versions of the model, 
it is assumed that the utility function is intertemporally separable, so that the utility 
derived from today’s level of consumption, and from other current choices, does not af­
fect or depend on choices made in other periods. Individuals maximise the discounted 
sum of the future stream of utility, which translates into keeping the marginal utility 
of money constant over time (and not necessarily into constant consumption over time, 
as assumed in Modigliani and Brumberg’s original Life Cycle Hypothesis approach).
When outcomes are uncertain, the maximisation of inter-temporal utility will re­
quire the formation of expectations. While this has long been recognised, the theo­
retical advances that allowed for a systematic exploration of how uncertainty might 
affect decisions, occurred only in the mid-1980s. Before that time, models were often 
analysed under a set of assumptions that led to “certainty equivalence”. Utility was
1See Browning and Crossley (2001) and Carroll (2001) for critical summaries of the evolution of 
models within the life cycle framework.
13
1 Introduction 14
assumed to be quadratic, and marginal utility of consumption linear, so that maximis­
ing expected lifetime utility would translate into a flow of consumption independent of 
the degree of uncertainty about future outcomes. In other words, only first moments 
of the stochastic processes over future outcomes would matter. As pointed out by Car­
roll (2001), it was only with Zeldes (1984) contribution that the “certainty equivalent” 
assumption was relaxed to allow for more realistic assumptions about how uncertainty 
could affect consumption decisions. Blanchard and Mankiw (1988) showed that con­
sumption paths could depend on the uncertainty faced by individuals, rather than 
only on expected future outcomes. This led to the introduction of the idea of precau­
tionary saving, whereby individuals reduce their current consumption when they face 
greater uncertainty about the future. Utility functions that would allow consumption 
(and other choice variables) to be sensitive to uncertainty, have since become common. 
A typical example is given by the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility 
function.
If we think of the life of an individual as being made up of three stages, one in which 
she does not work but perhaps engages in education, one in which she works, and one 
in which she is retired, the life cycle model in general predicts that there should be 
borrowing in the first stage, accumulation of wealth in the second stage and wealth 
decumulation in the third stage. Browning and Crossley (2001) highlight a number of 
partially solved as well as unsolved puzzles, together with areas that have not been 
yet investigated in depth within the life cycle framework. Puzzles that remain unre­
solved include: little spending, in the first stage of the life cycle, by individuals with 
high expected lifetime wealth; and a lack of consumption smoothing in the transition 
from the second stage (work) into the third stage (retirement) of the life cycle (the 
so-called “retirement-consumption puzzle”). Partial consensus is instead reported over 
the view that the empirical correlation between consumption and income found during 
working life is due to a combination of precautionary savings and demographic changes 
over the life cycle. Areas that have as yet received little attention include modelling 
consumption goods with different properties, including different durability, as well as 
assets with different characteristics, such as different liquidity.
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This thesis will focus on three main issues arising in the life cycle framework. The 
first concerns expanding the types of goods that are incorporated in the model, and in 
particular simultaneously adding both a durable good and the labour supply choice. 
The second involves exploring different methods that have been suggested to incorpo­
rate expectations in theoretical and empirical models. Finally, there is also an indirect 
contribution to the evidence on one of the unresolved puzzles identified above, namely 
that of the retirement-consumption puzzle. I will now briefly discuss each of these 
issues in turn, focussing on how they are addressed in the chapters of the thesis.
The first issue involves simultaneously adding both a durable good (housing) and 
labour supply choice to the fife cycle framework. Consumption and labour supply are 
modelled alongside housing, which is an illiquid asset, a collateral good, and a good that 
directly affects household utility. This is the focus of chapters 2 and 3. The importance 
of modelling labour supply along with home ownership is thought to be particularly 
important in contexts where an explicit income-related borrowing constraint holds for 
households that want to take out a mortgage. In this respect, empirical evidence 
for the United Kingdom is presented in chapter 2, which investigates whether female 
labour supply is correlated with mortgage repayments. In this analysis, mortgage 
repayments are thought of as a dimension that picks up the existence of a binding 
liquidity constraint, particularly in the early stage of the life cycle when households 
purchase a home.
The empirical evidence of a positive correlation between female labour supply and 
mortgage commitments found in chapter 2 is the basis for investigating, in chapter 3, 
the relationship between home ownership, consumption, labour supply and saving in a 
structural life cycle model. Two institutional borrowing constraints associated with the 
home purchase are introduced - namely a down payment constraint and an earnings- 
related borrowing constraint - as well as transaction costs of buying and selling the 
home. The utility function is CRRA and therefore allows for prudent behaviour. The 
model is calibrated to home ownership profiles of the cohort born in the late 194(J’s and
1 Introduction 16
produces labour supply profiles as well as profiles of consumption and asset accumula­
tion. It is found that changes in home-ownership affect both consumption and labour 
supply. Moreover, the labour supply of home-owners is found to be higher than that 
of non-homeowners, with peaks at the time of house purchase. This is suggestive of 
constrained behaviour, particularly via the income-related borrowing constraint, but 
the effect is mostly small and smaller than that observed in the data. Part of the 
reason why the model does not seem able to generate the scale of effects seen in the 
data could be that in the model there is only one source of ex-ante heterogeneity, 
which is the education level of the household. Considering the potential importance 
of the earnings-related borrowing constraint, the relevance and welfare implications 
of different degrees of wage uncertainty are also measured. In particular, compensat­
ing variations in assets, subsequently translated into lifetime changes in consumption, 
labour supply and home-ownership, are obtained for scenarios with different variance 
in wages. Simulations show that labour supply and consumption choices in a scenario 
with compensating variations in assets and a higher wage variance are, respectively, 
lower and higher than in a scenario with lower variance and zero initial assets. Home­
ownership is always higher at the beginning of life, since the compensating variation in 
assets relaxes the explicit borrowing constraints. However, it can be lower in the sec­
ond part of the life cycle due to the implicit “no-bankruptcy” constraint being tighter 
in a scenario with higher wage variance, and in fact becoming binding.
The second issue concerns incorporating expectations into the model. A common 
way to model expectations within the life cycle framework is to infer expectations from 
past realisations. This however requires making a number of assumptions on expecta­
tion formation. In particular, the economist is assumed to know what information on 
realisations individuals have and how they translate this information into expectations. 
These two steps are implicit when, for example, agents in a model with stochastic earn­
ings are assumed to form their expectations rationally by exploiting the properties of 
an econometrically estimated wage process. However, a strand of literature has now 
been developed on eliciting expectations in survey interviews (see Dominitz (1998,
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2001) and Dominitz and Manski (1994)) in order to recover probability distributions 
over future outcomes without imposing any structure a priori. Chapter 3 will adopt 
the first approach with respect to three stochastic processes: wages, house prices and 
the interest rate. Chapter 4 will instead draw on the second approach in looking at 
point expectations over retirement outcomes.
The third contribution of the thesis is to provide some evidence, within the life 
cycle framework, that indirectly contributes to the debate around the retirement- 
consumption puzzle. Since pension income is the main component of income during 
the last stage of the life cycle, expectations of it are crucial in determining inter­
temporal decisions of consumption and savings. Given that pension rules are nor­
mally set by governments, in order to form expectations correctly, individuals need 
to be informed about pension legislation, understand it, and adjust their expectations 
whenever changes in legislation take place. If any of these elements are missing, then 
current decisions over consumption and savings will be distorted by having inaccurate 
expectations. Chapter 4 analyses the expected retirement age and the expected ratio 
of pension benefits to pre-retirement income (the replacement rate) of working indi­
viduals in Italy, as collected in the Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth. 
It then estimates the offset between expected pension wealth and private wealth ac­
cumulation. In some sense, this analysis could contribute to the debate on the drop 
in consumption around retirement. For example, if individuals do not adjust their 
expectations about the replacement rate after a change in legislation has reduced it, 
then they will make their inter-temporal consumption and savings plans by aiming to 
smooth marginal utility for the wrong amount of wealth. If they only realise their mis­
take at retirement, they will need to re-optimise their consumption plans and possibly 
be forced to reduce their consumption at that time. Eliciting expectations directly 
from individuals, rather than inferring them from current legislation, is a crucial fea­
ture of this analysis. A drawback of this approach is that little is yet known about 
the way in which people answer questions about expectations. On the other hand, it 
seems particularly relevant to obtain information on expectations in this way, as it is
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what individuals believe that ultimately matters for their choices. It is found that indi­
viduals overestimate the replacement rate both before and after a series of changes to 
pension legislation. Moreover, the offset between private wealth and expected (state) 
pension wealth is found to be fax from complete.
Chapter 2
Labour M arket Participation and 
M ortgage R elated Borrowing  
Constraints
2.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the relationship between female labour market participation and 
mortgage commitments in a life-cycle setting.
Most of the literature concerning life-cycle models and borrowing constraints has 
focused on the impact of borrowing constraints on consumption, assuming labour sup­
ply to be exogenous: However, it is worth investigating whether this is a plausible 
assumption. In fact, labour supply may be thought of as a way to circumvent or to re­
duce the impact of borrowing constraints, and so assuming that it is exogenous would 
produce biased estimates of the impact of borrowing constraints on consumption.
The importance of mortgages in the context of borrowing constraints and labour 
supply decisions derives from two sources. The first is that housing is usually the 
most substantial component of assets for home owners. The second is that there is 
an explicit mortgage qualification constraint, based on household annual income and 
assets, when the mortgage is taken out.
19
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The ways in which mortgage commitments can be interpreted , will now be analysed 
in turn.
When taking out a mortgage individuals normally face two types of constraints: 
a wealth constraint, typically in the form of a minimum downpayment, and an in­
come constraint, typically in the form of a maximum ratio of mortgage payment to 
household earned income. In the UK, it is theoretically possible to borrow up to 100% 
of the property’s value (although a higher lending fee, the so-called MIG -Mortgage 
Indemnity Guarantee-, normally applies for mortgages of more than around 90% of 
the property value) and the effective qualification constraint is the one related to the 
household income. The Financial Service Authority reports that “typically, the maxi­
mum mortgage a lender offers is three times the main earner’s income plus one times 
any second earner’s income, or two-and-a-half times the [households] joint income”. 
Hence, there exists an explicit mortgage qualification constraint that is a function of 
household earned income.
Although it formally applies when the mortgage is taken out, it is possible to 
consider an income constraint as holding at every period during which the mortgage is 
being repaid as long as remortgaging is a possibility. Fortin (1995) justifies the presence 
of such a constraint at every period on the basis of the Canadian institutional setting, 
where people remortgage very frequently1 or, alternatively, in the light of allocational 
inflexibilities introduced by mortgage payments in the household decision process. In 
other words, it is explicitly taken into account that mortgage payments might alter 
household consumption and leisure decisions due to the fact that they must be met at 
every period and that they normally constitute a substantial part of households’ total 
income.
Moreover, a more general eaxnings-related borrowing constraint (see Alessie, Me- 
lenberg and Weber (1988) and Aldershof et al. (1997)) may apply to households that 
have taken out a mortgage. If capital markets are imperfect, people might not be 
able to borrow as much as they would like to, and one way to express the borrowing
*In the selected sample used in this work, 20.5% of households take out additional mortgage on 
their home at least once during the observation period.
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constraint is in terms of earned income. In particular, individuals who earn more can 
borrow up to a higher sum than people who earn less, on the basis that their higher 
earnings reflect higher human capital to be used as collateral. Households with mort­
gages might be particularly subject to this type of constraint if their home equity is 
still low and they do not have other assets to offer as collateral. However, it might be 
the case that individuals with higher earnings, together with a mortgage, hold assets 
of various forms, hence rendering this type of borrowing constraint binding only for 
households at the bottom of the income distribution.
An important issue that follows from the existence of a mortgage-related qualifi­
cation constraint is that mortgage commitments are potentially endogenous in labour 
supply decisions. Most of the literature that addresses the relationship between mort­
gage commitments and labour supply decisions takes mortgage choice (whether to take 
out a mortgage, its size) as exogenous (see Fortin (1995), Aldershof et al (1997)). In 
other words, the borrowing constraint is considered to hold at every period but the 
amount of the mortgage payment is assumed to be exogenous. This will be the implicit 
assumption in the first part of this analysis as well. That is, it will be assumed that the 
direction of causality in the relationship between mortgage commitments and labour 
market participation runs from the former to the latter. The hypothesis of exogeneity 
is then tested in the second part of the chapter.
Most of the studies that have been carried out so far have analysed a single cross- 
section of the data set of interest and have thus relied on a static-level analysis. In 
this work, panel data from the British Household Panel Study will be used. Although 
a static model will be estimated, unlike static models based on a single cross-section, 
individual unobserved heterogeneity will be controlled for.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 presents a survey of the related 
literature. Section 2.3 contains the theoretical framework that is used as a guide in 
the interpretation of the empirical results. Section 2.4 describes the data set as well 
as sample selection issues and the variables used in the analysis. It also contains a de­
scriptive section on the relationship between participation and mortgage commitments. 
Section 2.5 presents the empirical model and the estimation methods, a description of
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the empirical results and a discussion of endogeneity of mortgage choice. Section 2.6 
concludes.
2.2 T he literature review
The effect of mortgage market constraints has been analysed in relation to different 
types of household decisions such as tenure, savings and labour supply. Either the 
institutional borrowing constraints regarding the downpayment or the ratio of mort­
gage payments to household income, or both, have been considered. Some works have 
instead adopted a more general borrowing constraint.
Yoshikawa and Ohtake (1989) examine housing demand and female labour supply 
in the context of a three-period life-cycle model in which households choose the type 
of tenure (renting/owning), consumption of other goods and female labour supply, 
subject to a life-time budget constraint and to an additional constraint related to the 
downpayment for those who choose to own. They estimate the savings function and 
the female labour supply function for the two tenure types from a cross-section of the 
Japanese National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure, by using a two-step 
Heckman procedure. Tenure choice and savings are made to depend, among other 
variables, on permanent income of the household head, total net assets and price of 
land. It is found that changes in husbands’ permanent income and/or the price of land 
affect the tenure decision and that this switching effect makes the price of housing 
affect the savings rate in two opposite directions. Whether the switching effect affects 
female labour supply as well, is not examined.
Fortin (1995) analyses the relationship between household labour supply and the 
mortgage qualification constraint expressed in terms of a maximum gross debt service 
ratio (mortgage payments/gross household income). The theoretical setting is that 
of a multiperiod life-cycle model with utility maximization over leisure and consump­
tion, subject to the current period allocation of life-time wealth and to the additional 
mortgage qualification constraint based on earnings. It is assumed that this mortgage 
qualification constraint holds at every period on the basis of the Canadian institutional
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setting, where people remortgage very frequently. Using 1986 data from the Canadian 
Family Expenditure Survey, the first estimate is of a reduced form model of female 
labour supply in relation to a set of housing variables that include the value of the 
house owned, the balance of mortgage and dummy variables for different levels of the 
ratio of mortgage charges to gross family income (exclusive of wife’s labour income). 
Both a higher balance of mortgage and a higher ratio of mortgage charges to other 
family income positively affect female labour market participation and hours of work. 
Subsequently, two labour earnings equations are estimated in relation to the theoret­
ical model. In order to test whether binding constraints for mortgage qualification 
influence wives’ participation, one equation relates to the case in which the housing 
constraint applies to both the husband and the wife, and the other equation relates to 
the case in which it applies only to husband’s earnings. It emerges that the housing 
constraint should apply to both spouses but the husband’s earnings should be given a 
greater weight than the wife’s.
Aldershof et al. (1997) analyse the relationship between female labour supply and 
housing consumption by developing a life-cycle consistent model in which households 
maximise expected lifetime utility over female leisure, housing consumption and non­
housing consumption, subject to a housing production function, to the standard life­
time budget constraint and to an earnings-related liquidity constraint.2 Hence, labour 
supply and housing consumption are jointly determined. Separability of preferences 
between these two choices is tested by estimating the female labour supply function 
conditional on housing consumption and it is not rejected. Estimation is based on 
the 1989 wave of the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel. Moreover, it is found that female 
labour supply is positively affected by the ratio of mortgage interest payments to total 
family income (exclusive of the woman’s earnings), which is considered to be a proxy 
for the presence of binding liquidity constraints.
Del Boca and Lusardi (2001) examine whether imperfections in the credit market,
2It is through this earnings dependent liquidity constraint that mortgage commitments are expected 
to relate to female labour supply. It is argued that the constraint is more likely to be binding in cases 
where the household has high mortgage commitments.
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and in particular in the mortgage market, spill over to the labour market by using the 
1989 and 1993 cross-sections from the Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth. 
Exogenous changes in the mortgage market, such as the reduction of the down payment 
and wider access to the mortgage market (due both to the financial liberalization 
brought by the European unification in 1992 and to the Amato Act of 1990), are 
considered to be an important source of variation to identify these effects. The decision 
to participate in the labour market and to obtain a mortgage are modelled in terms 
of a latent variables simultaneous equation model. Mortgage debt is introduced in 
the empirical estimation using a dummy and a continuous variable for the amount 
outstanding. It is found that it has a positive and significant effect on female labour 
participation. A dummy and the outstanding value owed are also used for family debt 
and for other types of debt (car, appliances) to check whether mortgage commitment 
is different from other types of debt. The direction of causality between borrowing 
constraints and labour supply is assessed by relying on variables proxing for the credit 
system3 and the changes in the mortgage market over time.
2.3 T he theoretical framework
The theoretical framework that is adopted as a guide for the empirical specification is 
one of dynamic programming where individuals choose labour supply (participation) 
and consumption according to the value function
Vt(At) = max[ut (Pu cu Zt) + PEtVt+i(At+1)\ (2.1)
Pt,ct
3They include whether people have a checking account, how many banks they have been using and 
how many credit cards they use
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subject to the standard asset accumulation rule and to a mortgage-related liquidity 
constraint,4 as follows:
At+1 = (1 + rt+i)[At +  (yt +  wftPt -  ct -  m0)] (2.2)
Kvt +WftPt) > m 0
where
At = assets at the beginning of period t
ut{•) =  intra-temporal utility function at period t
Pt — hours of work (participation)
Ct = consumption
Zt =  demographic variables
Et — expectation operator based on information at time t 
j3 =  consumer’s discount factor 
rt = rate of return between period t — 1 and period t 
yt = unearned (non-asset) income (husband’s income)
Wft = female wage (earned income if Pt represents participation) 
m0 = mortgage payment at period t (assumed to be constant, i.e. non depending 
on the interest rate)
k = proportion of total household income to be allocated to mortgage payments
Utility is assumed to be intertemporally separable and the intra-temporal utility
function, ut{-), is assumed to be strictly concave and monotonically increasing in c
and decreasing in P  (there is no presumption regarding Z). Moreover, the amount of
4 The mortgage- related borrowing constraint has been introduced following Fortin (1995). Also 
if thought of in terms of allocational inflexibility, it is meant to be relevant for homeowners with 
mortgage but not for renters. In fact, it could be argued that homeowners with mortgage who are 
incapable of keeping up with mortgage payments could always move to a smaller house in the same 
way as renters could move to a cheaper accommodation. However, as opposed to renters, in order to 
do that, they would be subject to a mortgage qualification constraint based on earnings. Alternatively, 
by staying in the same accommodation, they would be subject to allocational inflexibilities (captured 
by the mortgage-related borrowing constraint) in a way that renters would not be.
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the mortgage is assumed to be exogenous so that the mortgage payment at period t is 
assumed as given.
First-order conditions axe obtained from standard dynamic programming tech­
niques and are represented by the following:
Uct = @Et[{ 1 + r t+i)At+i] (2.3)
uPt = 0Et[( 1 + rt+i)\t+i]wft -  ptkwft (2.4)
A t = 0Et[( 1 + rt+i)Af+i] (2.5)
Pt[k{yt + WftPt) ~ mQ] =  0, pt > 0 (2.6)
where and upt denote the first-order derivatives of the utility function with respect 
to consumption and hours of work, pt represents the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated 
to the mortgage-related constraint and A< is the marginal utility of wealth (dVt/dAt).
When constraint (2.6) is binding, pt > 0 and Pt = m°/k~yt. Hence,
Pt = f{m 0,yuWft) (2.7)
The effect of the mortgage constraint, when binding, is that participation becomes 
a function of mortgage payment, other family income and female wage. By contrast, 
when it is not binding, pt = 0 and participation does not depend on mortgage payment.
Using first-order conditions (2.3)-(2.5), optimal consumption and labour supply 
equations axe defined as follows:
ct = ct (At , wft, Zt , pt) (2.8)
Pt = ^(A f, Wft, Zt , pt) (2.9)
The equations derived for consumption and participation axe the so-called Frisch 
equations.5 In this framework, A is interpreted as capturing all the information from
other periods that is required in order to obtain the optimal choice in the current
period (e.g. it could be thought of as reflecting household permanent income).6
5Demand functions derived by holding the marginal utility of wealth constant.
6In an empirical specification, A would then be modelled as an individual fixed effect.
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In the theoretical framework presented so far, optimization is carried out over 
hours of work. However, the empirical specification that will be introduced later is 
expressed in terms of a participation rather than hours equation as a function of other 
family income, demographics, ratio of mortgage payment to other family income (also 
interacted with demographic variables). This discrepancy is purely due to the easier 
analytical tractability of a continuous variable rather than a discrete one, and the 
model is meant to be just an indication of the way in which the mortgage-related 
constraint affects labour supply decisions. Finding a positive effect of the mortgage 
variable on participation is taken as evidence that the mortgage borrowing constraint is 
binding, and hence that having a mortgage distorts households participation decisions.
2.4 T he data
The data used for this work is the British Household Panel Study (BHPS), waves 3- 
10 (1993-2000).7 It reports information on British households on the basis of yearly 
interviews conducted on an original sample of approximately 5,000 households (circa 
10,000 individuals).8 The panel nature of the data set means that the same individuals 
are interviewed each year.9
The data contains both household and individual level information. At the indi­
vidual level, apart from demographic characteristics such as age, region, number of 
children and education, there is detailed information concerning current labour force 
status, labour force history, health and personal finances (including different sources 
of income and of investment). Moreover, detailed wealth data is collected every five 
years.
At the household level, there is detailed information regarding household composi­
tion, household expenditure and tenure type of the home lived in, and details on rent
7Waves 1 and 2 are not being used since wave 2 reports many missing observations on housing 
variables.
8Children sire interviewed if above 16.
9In fact, the selected sample that is being analysed in this work reports on average 4.3 observations 
per individual over 8 years. This is partly due to attrition and partly to sample selection (see next 
section).
2 Labour Market Participation and Mortgage Related Borrowing Constraints 28
or mortgage payments and on loan repayments. In particular, housing information 
is provided with different degrees of detail according to whether households own the 
accommodation, are paying a mortgage or are renting. Each year, all respondents 
are asked about the type of accommodation and the number of rooms. Homeowners, 
including those with a mortgage, also provide their estimate of the value of the house 
(based on current prices). Further, owners with mortgage are asked to provide some 
information every year and some additional information the first time they are inter­
viewed at their current address. Among the information which is provided only by 
people being interviewed for the first time (or who have moved address since previous 
interview), there is the following: the year in which the mortgage was taken out, the 
original cost of the house, the original amount of the mortgage (excluding later ad­
ditions), the number of years the mortgage has still to run and the type of mortgage 
(whether a repayment mortgage, an endowment mortgage, a mixture of the two or 
some other type). Every year homeowners with a mortgage are asked whether any 
additional mortgage has been taken out, its amount, the destination use of it (home 
extension/ improvement, car purchase, other consumer goods, other). They are also 
asked to provide the last total monthly instalment on the mortgage or loan.10 Fi­
nally, there are three direct questions on liquidity constraints related to either rent or 
mortgage payments. In particular, respondents are asked whether there have been any 
difficulties paying for the accommodation in the last twelve months, and, in case of 
affirmative answer, whether this has resulted in borrowing money or in cutting back on 
other household spending. Respondents are also asked whether or not the household 
has been more than two months behind with the rent or mortgage payment.
2.4.1 Sam ple selection
Since the purpose of this work is to analyse whether mortgage-related borrowing con­
straints affect households’ labour participation, the focus will be on female partici­
pation on the ground that males normally work full time and so their labour supply
10It includes life insurance payments if they are paid together with the mortgage, and it includes 
both the premium and the interests if it is an endowment mortgage.
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behaviour is already constrained. Only people who axe in couples (either married or 
cohabiting) and of different sex will be taken into account and, in line with Fortin 
(1995), it will be people who are in couples in which the husband works full time and 
so receives a regular salary. The number of observations drops from 90998 to 45082.
Self-employed are selected out on the basis of the assumption that their labour 
supply behaviour is different from employed people.11 Moreover, renters are removed 
from the sample as it is assumed that the tenure decision is exogenous and the focus 
is on homeowners either with or without a mortgage. Finally, only women in the age 
range 25-45 axe kept for the analysis. This is based on the assumption that above this 
range the mortgage qualification constraint is unlikely to be binding, moreover it is in 
this range that interactions with the presence of children axe more likely to take place. 
The final working sample is of 12510 observations, that is, 6255 households. Summary 
statistics of the variables used in the estimation axe reported in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of vaxiables used in the estimation (N=6255)
variable M ean Std. Dev. M in M ax
female paxticipation 0.818 0.386 0 1
other hh income 1996.309 1123.378 235.177 21483.810
log (other hh income) 7.494 0.438 5.460 9.975
age (rescaled by 25) 9.741 5.694 0 20
obligation ratio 0.168 0.096 0 1
youngest child 0-2 0.155 0.362 0 1
youngest child 3-4 0.122 0.327 0 1
no. of children 1.174 1.060 0 7
no education 0.119 0.324 0 1
education 0  level 0.453 0.498 0 1
education A level 0.203 0.402 0 1
higher degree 0.221 0.415 0 1
Since we have an unbalanced panel, the number of households is in fact 1475, of 
which 281 axe only observed once over 8 periods and 258 axe observed over the whole
11 In particular, self-employed people do not receive a fixed wage as is assumed in this1 analysis.
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period (8 times). A varying number of 120 and 200 households are observed 2-7 times. 
On average, people are observed 4.3 times out of 8 periods. The sample selection plays 
an important role in this apparent high attrition, both through selection of people in 
couples and through the choice of the age range.
2.4 .2  D escrip tion  o f  variables
Female participation
It is a dummy variable defined on the basis of whether the female did any paid work 
the week before the interview and, in case of negative answer, whether she had a job 
that she was away from in the same week.12 Since this definition may assign women 
who did casual work and who were on maternity leave to the group of participants 
in the labour market,13 two alternative definitions of participation have been used to 
check the sensitivity of the results. One is based on whether the number of weeks of 
employment during the year before the interview was positive and the other is based on 
whether the declared current employment status is that of being in paid employment. 
None of these alternative definitions change the pattern of the results.
Demographic information
The BHPS includes all the standard demographic information such as age, educa­
tion, number of children, age range of children and region of residence.
In the analysis that follows female’s age has been rescaled, so that the youngest 
females in the selected sample (25 years old) are the reference group. Its square has also 
been included in order to take into account non-linearities in the relationship between 
participation and age.
Children possibly play a central role as the focus of the analysis is on female par­
ticipation at early/middle stage of the life cycle. The number of children is controlled 
for, as is age of the youngest child using dummies which indicate whether the youngest
12 “Any paid work” includes any number of hours, including Saturday jobs and casual work. The 
reasons of being away from work include those on maternity leave, on holiday, on strike and on sick 
leave.
13It turns out that only 8 observations register the female as participating while she is in fact on 
maternity leave.
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child is either between 0 and 2 years of age or between 3 and 4 years of age. As long as 
this adds information to the analysis, a dummy for the youngest child being above 5 
years of age will be included. Female’s education and the region of residence axe used 
as additional control variables whenever the estimation method does not eliminate the 
fixed effect. Education is summarised by four dummy variables: no education, O level, 
A level, degree or higher. Dummies are defined for each of nineteen regions.
Income measures
Since the focus of this analysis is on female labour participation, it is necessary to 
control for income effects related to unearned income. Hence, the log of other family 
income defined as all household income but female’s earned income (i.e. husband’s 
earned and non-earned income and the female non-earned income) is included as ex­
planatory variable. In particular, monthly non-labour income is recovered from the 
sum of all non-labour income in the year prior the start of the interview period, whereas 
labour income is given by the usual gross pay per month.14
Mortgage and housing information
Of all the housing information described in the previous section, the main variable 
that has been used in this context is the monthly mortgage payment. The ratio between 
the monthly mortgage payment and the other family income is the so-called obligation 
ratio (or). As opposed to the ratio that enters the mortgage qualification constraint, 
this ratio has other family income rather than total family income in the denominator, 
the difference between the two being the female earned income.
The obligation ratio is expected to capture the effect on household labour mar­
ket participation of the variation in the burden of mortgage commitments relative to 
household income. In other words, it is expected to capture the effect of mortgage- 
related borrowing constraints on labour market participation. Although the institu­
tional mortgage qualification constraint should hold only when the mortgage is taken 
out, it is plausible to think that it may hold also in subsequent periods. In fact, a pos­
itive correlation between the obligation ratio and female participation may be taken
14It is gross payment in the month before interview as long as this is the usual payment; when only 
the net monthly income was available, BHPS imputed values have been used.
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as evidence of this hypothesis. Fortin (1995) suggests that the mortgage qualification 
constraint may hold after the mortgage has been taken out as people may remortgage 
quite frequently. On the other hand, variation in interest rates may provide another 
reason for variation in participation related to mortgage commitments. For instance, 
assuming that the constraint binds, a household that obtained a mortgage on the basis 
of only male’s income and then faces an increase in the obligation ratio due either 
to higher interest rates or to a decline in male’s earnings, would probably have to 
increase its labour market participation in order to lessen the effect of the underlying 
mortgage-related borrowing constraint. Alternatively, it could re-mortgage but in that 
case it would face the institutional mortgage qualification constraint. Hence, either 
implicitly or explicitly, the earnings-related mortgage constraint would hold not only 
when the mortgage is taken out but also in subsequent periods.
2.4 .3  D escrip tive  sta tistics
Table 2.2 and Figure 2.1 illustrate female labour market participation behaviour by 
different types of tenure and age as obtained from the pooled selected sample (years 
1993-2000).15
Both document a strikingly higher participation rate for females in households 
that have a mortgage, particularly in the age range 30-35, when presumably labour 
supply decisions are strongly related to the presence and the age of children. Whereas 
participation for women without a mortgage shows a definite U-shaped pattern with 
its minimum at the age of 32-33, participation for those with a mortgage only decreases 
slightly from 84% to 80%. The participation rates of renters appear to be in between 
the participation rate of owners with no mortgage and owners with a mortgage for any 
age after 29 and it is the lowest before age 29.
Since households that own the house outright are less than 4% of the sample that 
includes renters,16 and since 80% of households in the same sample own with a mort­
gage, it is necessary to rule out the possibility that the above result is driven by the
15The figures have been obtained by running mean least-squares smoothing and confidence intervals
have been constructed from pointwise standard errors of smoothed values of participation.
164.5% of the sample with no renters.
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Figure 2.1: Female participation by tenure
small number of observations for the group of outright owners, particularly for age 
below 35. Rather than dividing the group of owners into those who own outright 
and those who have a mortgage, the two groups are defined according to whether the 
monthly mortgage payment is below or above the 33rd percentile of the distribution of 
the monthly mortgage payment (dummy for low/high mortgage payment), where the 
group with low mortgage payment includes those that own outright. As documented 
in Table 2.3 and in Figure 2.2, up to the age of 36 the participation rate of these 
two groups presents the same features as the groups of owners outright and owners 
with mortgage, with a definite U-shaped pattern for those with low monthly mortgage 
payment (although, as expected, the average participation rate for the group of owners 
with low mortgage is now higher than before). After the age of 36 the two patterns are 
very similar, possibly due to the fact that the mortgage-related constraint is no longer 
binding. The participation rate of renters, on the other hand, is now lower than the 
one of both groups of home owners.
In what follows it is then further explored the relationship between the participation
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Table 2.2: Female participation by age and tenure
age owners 
w /o u t m ortgage
owners
w /m ortgage
renters All
25-30 0.727 0.844 0.608 0.798
(0.451) (0.362) (0.489) (0.402)
44 1,677 398 2,119
30-35 0.411 0.801 0.637 0.765
(0.497) (0.399) (0.482) (0.424)
51 1,697 281 2,029
35-40 0.724 0.807 0.784 0.801
(0.450) (0.394) (0.412) (0.399)
87 1,454 158 1,699
40-45 0.784 0.848 0.787 0.838
(0.414) (0.359) (0.411) (0.369)
97 1,148 141 1,386
All 0.688 0.824 0.671
(0.464) (0.381) (0.470)
279 5,976 978
Notes: Cells contain, top to bottom, the mean, the standard deviation (in brackets), and group size of female 
participation in the labour market.
rate of home owners (with and without a mortgage) by focusing on a sample that 
excludes renters. The obligation ratio is used instead of the mortgage monthly payment 
in order to net out the effect of household income (excluding female labour income) 
from a measure of allocational inflexibilities imposed by the mortgage.17 Figure 2.3 
follows the same logic as Figure 2.2 but is based on the obligation ratio rather than the 
level of mortgage monthly payment. It illustrates the pattern of female participation 
according to whether the obligation ratio is below or above its 33rd percentile level.
17In fact, the institutional mortgage borrowing constraint imposes an upper bound on the mortgage 
level in terms of household income. Hence, if household income does not change significantly over time, 
and mortgage payments do not decrease (for instance due to decreasing interest rates) it is plausible 
to expect that mortgage payments are positively related to household income. Hence, the effect of the 
burden imposed by the mortgage on female labour supply must be measured in relative terms (relative 
to household income, excluding female labour income) rather them in absolute ones.
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Figure 2.2: Female participation by mortgage repayments
As for the mortgage level, the pattern of female participation for the group with low 
obligation ratio is U-shaped, with a minimum at the age of 32-33, whereas participation 
for the group with high obligation ratio stays at a significant higher level and has 
only a slight decline at the age of 35. This indicates that other household income 
is positively related to monthly mortgage payment (otherwise the relative and the 
absolute mortgage payments would have different effects on labour participation) and 
that there is a positive correlation between mortgage-related allocational inflexibilities 
(as represented by the obligation ratio) and female labour market participation.
This latter feature is explored further in Figures 2.4 and 2.5 by controlling for the 
presence of young children in the household. In fact, it might be argued that mortgage 
decisions and fertility decisions are not separable. It turns out that even when the 
youngest child is between 0 and 2 year old a high obligation ratio significantly increases 
the probability that females work more than in cases where the obligation ratio is low, 
at least after the age of 32. When the youngest child in the household is between 3 
and 4 year old, the same result holds in the age range 32-37.
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Table 2.3: Female participation by age and mortgage repayments
age m onthly m ortgage repaym ent
< 33rdpctile* > 33rdpctile*
25-30 0.800 0.857
(0.400) (0.350)
460 1,261
30-35 0.698 0.827
(0.460) (0.379)
496 1,252
35-40 0.792 0.809
(0.406) (0.393)
552 989
40-45 0.854 0.834
(0.353) (0.373)
583 662
All 0.788 0.833
(0.408) (0.373)
2,091 4,164
Notes: Cells contain, top to bottom, the mean, the standard deviation (in brackets), and group size of female 
participation in the labour market.
*The 33rd percentile of the distribution of monthly mortgage repayments is 213 GBP
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 report female labour market participation by 5-year-age groups 
and obligation ratio quartiles (the lower quartile is defined for or < 0.104 and the 
upper one for or > 0.219). In table 2.4 children are not controlled for. It emerges that 
female labour market participation is higher the higher the obligation ratio for any 
age group. Particularly in the age range 25-35, labour market participation for the 
group with the highest obligation ratio is about 20 percentage points higher than for 
the group with the lowest obligation ratio: female participation is 72% for those aged 
25-30 with an obligation ratio below 10.4%, it is 93% if their obligation ratio is above 
21.9%, and it is 78.7% and 83.8% if their obligation ratio is in between 10.4% and 
21.9%. For females aged 30-35, participation goes from 66% to 86% when switching 
from the lowest to the highest obligation ratio.
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Figure 2.3: Female participation by “obligation ratio” (mortgage repayment/other hh 
income)
When controlling for the presence of the youngest child in the age range 0-2 (Ta­
ble 2.5), it is still true that females with the highest obligation ratio have a higher 
participation rate than those with the lowest obligation ratio. However, for the age 
group 25-30, the participation pattern is no longer increasing for intermediate levels 
of the obligation ratio. Whereas those having an obligation ratio below 10.4% have a 
participation rate of 65%, those having an obligation ratio between 10.4% and 21.9% 
have a participation rate of, respectively, 59% and 61%. Also when controlling for the 
presence of the youngest child in the age range 3-4 some non-linearities are present 
for the age group 25-30. It is noteworthy that participation is around 50% for all the 
females between 25 and 40 year of age with an obligation ratio below 10.4% whereas 
it is well above 80% for those with an obligation ratio above 21.9%.
Of course these results are obtained ignoring the panel structure of the data set and 
hence they can only be taken as a rough indication of a positive relationship between 
mortgage-related allocational inflexibilities and female labour market participation.
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Figure 2.4: Female participation by obligation ratio and age of youngest child 0-2
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Figure 2.5: Female participation by “obligation ratio” and age of youngest child 3-4
The analysis of this relationship in a regression framework that accounts for unobserved 
heterogeneity in labour market participation will be carried out in the next sections 
using the panel structure.
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Table 2.4: Female participation by age and level of obligation ratio
age or < 0.104 0.104 < o r<  0.158 0.158 < o r<  0.219 or > 0.219
25-30 0.721 0.787 0.838 0.926
(0.450) (0.410) (0.368) (0.260)
222 390 520 589
30-35 0.658 0.769 0.832 0.865
(0.475) (0.422) (0.375) (0.342)
354 428 493 473
35-40 0.733 0.809 0.809 0.896
(0.443) (0.393) (0.393) (0.305)
487 404 341 309
40-45 0.820 0.825 0.829 0.953
(0.384) (0.381) (0.378) (0.212)
501 342 210 192
All 0.742 0.796 0.829 0.905
(0.437) (0.403) (0.377) (0.293)
1,564 1,564 1,564 1,563
Notes: The obligation ratio is defined as the ratio between monthly mortgage payment and other family income 
(household income minus female’s earned income).
Cells contain, top to bottom, the mean, the standard deviation (in brackets), and group size of female partici­
pation in the labour market.
2.5 T he em pirical m odel
A static female participation equation with unobserved heterogeneity is estimated. 
Specifically, the form of the estimated equation is:18
Pit = 1 {/?Inpn + 7Zit + 5Hit + 0\ageit * orit + 62yochQ2it * orit + a* + eit > 0}
(2 .10)
18It is worth noticing that as long as mortgage monthly payment is small relative to household’s 
other income, a specification including the the log of other household income and the level of obligation 
ratio (and no interactions) as explanatory variables represents an approximation (a first order Taylor 
expansion) of a specification containing only the log of net income (other family income net of mortgage 
payment). In that case, the effect of the mortgage variable would be interpreted in terms of income 
effect.
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Table 2.5: Female participation by age, level of obligation ratio and age of the youngest 
child
Youngest child 0-2
age or < 0.104 0.104 < o r<  0.158 0.158 < o r<  0.219 or > 0.219
25-30 0.651 0.587 0.612 0.737
(0.481) (0.495) (0.489) (0.442)
63 92 121 114
30-35 0.381 0.660 0.692 0.667
(0.490) (0.476) (0.463) (0.474)
63 94 130 111
35-40 0.385 0.615 0.680 0.775
(0.493) (0.496) (0.471) (0.423)
39 26 50 40
40-45 0.571 0.750 0.571 1.000
(0.535) (0.463) (0.534) -
7 8 7 1
All 0.488 0.627 0.656 0.714
(0.501) (0.485) (0.476) (0.453)
Youngest child 3-4
172 220 308 266
age or < 0.104 0.104 < or < 0.158 0.158 < o r<  0.219 or > 0.219
25-30 0.513 0.688 0.696 0.886
(0.507) (0.467) (0.464) (0.321)
37 64 69 44
30-35 0.515 0.632 0.795 0.829
(0.504) (0.485) (0.406) (0.379)
66 87 88 76
35-40 0.489 0.717 0.729 0.860
(0.505) (0.455) (0.449) (0.351)
47 46 48 50
40-45 0.714 0.600 0.500 0.857
(0.488) (0.507) (0.527) (0.378)
7 15 10 7
All 0.515 0.665 0.735 0.853
(0.501) (0.473) (0.442) (0.355)
157 212 215 177
Notes: The obligation ratio (or) is defined as the ratio between monthly mortgage payment and other family 
income (household income minus female’s earned income).
Cells contain, top to bottom, the mean, the standard deviation (in brackets), and group size of female partici­
pation in the labour market.
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where P  is a binary variable indicating whether the female participates in the labour 
market.
Iny is the log of other family income and Z  is a vector of variables that capture de­
mographic characteristics. Typically it includes (a polynomial in) age and the number 
of children as well as the age of youngest child. H  is a vector of mortgage and housing 
variables. In the analysis that follows, it includes the obligation ratio (or), that is, the 
ratio of mortgage monthly payment to other family income and, possibly, the value of 
the house (in logs, to capture an income effect), the remaining mortgage life, the total 
mortgage outstanding.
The variable of interest is or and its interactions with age and with the number of 
children. Interactions with age are meant to capture a different effect of the mortgage- 
related borrowing constraint at different stages of the life-cycle. In fact, for people who 
take out a mortgage when they are 25, this interaction captures the effect related to 
the remaining life of the mortgage. The interaction with a dummy for the presence of 
young children in the household is meant to control for the possibility that the effect 
of mortgage commitments is different for people with and without young children.
c*i is the individual specific effect and £u is the time-varying error term.
2.5.1 E stim ation  m eth od
The equation that is estimated in this work belongs to the class of non-linear panel 
data models with individual specific effect, and in particular to the class of discrete 
choice panel data models, as represented by the following:
yit =  1 {xit/3 -I- a* + eit > 0} £ = 1,2,...,T  z =  l,2,...,ra
As a special case, if it is further assumed that e**’s are independent and logistically 
distributed conditional on a*, xn, Xi2 , ..., XiT, it follows that
■of -i i x _  exp (xitp  +  on)
Pr(j/i* 1 *^ tl> ••• > 2'tT’> &i) * . ( q \ \1 +  exp [Xit/3 +  Qj)
as in the standard logit model,19 with the only difference being the individual
19Similarly, if d t  s are independent and normally distributed conditional on a i , x n , X i 2 , ■ Xtr,  then 
Pr(j / i t  =  l | x j i ,  X i 2 , . . . ,  X i T ,  Q:,) =  4>(xit /?  +  Q i)
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specific effect, a*.
Estimating (3 requires dealing with the individual specific effect, c^. There are 
basically two methods for doing this, and they will be surveyed in this section. Es­
sentially, one approach, which defines the so-called fixed effects model, imposes no 
assumptions on the relationship between c*i and the explanatory variables and uses 
instead a method that “eliminates” the individual specific effect on the basis of the 
same idea that informs differencing in the linear panel data model with fixed effects. A 
second approach, which defines the so-called random effects model, assumes that both 
the individual specific effect and the idiosyncratic shock axe independent of observable 
characteristics (xn,Xi2 , ...,Xix)- The distribution of a* conditional on xn, Xi2 , ..., x ^  
is specified parametrically (semiparametrically) so that the individual specific effect is 
then integrated out.
In the fixed effects model the idea is to “eliminate” the individual specific effect by 
allowing it to be correlated in any form with the explanatory variables. A consistent 
estimator for (3 can be obtained by conditional maximum likelihood, where conditioning 
occurs with respect to the data (xfi, Xi2 , ...,xit) and to a sufficient statistic for the fixed 
effect.20 If the sufficient statistic depends on (3, the parameter to be estimated, then 
the conditional distribution of the data given the sufficient statistic depends on (3, and 
not on ai, and so (3 can be estimated by maximum likelihood. The problem with this 
method is that there is no common sufficient statistic for the non-linear panel data 
models such that the conditional distribution of the data given the sufficient statistic 
depends on (3. It follows that the method for constructing a likelihood function that 
does not depend upon the fixed effect is strictly related to the specific non-linear 
functional form that is chosen as a representation of the data.
One case in which the conditional maximum likelihood method can be success­
fully applied is the one outlined above, where e ^s  are independent and logistically 
distributed conditional on ai, xn,X{2 ,...,x it  (Conditional ML Logit). Here, the suffi­
where $ (•)  is the standard normal cumulative distribution.
20A sufficient statistic for ai  is a function of the data such that the distribution of the data given 
the sufficient statistic does not depend on a,.
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cient statistic that “eliminates” the individual specific effect and lets the conditional 
distribution depend on (3 is given by £ i.e. the number of times that yu = 1 
for the individual. Hence, in this application a sufficient statistic is given by the 
number of times that each female participates in the labour market over the observa­
tion period (1993-2000).21 The drawback of “eliminating” the unobserved fixed effect 
in this fashion is that also observed fixed effects do not enter the conditional likeli­
hood function and hence cannot be used as controls. In fact, identification requires 
that right hand side variables vary over time within individuals. Moreover, the ex­
planatory variables must be strictly exogenous, that is, current shocks, eu, must be 
uncorrelated with past, present and future values of the the explanatory variable x : 
E{£it\xii,Xi2 ,...,XiT) = 0, t = 1,2, ...,T. 22
This is a very strong identification assumption. In this work, a violation of strict 
exogeneity may occur if eu is correlated with oru, the obligation ratio (i.e. if current 
mortgage payment is driven by a shock in the female’s participation, such as an unex­
pected lay-off that makes the household obtain a low mortgage, or if current mortgage 
payment is correlated with past participation and the “true” model is one with lagged 
participation but the estimated model ignores the lags). Moreover, assuming also chil­
dren as strictly exogenous means that labour supply decisions do not affect fertility
21 Since cases in which the female does not switch between participation and non-participation (i.e. 
cases in which she participates at every period and cases in which she never participates) do not 
contribute to the likelihood function, 0  is in fact estimated on the basis of females that switch status 
at least once between period 1 and period T.  This means that the only relevant information for the
conditional distribution is given by the cases in which JlJLiyu ^  0 ,T.
22As pointed out by Honore (2002), this assumption is probably unrealistic in most economic context
in which t  represents time and particularly in cases in which yu  is the outcome of an individual’s 
optimization problem so that it is expected that yu  enters as an explanatory variable in the equation 
for yi, t+1 . This is very likely to be the case for females labour force participation decisions.
In a model with lagged participation as explanatory variable, a weaker assumption than strict 
exogeneity would be prederminedness. In other words, given a model like the following:
Vit =  72/tt-l +  00 Xu +  0lXit- l  +  OCi +  Bit
x  would be predetermined if E(eu \xn ,X i 2 , ■■■,xu,yn,yi2 , =  0, i.e. if current shocks were
uncorrelated with past values of y  and with past and current values of x.
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decisions.
As a further point, in these types of models the parameter(s) of interest are identi­
fied only up to scale23 and conditional on the individual specific effect. As pointed out 
by Honore (2002), by knowing the coefficient of the explanatory variable in a fixed ef­
fects logit model it is possible to judge the relative importance of different time-varying 
explanatory variables as well as to calculate the effect of the explanatory variables on 
the probability that the dependent variable takes the value 1 conditional on a partic­
ular value for the individual specific effect. However, it is not possible to calculate the 
average effect of the explanatory variable(s) on the same probability taken across the 
distribution of the individual specific effect in the population.
The random effects model “eliminates” the individual specific effect by assuming a 
parametric distribution for ai conditional on x n , x*2, •••, so that a* can be integrated 
out of the conditional distribution of the data.
For the Probit model, the traditional assumption is that of independence between 
ai and xn,Xi2 , ...,XiT, although Chamberlain (1984) in fact allows for some corre­
lation between them. Using Wooldridge (2002) definition, the “traditional random 
effects probit model” assumes that the distribution of the individual specific effect, 
ai, conditional on the observables is as follows: ai\xn,Xi2 , ...,XiT ~  A (^0,cr2), which 
implies that a* and the vector {xn,Xi2 , ..., Xix) are independent and that ai is normally 
distributed.
As already mentioned, a particular case is that of Chamberlain (1984)’s random 
effects probit model, where the conditional distribution of the individual specific ef­
fect is allowed to depend linearly on the observables (assumption 2 below). More 
formally, Chamberlain’s random effects probit model is obtained under the following 
assumptions:
1. (en,£i2 , ••■,£&) is independent of ai and of (xn,Xi2 , ...,Xix), with a multivariate
23Arellano (2000) recalls that in the logit case the scale normalization is imposed through the 
variance of the logistic distribution (and, in general, by the form of the cumulative distribution of 
ettlxii, ...,XiT,cti,  if known).
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0
normal distribution: (en,£i2 , ~  N(0,E) , S =
0
so that P r(yu = l\xn,Xi2 , ...,XiT,&i) = ( aitg*ai) , where $(•) is the standard
normal distribution;
2. the distribution for the individual specific effect conditional on ( x n , X i 2 ,  . . . , x i t )  
is linear in the xs and normally distributed:
oti = \o + \iX n + \2 Xi2 +...+\TXiT+Vi where V{ ~  N(0,crl) and independent of the xs.
Given assumptions 1. and 2., the distribution for yu conditional on (xn, Xi2 , ..., Xit) 
has a probit form:
A more parsimonious version of Chamberlain’s model allows the individual specific 
effect to depend on the average of xu, t = 1, 2, which we call X{, rather than on 
each single xu, as follows:24
^  = Ao 4- AiX{ + Vi , where v% ~  N(0, u2) and independent of the xs.
The distribution for yu conditional on (xn, Xi2 , x i t )  then takes the following 
form:
Alternatively, a random effects logit model is defined under the assumption that 
the distribution of the time-varying disturbances conditional on the individual specific 
effect, £it\c*i, are independently distributed according to a logistic cdf and that the 
individual specific effect, a*, conditional on (xn,Xi2 , ...,X{t) is normally distributed.
More generally, the joint distribution of the data conditional on observables is 
defined as follows:
P^ "(yil,2/i2 j • • • j ViTl^il ? i25 • • • j C^iT) I P^(2/il,Vi2> • • • 5 ViT\^i \ ? %i2 ? • • • > iT> Oii)d,F (ot{ \x% \ , X{2, • • •, Xif )
Pr {yit =  l \xn,Xi2, . . . , xiT) =  $
PT(yit = l\xii ,x i2,...,x iT) = $
24See Wooldridge (2002), Chapter 15.
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and F(ai\xn,Xi2 , the cdf of the individual specific effect conditional on
observables, has some specified parametric (or semiparametric) form.
This makes the model fully parametric and so, if the explanatory variables are 
strictly exogenous, maximum likelihood or methods of moments estimation can be 
applied.25
In this work both maximum likelihood random-effects logit and maximum likeli­
hood random-effects probit are estimated. The comparison between these two models, 
which rely on a different parametric specification of the individual specific effect, and 
of these two models with the conditional maximum likelihood estimator, should give 
us an indication of the nature of unobserved heterogeneity.
Finally, estimation of a logit model is performed on the pooled sample by ignoring 
the panel structure of the data. In other words, it is assumed that observations are 
i.i.d. and follow a logit distribution and so the fact that observations may be correlated 
over time within individuals due to the presence of unobserved individual heterogeneity 
is not taken into account. Hence, the individual specific effect is assumed to be zero. 
Moreover, the error term, su, is assumed to be uncorrelated over time and with the 
explanatory variables, Xit .
Vit ~  X u/3  -(- £{t  , Sit  ~
Pr(yit =  1 \xit) = A (xit) =
1 + exp (Xitp)
The comparison between the pooled logit and the conditional logit estimators 
should give an indication of the importance of unobserved heterogeneity that can be 
taken into account by using the panel structure of the data.
2.5 .2  E m pirical resu lts
As emphasised in the previous section, one of the main identifying assumptions un­
derlying the estimates obtained here is that the explanatory variables axe strictly ex­
25Arellano and Honore (2000) recall that there exists a practical issue in using maximum likeli­
hood, in terms of the speed and the accuracy in the calculation of a multinomial normal cumulative 
distribution.
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ogenous. Hence, both feedback effects from lagged participation to current and future 
values of the obligation ratio and to current and future fertility decisions (predetermi­
nation) and simultaneous decision about the mortgage and participation are assumed 
away.
The conditional ML logit, by allowing the individual specific effect to depend upon 
the explanatory variables, and by allowing this dependence to hold in an unspecified 
manner, is the least restrictive estimation method adopted here. Since only observa­
tions where at least one transition in participation has occurred over the observation 
period contribute to the likelihood function in a conditional logit, from the sample of 
6255 observations, 4598, corresponding to 1186 individuals, are dropped and 1657 are 
used in the estimation.
Estimation results from a conditional logit are reported in Table 2.6, column 1. 
The variable of interest, the obligation ratio (or), has a positive and significant effect 
on participation for the reference group of 25 year olds. The interaction of or with age 
shows a negative sign, and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the mortgage- 
related constraint has a decreasing impact on participation over the life cycle. It takes 
approximately 9 years (i.e. until the age of 34) to offset the positive effect of the 
obligation ratio on the participation of a female with no children.
As expected, children have a strong impact on female participation. In particular, 
having a youngest child aged either 0-2 or 3-4 has a negative and significant effect on 
participation, as does the presence of any additional child in the household. Whether 
it is the negative effect of children or the positive effect of mortgage commitments that 
dominates depends on the stage of the life cycle in which children enter. In fact, since 
the coefficient on the interaction between the dummy for having the youngest child in 
age 3-4 is not significant, the only relevant interaction between the obligation ratio and 
children is the one involving the dummy for having a youngest child aged 0-2 . So, for 
instance, for a 25 year old female in a household with mortgage constraints and with the 
youngest child between 0 and 2 years of age the net effect on participation is positive, 
whereas for a female in the same situation but with no mortgage constraints the effect 
on participation is negative. However, when the youngest child in the household is
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Table 2.6: Conditional ML Logit 
Dependent variable: female participation in the labour market
Conditional
ML
ML Random  
Effects
ML
Pooled
log(other hh income) -1.547*** -0.943*** -1.237*** -0.557*** -0.576***
(0.391) (0.205) (0.222) (0.084) (0.092)
age 0.333*** 0.229*** 0.218*** 0.094*** 0.085***
(0.113) (0.072) (0.073) (0.032) (0.033)
age squared -0.007 -0.008*** -0.007** -0.004*** -0.003**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
obligation ratio 5.843** 8.023*** 7.705*** 6.856*** 7.172***
(2.505) (2.232) (2.358) (1.199) (1.237)
age*obligation ratio -0.679*** -0.335* -0.388** -0.117 -0.130
(0.221) (0.176) (0.189) (0.093) (0.095)
youngest child 0-2 -1.525*** -1.853*** -2.011*** -0.758*** -0.905***
(0.413) (0.344) (0.362) (0.192) (0.197)
youngest child 3-4 -1.437*** -1.584*** -1.686*** -0.885*** -0.949***
(0.225) (0.197) (0.193) (0.103) (0.105)
child 0-2*obl. ratio -3.802* -3.437** -3.387* -3.419*** -2.996***
(2.090) (1.758) (1.864) (1.050) (1.073)
no. of children -0.677*** -1.025*** -0.957*** -0.511*** -0.495***
(0.173) (0.105) (0.112) (0.038) (0.039)
education O level 0.990*** 0.224*
(0.327) (0.117)
education A level 1.060*** 0.232*
(0.359) (0.134)
higher degree 1.817*** 0.460***
(0.383) (0.139)
intercept 10.977** 11.408*** 5.534** 3.638***
(1.722) (2.263) (0.680) (1.054)
region - V - V
<Ta
No. of observations 1657
3.249
(0.148)
6255
3.497
(0.191)
6255 6255 6255
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level
aged 0-2, the positive effect of mortgage commitments on participation dominates the 
negative one deriving from children only for women 28 or younger. In other words, 
a 30 year old female with the youngest child aged 0-2 has a higher probability of
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participating if she has no mortgage commitments.
Other family income, in logs, has the expected negative sign.
The conditional logit estimation results axe compared with estimates from a ran­
dom effects logit model in Table 2.6, column 2. As opposed to the conditional (fixed 
effects) logit, all the observations axe used (rather than just those in which there is 
a transition). Identification requires the cdf of the idiosyncratic shock conditional on 
the individual specific effect be logistic and the individual specific effect be normally 
distributed as well as independent of the explanatory variables. Moreover, as for the 
conditional logit model, strict exogeneity is assumed throughout. Both a specification 
that includes controls for education and region of residence and one that omits them 
are reported. In both specifications, all coefficients retain the same sign as in the condi­
tional logit estimation.26 However, the magnitude of both the obligation ratio and the 
age/obligation ratio interaction changes substantially, being, respectively, 5.843 and 
-0.679 according to the conditional logit and 8.023 and —0.335 according to the ran­
dom effects logit. This casts doubts on the validity of the assumption underlying the 
random effects model, that the unobserved individual-specific effect be uncorrelated 
with the explanatory variables. In this case, it would mean assuming that preference 
towards work be uncorrelated with the obligation ratio. This appears to be very un­
likely since the mortgage is given according to total family income, including female 
labour income (hence, participation).
The random effects probit model (see Table 2.7) produces substantially the same 
results as the random effects logit, both in terms of significance and in terms of mag­
nitude, once the rescaling factor (of approximately 1.8) is taken into account. This 
result suggests that the estimation results obtained under the random effects model axe 
not driven by the functional form (probit or logit) assumed for the individual specific 
effect. What seems to play the major role is the assumption of independence between
26Most of the coefficients on the time-varying explanatory variables do not change noticeably ac­
cording to whether these “fixed” effects are or are not included. The coefficients that show the biggest 
change are those for the log of other household income, the obligation ratio and the dummy for the 
youngest child being 0-2.
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the individual specific effect and the explanatory variables that underlies the random 
effects model but does not need to hold for the fixed effects estimation.
Table 2.7: Probit model
Dependent variable: female participation in the labour market
ML Random Cham berlain
Effects Random  Effects
log(other hh income) -0.531*** -0.685*** -0.617***
(0.112) (0.121) (0.123)
age 0.123*** 0.118*** 0.142***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.043)
age squared -0.004*** -0.004** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
obligation ratio 4.083*** 4.128*** 2.488**
(1.152) (1.170) (1.246)
age*obligation ratio -0.171* -0.201** -0.260**
(0.093) (0.095) (0.102)
youngest child 0-2 -1.041*** -1.116*** -1.112***
(0.194) (0.201) (0.196)
youngest child 3-4 -0.895*** -0.950*** -0.893***
(0.109) (0.109) (0.106)
child 0-2*obl. ratio -1.862* -1.985 -1.593
(0.982) (1.027) (1.012)
no. of children -0.568*** -0.526*** -0.506***
(0.059) (0.062) (0.057)
education 0  level 0.536***
(0.186)
education A level 0.607***
(0.204)
higher degree 1.013***
(0.217)
intercept 6.095** 6.394*** 5.782***
(0.892) (1.269) (0.930)
region - V -
mean (obligation ratio) 6.620***
(1.324)
mean(oblig.ratio) *mean(age) -0.008
(0.108)
<7a 1.838 1.973 1.854
(0.082) (0.129) (0.094)
No. of observations 6255 6255 6255
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level
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One can test whether or not the data support the assumption of independence 
between the individual specific effect and the explanatory variables by estimating a 
“Chamberlain random effects probit” . This involves defining the individual specific 
effect as a linear function of a vector of explanatory variables (or their average over 
time) and adding these variables into the probit model. The null hypothesis is that 
the coefficients on the variables that define the individual specific effect are jointly zero 
and this is tested against the alternative that there is some correlation taking the form 
of a conditional normal distribution with linear expectation and constant variance. 
In Table 2.7, column 3, we report the results obtained by adopting, as conditioning 
variables for the individual fixed effect, the individual average over time of both the 
obligation ratio and of the interaction between age and the obligation ratio.27 The test 
on the joint significance of these two coefficients makes us reject the null hypothesis 
(x 2(2) = 39.60), so that the usual random effects probit is rejected in favour of a 
random effects probit that allows for some correlation between the individual specific 
effect and the explanatory variables. We take these results as further supporting 
the choice of a fixed effects logit since this estimator remains consistent whether or 
not there is any correlation (of whatever form) between the individual effect and the 
explanatory variables of the model.
Finally, estimation of a logit model is performed on the pooled sample and is 
reported in table 2.6, column 3. Comparison with the conditional logit estimates is 
expected to inform on the gain arising from acknowledging the panel structure of the 
data, i.e. from taking into account that observations may be correlated over time 
within individuals due to the presence of unobserved individual heterogeneity. As for 
the random effects models, education and region of residence are controlled for. The
27This is to say that we run a standard random effects probit on our usual set of explanatory 
variables augmented with the individual mean of the obligation ratio over time and with the product 
of the individual means of age and of the obligation ratio over time. This corresponds to assuming 
that the conditional distribution of the individual specific effect has the following form:
at i \xn,Xi2, . . . ,XiT  ~  AT(Ao +  A i o f i  +  \ 2W i  * a g e i , a l )
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coefficients on all variables of interest retain the sign that was found by conditional 
logit estimation method and most of them are significant. However, the interaction 
between age and the obligation ratio is now insignificant. Moreover, the magnitude of 
the interaction term changes considerably relative to the conditional logit (from —0.679 
to —0.130, when education and region axe controlled for, and —0.117 when they are 
not). This perhaps suggests once again that unobserved preference towards work is 
in fact relevant in modelling participation and that it is correlated with age and with 
mortgage commitments.
2.5 .3  E ndogeneity
The variable of interest in this analysis, the obligation ratio, is likely to be endogenous 
for a number of reasons. One way in which the error term of our model could be 
correlated with the obligation ratio is through reverse causality between the mortgage 
and female labour market participation. So far, we have assumed the mortgage choice 
is given and consequently we have analysed the relationship as running from mortgage 
choice to labour market participation. Due to the existence of the institutional mort­
gage qualification constraint (whether and how much one can borrow is a function of 
household labour earnings, hence also of female labour participation prior to taking out 
the mortgage), it is plausible to think of the causality as running from participation 
to the mortgage. As long as participation is a fixed individual effect over the period 
analysed here, this should not be a problem for our estimation. In fact, conditional 
logit estimation deals with the individual specific effect by allowing it to be correlated 
with the obligation ratio and the other explanatory variables in any unspecified way. 
Our estimation would be biased and inconsistent if, instead, today’s participation in 
the labour market were a function of future mortgage payments in a way that is not 
“fixed”.28 This would be the case, for instance, if participation today were driven by 
changes in the expectation of future mortgage commitments.
28Recall that conditional logit estimation requires that the explanatory variables are strictly exoge­
nous. Focussing on the obligation ratio, this requirement translates into the following condition:
Pr( Pit =  l \or i i , . . . , or i t , . . . , or iT\<Xi)  =  Pr(Pu =  l|orit;o:i)
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Another potential source of endogeneity lies in simultaneous decisions about the 
mortgage and labour market participation. Even after controlling for the individual 
specific effect, it could be the case that the idiosyncratic shock (eu in equation (2.10)) is 
correlated with the obligation ratio if, for instance, a common shock hit the obligation 
ratio and participation in the labour market simultaneously.
In order to test for endogeneity, we use house price data as an excluded variable 
in a control function framework. House prices are presumably correlated with the 
obligation ratio but uncorrelated with labour market participation, which makes them 
a suitable instrument. We use two different data sets for house prices, which we will 
briefly outline hereafter. A discussion of the method and results of the test will follow.
The data
We first use data on house prices that contains quarterly information on residential 
property transactions by house type (flat, detached, semi-detached, terraced) at the 
Postal Sector level between 1995 and 2000.29 In order to match it with the BHPS, 
we have aggregated it at the Local Authority District level,30 which is the minimum 
geographical area recorded for each individual. Then, we have taken annual average 
prices (ratio between annual volume of transactions and annual number of transac­
tions), RPI adjusted, by house type and Local Authority District (LAD). Therefore, 
the vector of the mortgage variable, the obligation ratio for the years 1995-2000, is in­
strumented with a vector of house prices for the corresponding years, appropriate for 
the Local Authority District and the house type of the household. The BHPS sample 
includes years 1993 and 1994 but house prices are collected only from 1995 onwards. 
1500 observations (of the 6255) are missing due to this. A further 555 observations are
29Residential property transaction data were built by Experian, and made available through MIMAS,
using information supplied by HM Land Registry.
30Conversion has been done at the MIMAS webpage (http://convert.mimas.ac.uk), within the Up­
dated Area Master Files project (based on the ONS All-Fields Postcode Directory (AFPD)). In some 
cases, the Local Authority Districts as defined in the BHPS did not match with the Census definition 
as of 1998, particularly for Scotland and Wales. As a consequence, the match is not always 1:1. If 
more Census districts form a BHPS district, the price index of the latter is the result of a weighted 
average of the prices of the contributing districts, each of which with equal weights.
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dropped due to missing house prices mostly in Scottish LADs.31
Since it might be argued that current house prices are not suitable instruments 
for a mortgage that could have been taken out several years before, we also collect 
information on house prices at the time the mortgage was taken out (RPI adjusted). 
Unfortunately, we are not aware of any data set that collects house prices at Local 
Authority District level as far back in time as mortgages were taken out by households 
in our sample (the earliest dates back to 1968 although 95 percent of households took 
out the mortgage in 1980 or after). We then use house prices at regional level.32 Unlike 
the data at LAD level, house prices are now the average dwelling price for all dwellings. 
We had to sacrifice geographic and house type detail in order to find earlier data. Since 
the mortgage is taken out at one point in time, in order to capture the variability over 
time within individuals we interact the house price measure with current (annual) 
mortgage interest rates.33 That is, the vector of obligation ratio between 1993 and 
2000 is instrumented with a vector of the interactions between the average house price 
in the region of residence at the time the mortgage was taken out and mortgage interest 
rates between 1993 and 2000.34
31 See Appendix (section 2.7.1) for a detailed list of LADs and corresponding number of missing 
observations.
32The geographic units are “Standard Statistical Regions”, namely: North, North-West, Yorkshire
and the Humberside, East Midlands, West Midlands, East Anglia, London, South-East, South-West,
Wales, and Scotland. The source of the data is the Survey of Mortgage Lenders made available through
the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister at www.odpm.gov.uk.
33This is justifiable on the basis that most mortgages in the UK have variable intrest rates.
34We should also note that using prices at LAD level carried the cost of loosing observations for the
years 1993-1994, when prices were not available. This is not the case when using prices at regional
level for the time the mortgage was taken out, although some observations are still missing due to not
observing either the year the mortgage was taken out or the region of residence.
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The test
The test of endogeneity for the mortgage variable (the obligation ratio) in our regression 
is performed within a control function approach. We write our binary model as follows:
Pu = l{xit(3o + cti + eit > 0} (2.11)
= l{h(zut,yit) + oii + eit > 0}
where oti is the individual specific effect and Bu is the idiosyncratic shock; x# = 
( z n t , y i t ) ,  Y i t  is the endogenous variable (the obligation ratio), and z m  is a vector of 
all the other (exogenous) explanatory variables.35 Y i t  is in turn, determined by the 
exogenous variables zm  and an “excluded instrument”, z 2u, given by house prices (or 
by the interaction between house prices and interest rates), as follows:
Yit =  z i t TT +  8i +  u i t  (2.12)
and
z*t =  (zi*t,z2«), (2.13)
6{  and u u  are, respectively, the individual specific effect and the idionsyncratic error 
term
As pointed out in Blundell and Powell (2001), the control function approach uses 
estimates of the reduced form error terms u u  as “control variables” for the endogeneity 
of the regressor Y i t  in the original equation (2.11). Testing the significance of these 
“control variables” is therefore a test of endogeneity of the regressor Yit •
The control function assumption is that
eit -L y*i|uit,£*,z<t (2.14)
In order to integrate out, we therefore need to know the form of the distribution of
Bit conditional on u u .  If the joint distribution of b u  and u u  were normal, as in Smith
and Blundell (1986), one could write Bu conditional on as linear: bu = 11^ 7 + 77**. In
our context, where estimation is performed by conditional logit, we cannot assume joint
35The function h is left generic to allow for interactions between our exogenous and endogenous 
variables (in particular, age and the obligation ratio).
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normality of the two error terms and linearity of their conditional distribution. Instead, 
we say that eu is some function of uu plus an error term (r/u), and we approximate 
this with a second-order Taylor series expansion.
It follows that the conditional expectation of the binary variable Pit given the 
regressors x^, the fixed effect oci and the reduced form error terms u;t , now takes the 
form
E(Pit \xit, oii, u it) ~  P r(xitfo + ai + 7 iUit + 72u?t + rjit > 0) (2.15)
= A(xit(30 + cxi + lin n  + 7*2*4)
and the test of endogeneity is a test of joint significance of the coefficients 71 and 72. 
(2.15) is estimated by a two-stage procedure that allows us to replace and uft with 
their estimated counterparts uu and ujt obtained from the first stage estimation of 
(2 .12).
In practice, the reduced form equation (2.12) is estimated by a within-groups re­
gression of the obligation ratio on the set of exogenous variables (log of other income, 
quadratic in age, dummies for the youngest child aged 0-2 or 3-4, number of children) 
and the “excluded instrument”, i.e. the log of the current house prices at LAD level 
or the log of the interaction between the average house price in the local region at the 
time the mortgage was taken out and current mortgage interest rates. The results are 
reported in the top panel of Table 2.8; column 1 and column 2 report, respectively, 
the outcomes from using the two different sets of instruments. The t-ratio for our 
instruments are, respectively, 15.93 for the log of house price at LAD level and 16.17 
for the log of the interaction of house prices at regional level and mortgage interest 
rates. A quadratic form of the estimated residuals from the first stage estimation is 
included in the conditional logit regression as indicated in equation (2.15). A x2(2) 
test of their joint significance takes the values of 1.6063 and 0.0084, respectively for the 
case where regional or LAD prices are used. Since they do not appear to be significant, 
we conclude that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity in our model.
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Table 2.8: Conditional ML Logit - Endogeneity: control function technique 
Dependent variable: female participation in the labour market
control variable 1 control variable 2
First stage: Within-groups regression
log (other hh income) -0.1534*** -0.1587***
(0.0043) (0.0053)
age 0.0135*** 0.0044***
(0.0011) (0.0015)
age squared -0.0002*** -2.06e-04***
(4.50e-05) (6.13e-05)
youngest child 0-2 0.0042 0.0049
(0.0029) (0.0038)
youngest child 3-4 -0.0006 2.19e-04
(0.0028) (0.0035)
child -0.0021 -0.0041
(0.0021) (0.0028)
control variable 0.1412*** 0.0854***
(0.0087) (0.0054)
intercept -0.6078*** 0.4055***
(0.1174) (0.0645)
No. of observations 5775 4125
Second stage: test of residuals
lst-step est. residuals 7.511 0.660
(6.821) (8.816)
(lst-step est. residuals)2 -18.784 -1.954
(26.301) (40.140)
X2(2) 1.6063 0.0084
No. of observations 1524 867
Notes:
C on tro l variab le 1: log(REG house prices at t=mortgage taken out*current interest rates)
C on tro l variab le 2: log(LAD house prices, 1995-2000) (original panel: 1993-2000)
Bootstrapped St. Err. (2nd stage) in parentheses (500 bootstrap samples of size n)
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level
2.5 .4  S en sitiv ity  analysis
As mentioned in section 2.4.2, sensitivity analysis is performed with regard to the defi­
nition of participation. Results are reported in table 2.9 and bring the same conclusions
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as the definition of participation adopted for the main analysis.
Table 2.9: Conditional ML Logit - Sensitivity analysis: definition of participation 
__________Dependent variable: female participation in the labour market__________
Definition 1 Definition 2
(no. weeks worked) > 0
employment status: 
in employment
log(other hh income) -1.871*** -1.129***
(0.459) (0.347)
age 0.345*** 0.347***
(0.128) (0.097)
age squared -0.006 -0.006*
(0.005) (0.004)
obligation ratio 5.888** 5.561***
(3.036) (2.091)
age*obligation ratio -0.611** -0.571***
(0.267) (0.188)
youngest child 0-2 -1.344*** -1.756***
(0.475) (0.339)
youngest child 3-4 -1.871*** -1.112***
(0.260) (0.198)
child 0-2*obl. ratio -3.630 -3.013*
(2.528) (1.627)
no. of children -1.044*** -0.505***
(0.200) (0.154)
No. of observations 1388 2237
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 also document the pattern of female labour market behaviour 
when hours of work are used rather than participation. Although a declining pattern 
in hours worked is observed in the age range 25-35 for both outright owners and owners 
with a mortgage (or for owners with low mortgage and owners with high mortgage), 
it is still true that a more pronounced dip is observed for the group of outright owners 
(alternatively, for those with low mortgage).
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Figure 2.6: Female hours of work by tenure
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Figure 2.7: Female hours of work by mortgage repayments
Further sensitivity checks are performed by controlling for wealth. One concern 
regards real assets, and in particular whether it is necessary to control for the value of 
the house when analysing labour supply in relation to mortgages. In other words, we 
need to control for the possibility that some households have experienced an increase in
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their house value that has relaxed their liquidity constraint. Including a self-reported 
measure of the value of the house (in logs), however, does not appear to change the 
results of our analysis.36 As reported in table 2.10, the conditional logit estimates are 
almost identical to those of the basic model of table 2.6 (column 1) and the house value 
is not statistically significant.
Table 2.10: Conditional ML Logit - Sensitivity analysis: house value
Dependent variable: 
female participation in the labour market
log(other hh income) -1.501***
(0.396)
log(house value) 0.260
(0.388)
age 0.342***
(0.113)
age squared -0.006
(0.004)
obligation ratio 5.962**
(2.507)
age*obligation ratio -0.661***
(0.222)
youngest child 0-2 -1.520***
(0.413)
youngest child 3-4 -1.442***
(0.226)
child 0-2*obl. ratio -3.879*
(2.091)
no. of children -0.662***
(0.174)
No. of observations 1657
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level
Another concern relates to financial assets, in that it is necessary to rule out the
possibility that those who appear to be more subject to liquidity constraints (in the
36The same conclusion applies when including the ratio between the value of the house and total 
household income (excluding female’s labour income). Results are not reported for brevity.
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form of a higher obligation ratio), do not hold financial assets that could be used 
as collateral instead of human capital. If that were the case, claiming that having 
a mortgage makes the household work more, would not be correct as the liquidity 
constraint would not in fact be binding.
The BHPS collects data on household financial wealth every five years, namely in 
1995 and 2000. Savings, investments and debt axe reported separately by individuals, 
who also report whether they hold their assets jointly with someone else, so that a 
measure of net financial wealth at the tax-unit level can be constructed. Missing infor­
mation or information for those who only provide bands for their assets are imputed 
according to the age of the head of the benefit unit, whether either of the adults in the 
benefit unit have completed any higher education and whether the head of the benefit 
unit is self-employed. The single components of net wealth axe imputed separately.37
As pointed out in Banks, Smith and Wakefield (2002), wealth information across 
the 1995 and 2000 waves is not fully comparable, due to the different definition of 
debt, which in 1995 does not include student loans and overdrafts, whereas it does in 
2000. We then rely on the two single cross-sections of the data for our analysis. With 
only this data at hand it is not possible to perform a conditional logit estimation of 
our model with controls for wealth, which would allow comparability with the baseline 
model. We therefore investigate the issue at a descriptive level. Table 10 reports the net 
financial wealth in 1995 and in 2000 for increasing levels of the obligation ratio within 
each chosen age group. If increasing levels of the obligation ratio were to mean tighter 
liquidity constraints, we would want those households with higher levels of obligation 
ratio to hold lower net financial wealth. This is in fact what generally emerges in table 
2.11, being violated only for the year 2000 for the top level of obligation ratio (note, 
however, that the difference between the third and the fourth column is small and that 
standard deviations axe very large).
A final sensitivity check is performed with respect to the timing of taking out 
the mortgage. So far, all the observations of the selected sample have been used,
37The wealth data used in this chapter has been derived and imputed by Banks, Smith and Wakefield 
(2002). For details, please refer to their paper.
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Table 2.11: Net financial wealth by age and level of obligation ratio
Year 1995
age or < 0.104 0.104 < o r <  0.158 0.158 < o r <  0.219 or > 0.219
25-30 18,840 4,635 1,452 2,563
(37,890) (11,695) (9,208) (10,148)
31 49 76 77
30-35 20,445 14,564 5,234 3,852
(50,673) (47,771) (17,205) (13,653)
47 48 54 54
35-40 16,999 11,381 13,797 8,224
(33,245) (30,278) (32,122) (17,226)
56 49 36 38
40-45 33,543 11,993 10,156 9,991
(151,211) (25,522) (30,770) (44,620)
46 46 26 21
All 22,444 10,602 6,009 4,883
(83,860) (31,519) (21,228) (19,238)
Year 2000
180 192 192 190
age or < 0.104 0.104 < o r <  0.158 0.158 < o r <  0.219 or > 0.219
25-30 13,563 1,520 1,376 2,285
(34,591) (13,808) (12,719) (12,836)
27 39 58 80
30-35 18,346 9,895 5,226 7,360
(35,157) (24,040) (21,800) (43,853)
31 53 66 68
35-40 9,721 11,900 8,886 9,464
(18,909) (50,624) (59,756) (36,987)
61 52 48 48
40-45 24,346 18,181 2,976 10,169
(60,353) (30,431) (15,543) (35,010)
68 46 34 31
All 17,024 10,731 4,623 6,400
(42,815) (33,778) (32,573) (32,941)
187 190 190 227
Notes: Net financial wealth is defined as (savings+investments-debt and does not include housing. Savings, 
investments and wealth have been imputed separately when missing.
Cells contain, top to bottom, the mean, the standard deviation (in brackets), and group size of net financial 
wealth at individual level.
regardless of when the mortgage was taken out. The interaction term between the 
obligation ratio and age of course allows for the mortgage-related constraint to vary
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over time. However, it is being investigated whether the qualitative results hold for 
households that have taken out a mortgage recently. In particular, also in relation 
to the use of house prices between 1995 and 2000 in order to test for endogeneity 
(see previous section), we perform our estimation on the sub-sample that took out the 
mortgage between 1995 and 2000 and for whom the house price is not missing, having 
a final sample of 1318 observations. Conditional logit estimation results are reported 
in table 2.12. Because of the small number of observations where a change in outcome 
is observed, the sample used in the estimation is made of 192 observations, which 
justifies obtaining very few significant coefficients. The qualitative results, however, 
axe unchanged and both the obligation ratio (for 25 year old) and the interaction 
between the obligation ratio and having the youngest child between 0 and 2 remain 
significant and stronger in magnitude. Consistently with the nature of the sub-sample 
of those who have taken mortgages out recently, it would take longer to offset the 
positive effect of mortgage on the participation of a female with no children (16 years) 
relative to the baseline case (9 years).
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter contains an analysis of whether female labour supply is affected by mort­
gage commitments. It employs panel data techniques and uses the British Household 
Panel Study (waves 3-10). The sample used includes any woman aged 25-45, in a 
couple, and whose husband works full-time; it excludes self-employed individuals and 
renters. It is found that mortgage commitments, as captured by the ratio between 
monthly mortgage payment and household income excluding female’s earned income, 
have a positive effect on female participation. However, the negative effect on female 
participation of having a young child is very strong and the combined effect of children 
and mortgage commitments on participation can stay negative.
As opposed to previous studies that have used cross-sectional data, the key advan­
tage of the panel structure of this dataset is that it allows estimation of a static model 
that controls for unobserved heterogeneity. This is done by means of conditional logit
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Table 2.12: Conditional ML Logit - Sensitivity analysis: mortgage 1995-200Q(*)
Dependent variable: 
female participation in the labour market
log(other hh income) -0.824
(1.028)
age 0.667
(0.429)
age squared -0.020
(0.016)
obligation ratio 16.564*
(9.937)
age*obligation ratio -1.049
(0.898)
youngest child 0-2 0.734
(1.418)
youngest child 3-4 -0.574
(0.658)
child 0-2*obl. ratio -10.363*
(6.274)
no. of children -1.143
(0.848)
No. of observations 192
Notes: The sample is restricted to those who took out the mortgage between 1995 and 2000
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level
and random effects logit estimation. The conditional logit estimation method takes 
care of the individual specific component of the error term by allowing it to be cor­
related in any unspecified manner with the explanatory variables. Hence, preference 
towards work is allowed to be correlated with mortgage decisions.
Endogeneity of the mortgage variable is a potential issue; it could emerge due, for 
example, to correlation between mortgage decisions and transitory shocks or to reverse 
causality (from participation to the mortgage). A test of endogeneity is performed in 
a control function framework using house prices as control variables. We use, respec­
tively, contemporaneous house prices by house type at Local Authority District level, 
and the interaction between house prices at regional level at the time the mortgage was 
taken out and current mortgage interest rates. The null hypothesis of no endogeneity
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cannot be rejected.
Sensitivity checks axe performed with respect to real and to financial assets. The 
value of the house, when controlled for, does not appear to be significant and does not 
change the results of the analysis. A first look at financial assets, which axe measured 
in 1995 and in 2000, seems to rule out the possibility that many people with higher 
mortgage commitments could hold financial assets to use as collateral.
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2.7 A ppendix to  chapter 2
2.7.1 H ouse price d ata  at L A D  level: m issings
Missing house prices at LAD level occur for the years 1993-1994 and mostly for Scottish 
LADs in subsequent years. In particular, the distribution of missing house prices for 
the years 1995-2000 is as follows:
Local Authority District
no. of observations in our sample 
for LADs where house prices 
are missing
E Yorkshire; Holderness 3
Thamesdown 67
Blaenau Gwent; Islywn 56
Edinburgh City 106
West Lothian 10
Clackmannan; Stirling 1
Falkirk 21
Annadale; Nithsdale; Stewarty; Wigtown 5
Dunfermline 6
Kirkcaldy; NE Fife 7
Aberdeen City 20
Banff & Buchan; Moray 6
Gordon; Kincardine & Deeside 7
Bearsden ; Clydebank; Strathkelvin 63
Cumbernauld &; Kilsyth; Monklands 11
Clydesdale; Cumnock Doon ; Kyle Carrick 31
Cunninghame 46
Eastwood; Kilmarnock & Loudon 19
Glasgow City 7
Renfrew 2
Angus; Perth &; Kinross 18
Dundee City 43
Chapter 3
Explaining Life-Cycle Profiles of 
Hom e-Ownership and Labour 
Supply
3.1 Introduction
For many households, housing wealth comprises a large fraction of total household 
wealth. For example, in the UK in 2000, housing wealth made up 80% of the non­
pension wealth of households in the British Household Panel Survey. However, owning 
a home is often associated with large mortgage debt. By contrast, debt among non­
home owners is small. Such differences in debt are likely to affect liquid savings, labour 
supply and non-durable consumption. The main aim of this chapter is to explore these 
interactions, and in particular to focus on how labour supply, home ownership and 
debt interact.
The importance of labour supply in this context has been a particularly neglected 
area of research. Labour supply is likely to matter for a number of reasons: banks 
and other mortgage lenders have explicit policies that relate debt to current household 
earnings, and so greater labour supply increases the availability of debt. Further, the 
ability to vary labour supply once a household has a mortgage gives extra protection
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against interest rate uncertainty. At an empirical level, chapter 2 has studied some 
of these relationships, showing that women in households with greater mortgage com­
mitments are more likely to participate in the labour force. Clearly labour supply, 
debt and home-ownership are jointly determined and we cannot treat the extent of 
the mortgage as exogenous. For example, individuals may have taken out greater debt 
knowing they were going to be working or they might have had to return to work 
because their debt payments were unexpectedly large. Our motivation in the current 
chapter is to try to understand these effects by building a structural life-cycle model of 
labour supply and housing choices. A further motivation is to understand the timing 
of house purchases over the life-cycle. This will again be affected by labour supply 
choices.
In the structural model, liquidity constraints lead households who have not yet 
purchased a house to work more to increase savings and to bring forward the date 
at which they can afford to buy a house. Further, working more can help relax any 
income related constraint on mortgage borrowing. We calibrate our model to match 
the level of home ownership in the data and then simulate the model to address a 
number of questions. First, we show that the labour supply of home owners is greater 
than that of non-owners. Second, we show that changes to the financial environment 
change home-ownership and labour supply patterns: reducing downpayment require­
ments leads to households buying their homes earlier in the life-cycle and also to lower 
labour supply; increasing the multiple of household income that households can borrow 
against leads to earlier home ownership, with an effect on labour supply at the time 
of house purchase.
We also analyse the welfare cost of wage uncertainty, given the importance of the 
endogenous borrowing constraint in determining home-ownership and labour supply 
choices. We first compute compensating variations in assets between scenarios with 
different wage variance and then translate them into changes in consumption, labour 
supply and home-ownership overall in the life-cycle.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the main lit­
erature that is related to our contribution. Section 3.3 reports life-cycle patterns of
3 Explaining Life-Cycle Profiles of Home-Ownership and Labour Supply 69
home ownership and labour supply in the data. Section 3.4 presents the structural 
model. Section 3.5 discusses the calibration strategy and shows the calibrated solu­
tion. Section 3.6 addresses the question of how labour supply and home ownership 
interact. Section 3.7 addresses the question of how changes to the capital market af­
fect home ownership and labour supply and section 3.8 provides a welfare analysis of 
wage variance. Section 3.9 concludes.
3.2 R elated  literature
This chapter analyses life-cycle decisions concerning consumption and savings, labour 
supply and homeownership when households are subject to borrowing constraints and 
face transaction costs of trading the durable good (housing). It is related to several 
recent papers that have incorporated durable consumption into life-cycle models. One 
strand of research has analysed households decisions over portfolio allocations and/or 
savings levels when a durable good is added to a standard life cycle setup. Lustig and 
Nieuwerburgh (2002) study (non-durable) consumption growth and aggregate stock re­
turns in a general equilibrium economy in which housing provides both utility services 
and collateral services, and in which its price is determined endogenously. Moving to 
a life-cycle framework with exogenous house prices, Flavin and Yamashita (2002) gen­
eralise the Grossman and Laroque (1990) model of optimal consumption and portfolio 
allocation when utility derives from a durable good the stock of which can be adjusted 
only at cost, by allowing for both a non-durable and a durable good as arguments of 
the utility function. They show the implications of this addition for the optimal port­
folio composition over the life-cycle. In a similar set-up, Flavin and Nagakawa (2004) 
study the implications of the presence of housing for the life-cycle profile of non-durable 
consumption. Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002) study the life-cycle profiles of 
the durable and non-durable goods, as well as of asset allocation, when households can 
use the durable good as collateral, but contrary to Lustig and Nieuwerburgh (2002) 
the house price is exogenous.
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Our contribution to this literature consists is twofold. First, we want to model 
household behaviour under standard explicit institutional borrowing constraints asso­
ciated to the purchase of a house. Therefore, we consider an earnings-related borrowing 
constraint in addition to the downpayment constraint embedded in the previous mod­
els. Second, and in relation to the first point, we want to allow households choose 
labour supply, as well as non-durable consumption and savings, and home-ownership 
status. In the same way that durable consumption has been found to generate spill-over 
effects on non-durable consumption and asset allocation, one also would expect labour 
supply to be affected, particularly given the explicit earnings-related constraint. In this 
respect, there is empirical evidence, discussed in chapter 2, of a correlation between 
labour supply behaviour and mortgage commitments but, as far as we know, there is 
no attempt to model these features in a structural model of life-cycle behaviour.
Since the labour supply component is a key feature of our analysis, this chapter 
also relates to the literature on life-cycle choices of consumption, labour supply and 
savings, where durable consumption is not modelled explicitly. Low (2005) finds that 
flexibility in hours worked changes life-cycle profiles of assets, in that borrowing when 
young is greater and saving when middle-aged is greater than when labour supply is 
fixed. Moreover, he also finds that uncertainty causes individuals to work longer hours 
and to consume less when young. We will be able to analyse labour supply behaviour 
when the introduction of a durable good brings with it an explicit borrowing constraint 
that is a function of hours worked, as well as an additional dimension of uncertainty.
3.3 Observed P atterns o f H om e Ownership
The aim of this section is to highlight the main facts about home ownership that we 
want to understand using our model. We begin by showing how home ownership rates 
vary over the life-cycle and across education groups, and then consider at what age 
individuals are likely to transit from renting to home ownership.
In order to plot proportions of home owners at different ages, we use Family Expen­
diture Survey (FES) data on individuals born between 1910 and 1959, and construct
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a pseudo-panel data set based on 5-year date of birth intervals. Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 
3.3 split the cohorts between high and low education groups (where high education 
means at least some college education) and report how home ownership has varied 
with age within each cohort and education group. We report the proportion owning 
their home and the proportion either owning or in government housing. There appear 
to be substantial increases in home-ownership by age, particularly for the low educated. 
However, part of this increase is a year effect caused by the sale to tenants of some 
government owned housing that took place in the 1980s. Clear evidence of the effect 
this policy can be found in Figure 3.2, where we plot, for the low education group, 
home ownership over time for all the cohorts born in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. All 
the cohorts experienced a parallel increase in the proportion of home owners during 
the 1980s, suggesting that this increase was not just a life-cycle effect. The same graph 
for the high education group shows instead an almost flat profile, indicating that this 
group was not affected by the so-called “right-to-buy” phenomenon of the 1980s. A 
further check of the year effect can be found in Figure 3.1, where we include the total 
proportion either owning or in government housing. For the low educated, this com­
bined proportion varies little by age or by cohort.1 For the high educated (Figure 3.3) 
there remains some age effect: the proportion owning their homes (or owning and rent 
- not shown) increases with age up to about age 35. There is relatively little decline in 
home-ownership as households age, but this may mask transitions to houses of smaller 
size.
In our model we will want to capture not only the likelihood of homeownership 
at different ages, but also the fact that home ownership is a very persistent state. 
This persistence is highlighted in Figure 3.4 where we report estimated probabilities 
of moving from renting to owning, that are predicted from the regression reported in 
Table 3.1.2 The logit regression is based on BHPS data for 1991-2002 and models 
the likelihood of transition to owning in period t for those renting in period t — 1.
xThe cohorts plotted in Figures 3.1 and 3.3 are, left to right, 1950-54, 1940-44, 1930-34, 1920-24, 
1910-14
2These predictions are for an individual living in a couple, with no children and in a conurbation 
outside the South-East of England, in the year 2002.
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Figure 3.1: Low education: Home ownership rates by cohort
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Figure 3.2: Low education: Home ownership rates by year
Transitions from renting to owning peak in the late twenties and the high education 
group shows a higher transition rate, which is a feature consistent with their higher 
home ownership rate.
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Figure 3.4: Transition probabilities over the life-cycle
We want to use this evidence on home ownership over the life-cycle to calibrate 
the model that we will use to analyse the interaction between housing and labour
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Table 3.1: Logit Regressions for Becoming a Home Owner
High Education Low Education
Age 0.22 (1.96) 0.059 (3.08)
Age2 -0.0075 (-1.94) -0.0019 (-3.13)
Age3 1.06 * 10~4 (1.85) 2.52 * 10~5 (3.03)
Age4 -5.47 * 10- 7 (-1.77) 1.18* 1 0 '7 (-2 .88)
Couple 0.069 (4.67) 0.023 (5.76)
Children 0.052 (0.31) 0.0093 (0.24)
No. of Children -0.19 (-2.15) -0.056 (-2.71)
Children * Age -0.0033 (-0.75) 5.57 * 10”4 (-0.53)
No. of Children * Age 0.0052 (2.18) 0.0012 (2.03)
Conurbation -0.024 (-1.59) -0.011 (-2.79)
London/SE -3.8* 10' 4 (-0.03) 0.011 (2.56)
Number of observations 2492 9963
Mean Probability: Rent to Own 0.16 0.050
Pseudo R2 0.0695 0.0746
L R - x 2 152.33 296.17
Notes: Marginal effects (z-statistic of underlying coefficient). Dependent variable =  1 if the household moves 
from renting to home-ownership, 0 otherwise. The sample is households renting in t-1. Year dummies are also 
included in the regression.
The measure of Pseudo R 2 is 1 — L i / L q.
supply choices. The evidence reported in chapter 2 suggests that women in households 
which own their homes are more likely to participate, and that this effect is especially 
strong amongst those with greater mortgage debt. Participation is likely to be greater 
for those with greater debt firstly because of a wealth effect and secondly because 
mortgage repayments can be seen as committed expenditure. Of course, participation 
and debt are joint decisions and we cannot treat the extent of debt as exogenous. 
This is the reason we resort to calibration of a structural model of housing and labour
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supply: it enables us to model explicitly the labour supply decision when households 
axe making a decision about housing tenure.
3.4 M odel o f housing and labour supply
A household lives T  periods. In every period t < T, the household maximises utility 
by choosing consumption Ct G R+, housing ht  G {0,1} and the fraction of household 
time devoted to leisure3 It G [0,1]. The household value function in period t is given 
by
Vt (At ,ht- i ,p t ,wt ,t) = max u(ct , htJt) + pEVt+\ (At+i, ht ,pt+i,wt+i , t  + 1) (3.1) 
{ct,ht,h}
subject to
A t+ i  =  <
(1 + f’t+i) [At + Ptht—i (1 — F) (I{6 — 1} 4 - I{ht — 0,8 — 0}) +  wt (L — It) — c
if ht-1 = 1
(1 + rt+1) [At -  ptht (1 +  F) + wt (L -  lt) -  ct] , if ht- \  = 0
(3.2)
where At is the start of period asset stock and rt+i is the interest rate on the liquid 
asset; 5 is an indicator of having to sell the house, which occurs with an exogenous 
probability; pt is the price of housing which is realised at the start of period t\ F  is 
the cost of selling or buying a house, which is proportional to the price; the household 
has a time endowment L which is allocated to leisure It or work at wage Wt per unit 
of time.
For households which axe home-owners at the start of period t, liquid resources 
in a particular period are given by liquid assets at the start of the period plus the 
value of the house if the household has been forced to sell (8 = 1) or the household 
chose to sell (8 = 0, ht = 0), plus earnings from working. For households which axe not 
home-owners at the start of period t, liquid resources in a particular period is given by
3Our current model assumes a single household labor supply choice with one wage. This is clearly 
restrictive and was necessitated by computational feasibility.
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liquid assets at the start of the period minus the price of a house plus the proportional 
cost of buying if the household chooses to buy in period t , plus earnings from working.
We only allow for collateralised debt, i.e. households are only able to have negative 
financial assets when they are home owners, so that when they do not own a house 
(ht = 0) they are subject to the constraint
A t > 0 (3.3)
Home owners can borrow, and when they do so they are subject both to a terminal 
asset condition that translates into an implicit borrowing constraint, and to two explicit 
borrowing constraints. In particular, we impose the terminal condition A t + \ = 0. The 
specification of marginal utility becoming infinite at 0 consumption means this terminal 
condition prevents households borrowing more than they can repay with certainty. In 
addition to this implicit borrowing constraint, we allow for two explicit constraints. 
The first is a constraint on the fraction of the value of a house that a household is able 
to borrow at the time of purchase or when remortgaging. This implies a constraint on 
end of period assets, A t, in the period that the new mortgage is agreed, of:
At > -XhPtht (3.4)
The value (1 — Ah) can be thought of as a downpayment requirement.
The second constraint is on the the debt to income ratio. Individuals in period t 
are not able to borrow more than a multiple Xy of their earnings in that period. This 
constraint is imposed whether or not house status changes in period t.
A t  >  - X y W t  (L  -  It) (3.5)
These constraints are on the stock of debt rather than only on new borrowing and 
are taken to be exogenous. There is no mortgage repayment scheme in our model, 
and households only have to repay mortgage interest when they sell their house. This 
means that any repayment that takes place before selling the house is the result of an 
optimal saving decision and not of an exogenous constraint on the flow of debt. The 
main reason why we do not include a mortgage repayment scheme is computational
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tractability, as this would introduce additional states to our model. On the other hand, 
a mortgage repayment scheme would be a potential source of constrained bahaviour 
in labour supply, and therefore relevant to our model. We instead choose to impose 
the income-related borrowing constraint at every period in which a household is a 
home owner as an alternative, less computationally costly, way of relating household 
labour supply to home ownership in periods after the time of house purchase. The 
decision to create this link is partly supported by the empirical evidence found in 
chapter 2 , where female labour market participation appears to be related to the 
existence of an income-related constraint from the mortgage, at least for part of the 
life-cycle. Moreover, Fortin (1995) considered the assumption that households were 
subject to income-related constraints even beyond the date of house purchase, to be 
an appropriate one in contexts in which households could remortgage frequently.
In order to complete the picture of the model that we have adopted, we will now 
describe the form of within-period utility and the type of stochastic processes assumed 
for our analysis.
U tility  function
The within period utility function has a Cobb-Douglas form between consumption and 
leisure and this is nested within a CRRA utility function. This is augmented by a term 
reflecting the value of home-ownership:
u(ct ,h t ,lt) = e *— :----  • (3.6)1 - 7
The parameter 0 is a housing preference parameter which determines the utility 
that households obtain from owning a house versus renting it, and is calibrated in 
our model. Given a choice of 7 > 1, if 6 < 0 home owners obtain additional utility, 
measured by eeht, relative to renters. Moreover, the marginal utility of consumption 
(and of leisure) is lower when owning than when not owning.
We can now summarise the main properties of housing in our model. Housing 
is considered as a good that gives additional utility (under appropriate parameter 
specification) to home owners relative to renters. Moreover, housing serves as collateral,
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i.e. it allows borrowing, although subject to borrowing constraints related to its price 
and to household income. As an asset, housing has higher expected return and variance 
than financial assets. However, it can only be bought as a discrete unit (a house) and 
there are transaction costs of buying and selling housing, as well as an exogenous
Stochastic processes
Households face three dimensions of uncertainty: over wages, over house prices and 
over the interest rate.
The house price follows an AR(1) process:
where dt is the deterministic trend. We assume that house price risk is aggregate. 
The interest rate on liquid assets or debt is also an aggregate rate and follows an i.i.d 
process:
where at is the deterministic growth in wages and has a hump shape over the life-cycle 
(see section 3.5.1).
We have made several simplifying assumptions in setting up our model and yet we 
have to deal with a problem that is computationally burdensome, involving 5 states, 3 
of which axe continuous variables, and 3 dimensions of uncertainty. We provide details 
of the computational method in Appendix 3.10.1.
probability of having to sell the house that one owns (to move to another area, for 
example).
(3.7)
rt = r + vt vt ~  N  (0, al) (3.8)
The wage process is idiosyncratic and follows a random walk:
In wt =  at + vt where Vt = vt- \+  it (3.9)
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3.5 Calibration
We begin this section by specifying exogenous parameters. We then report the results 
of the calibration and the simulated life-cycle profiles. We end the section by showing 
some implications of our baseline parameterisation.
Parameter values axe summarised in table 3.2. For the inputs into the calibrated 
model, we need to use data on wages, the house price process and the interest rate 
on the liquid asset. For the calibration, we need life-cycle profiles of home-ownership 
status. To assess the calibration, we use data on labour supply choices over the life­
cycle and labour supply conditional on being in debt, as well as transition probabilities 
between home-ownership states over the life-cycle.
Table 3.2: Parameter Values
Param eter Value
Calibrated Parameters 
F  0.03
0 -0.03
Exogenous Parameters
A y 3.0
^h 0.9
7 1.58
V 0.74
4> 0.94
Ge 0.089
0.122
G u 0.046
f 0.015
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3.5 .1  E xogenous param eters  
Borrowing limits
The parameters that determine the fraction of the house price (A/J and the multiple 
of earnings (Xy) that households can borrow are chosen to match the UK institutional 
features. Households can borrow whichever amount is lower between three times house­
hold earnings (Xy = 3) and 90% of the house price (A^  = 0.9).
U tility function
The preference parameters rj and 7  in the utility function are set to match estimated 
elasticities in the data: the consumption elasticity of intertemporal substitution is set at 
0.7 (from Attanasio and Weber, 1995) and the hours of work elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution is set at 0.3 (from Pistaferri, 2003). These numbers correspond to a 
curvature 7  = 1.58 and to 77 =  0.74 for our within period utility function.
House price process
Estimation of the parameters of the house price process is based on the Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) national and regional house price series for the UK, 
years 1969-2000 (Figure 3.5).4 We estimate an AR(1) process, with linear trend (equa­
tion 3.7), for the logarithm of real house prices, where the conversion from nominal 
house prices was made using the Retail Price Index (RPI, all items). The result of the 
estimation is a persistence parameter (<f>) of 0.94 and a variance of the shock (o£) equal 
to 0.008. In the model we treat house price shocks as aggregate and we set particular 
realisations of the process to match realised house prices for the cohort born in the 
late 1940s. We assume households exist from age 22 to 66.5
4We use the series reporting average house prices for all dwellings.
5 Having house price data only up to the year 2000, we can use actual realisations only up to age 
53. For age 54-66 we draw shocks randomly from the distribution of the error term.
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Figure 3.5: UK House price series
Wage process
For the wage process, we estimate the deterministic growth component from the Family 
Expenditure Survey (FES) and the wage rate uncertainty from the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS). The reason why we use two separate data sets is that the BHPS 
is only available starting in year 1991 and this would not allow us to obtain the wage 
growth for the 1940s cohort we calibrate our model to.
FES data are from the years 1978-2000, and axe again organised into five year 
cohorts based on the date of birth intervals. We only base our estimates on males, 
working more than 10 hours a week, and obtain a measure of growth in median earnings 
by education group.6 In particular, we take median individual real earnings by cohort 
and education, and estimate, separately for each education group, a regression of 
the logarithm of median earnings on a quadratic term in the median age of the cell,
6Selecting males that work more than 10 hours per week means that average hours in our sample 
vary very little over the life-cycle and so this helps to mitigate the bias in estimating the growth of 
earnings instead of that of wages.
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and cohort dummies. Defining the deterministic component at in equation (3.9) as 
04 = aut + a2it2, we find that ait is 0.032 and 0.058, and a2t is -0.0004 and -0.0008, 
respectively for the low and high education groups.
The variance of the log-wage process, cr^ , is estimated using BHPS data, years 1991- 
2002. We select male employees aged between 25 and 59, and we obtain a measure of 
real hourly wages as the ratio between the normal gross monthly pay (in real terms) 
and hours worked, converted from a weekly basis to a monthly one. Following the 
estimation procedure adopted in Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2004), we obtain 
Of=0.018 for both education groups (see Appendix 3.10.2).
Interest rate process
For interest rates we use the Bank of England base rates, years 1968-1996, and assume 
that interest rate shocks axe aggregate in the economy. The average interest rate (r) 
is estimated at 1.5 percent and the variance of the shock, cr^ , is 0.0021.
3.5 .2  C alibrated  param eters
We select the preference parameter for housing, 6 7 and the fixed cost of housing, F, 
by calibration to match average life-cycle home-ownership rates between age 26 and 
60. We assume that these parameters are common across the two education groups. 
We obtain 9 = —0.03 and F = 0.03 (i.e. the transaction cost for buying and selling is 
3% of the house price). Figure 3.6 contains the simulated home-ownership profiles and 
Table 3.3 compares home-ownership rates predicted by the model to those observed 
in the data.8 The spike and subsequent dip in home-ownership around age 25 that 
can be seen in Figure 3.6, happen at times in which the aggregate house price is, 
respectively, at its lowest (year 1971) and highest (1973) levels of the 1970s. Since 
buying a house is relatively more costly, in terms of earnings, for the low education 
group, the biggest difference in home-ownership rate between the two education groups
7Since the estimates of the intertemporal elasticities are taken from papers which do not condition
on home-ownership, there is a possible bias.
8Data come from the years 1991-2000, as years prior to 1991 are affected by the large-scale selling
off of local authority housing.
3 Explaining Life-Cycle Profiles of Home-Ownership and Labour Supply 83
appears to take place early in the life-cycle. Given that by age 35 most households 
have purchased their home, in Table 3.3 we produce the average rates by two age 
groups, 26-35 and 36-60, to assess the calibration for two phases of the life-cycle: one 
in which households are entering the housing market and one in which tenure decisions 
axe largely completed. We do not consider the years of the life-cycle up to age 26 since 
we assume that households have zero financial asset and housing endowments at age 
22, with the counterfactual implication that our model makes it particularly hard for 
households to become home-owners early in the life-cycle. Symmetrically, we do not 
consider the years of the life-cycle above age 60 since we do not model retirement 
behaviour or bequests, which has the implication that households run down all assets 
by age 66, leading to an overestimate of the amount of selling of homes towards the end 
of life. The model slightly over-predicts home-ownership rates early in the life-cycle 
for the high education group (top left cells in Table 3.3)
Table 3.3: Calibration Statistics
High Education Low Education
Statistic D ata Model D ata M odel
Ownership rate
Age 26 - 35 0.74 0.80 0.58 0.53
Age 36 - 60 0.84 0.84 0.66 0.69
Probability of Moving
Age 26 - 60 1.54 3.4 1.49 4.6
Medianpt 
Medianwt (L—lt)
Age 22 - 26 2.9 2.8 3.5 3.5
Notes: The data figures for home-ownership rates are based on the years 1991-2000 of the FES.
Probabilities for moving from owning to renting are the proportion of home-owning households in the BHPS 
(1991-2000) that become non-owners between years of the panel survey.
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Figure 3.6: Simulated home-ownership rates 
3.5.3 N o n -C alib ra ted  profiles
We turn now to showing predictions for and data on variables which have not been 
used in the calibration, to assess the validity of the model. We begin by showing in 
Figure 3.7 simulated and actual transition probabilities from renting to owning. The 
actual transitions are calculated from the BHPS as described in section 3.3. We match 
these transition paths fairly closely, although we under-predict the transition probabil­
ity when young, particularly for the high education group. This is largely because of 
our assumption of zero initial housing and financial wealth, which means that house­
holds need some time to save up to meet the credit constraints to buy a house. We 
also over-predict the number of transitions back from owning to renting: as shown 
in Table 3.3 (“Probability of moving”), too many households sell their houses in our 
simulations. Many of these sales occur towards the end of the life-cycle. Since there 
are no bequests or retirement period in our model, households have a strong incentive 
to sell their housing to fund consumption in old age. It is therefore not surprising that 
we over-predict house sales late in life.
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Figure 3.7: Simulated transition probabilities
We now turn to show other key predictions of the baseline model, namely the 
profiles on assets, consumption and labour supply.
Figure 3.8 reports simulated mean asset to mean income profiles. The definition of 
assets are all liquid assets which is liquid wealth minus outstanding debt. In our model, 
the rate of interest is the same on debt and liquid wealth and so we can concentrate 
on the net position. The large fall in the net position occurs when households buy 
their homes, the gradual subsequent reduction in debt is the voluntary repayment of 
the mortgage.
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 report simulated consumption and labour supply profiles for 
each education group. Consumption is higher for the higher education group through­
out the whole life-cycle. The high education group supplies less labour in the first part 
of the life-cycle and more in the second part, which is consistent with their having a 
steeper wage profile and so a higher incentive for intertemporal substitution of labour
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than the low education group.
The early peak (age 26) and drop (age 28) in consumption, and corresponding drop 
and peak in labour supply, happen when home-ownership drops and subsequently picks 
up again, suggesting evidence of constrained behaviour.
3.6 Labour Supply and H om e-ow nership
One of the main aims of our model is to analyse the interaction between labour supply 
and housing choices. The key question is how labour supply varies by home-ownership. 
There are two reasons why we focus on the comparison between homeowners and non­
homeowners, rather than between different levels of mortgage repayments. The first 
reason is that we only allow for collateralised debt, and therefore homeowners are those 
who can borrow and non-homeowners are those who cannot. The second reason is that 
mortgage payments are voluntary, and therefore distinguishing households by level of 
mortgage repayments, and comparing their labour supply behaviour, would not give us
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an indication of constrained behaviour. Those who repay higher amounts of mortgage 
will tend to be those with higher income draws, and we cannot expect their labour 
supply behaviour to be constrained.
The fact that only home-owners can borrow, and that the income-related borrow­
ing constraint holds at every period, imply that our model predicts labour supply 
as being positively related to the proportion of income that households can borrow. 
In particular, given that the income-related borrowing constraint is a function of the 
current choice of leisure, the intra-period allocation between consumption and leisure, 
when the income-related constraint binds, is governed by the following:
g |f - ( 1 + v. («
In other words, the constraint affects the price of leisure. We will now analyse how 
household labour supply is affected by this change in price by specifying the form of 
the utility function.
3.6 .1  B aseline m od el
When utility (between consumption and leisure) is Cobb-Douglas, as in our baseline 
model, equation 3.10 implies the following relationship between labour supply and the 
proportion of income that households can borrow (see Appendix 3.10.3 for details):
At ( \ - r j )  _ -> |  At - p tht (l + F) if buy house
lst = rjL . where At = {
+ [ A t i i b  = ht-i = \
and 1st is labour supply at period t (1st = L — It)- Labour supply is therefore higher 
when the constraint is binding than when it is not (in which case the price of leisure 
is simply wt)■
Given this theoretical implication of the income constraint for labour supply, it is 
interesting to examine how much, and at what points in the life-cycle, this affects the 
behaviour of home-owners.
In Table 3.4 we report a comparison between the labour supply of homeowners and 
that of non-homeowners predicted by our baseline model. We find that homeowners
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aged between 26 and 35 supply about 2.5% more hours than non-homeowners, and 
that those aged between 36 and 60 supply 5.4% and 3.5% more hours than non­
homeowners in the low or high education groups, respectively. BHPS data for the 
sample of women aged between 25 and 45,9 in couples in which the partner works 
full-time, show that the difference in average hours supplied by the couple between 
homeowners and non-homeowners is 8.6% and 1.44%, respectively, for the low and high 
education group.10 For the sub-sample of women aged 25-35, this difference is more 
pronounced, amounting, respectively, to 12.2% and 2.9%. Our model, therefore, seems 
to underpredict the difference in labour supply behaviour between homeowners and 
non-homeowners for the low education group. However, some care needs to be adopted 
when making this comparison, since our model, by considering only the household unit, 
attributes the education level to the household, whereas the data figures that we have 
reported concern only the education level of the woman. Moreover, in the model 
a single wage is attributed to all the labour supplied in the period, whereas this is 
obviously not the case in the data. More generally, the model allows only one source of 
ex-ante heterogeneity, which is the education level of the household. By contrast, the 
data will reflect many other sources of heterogeneity, both observed and unobserved. 
The predictions from the model can be interpreted as an examination of how much 
diversity in behaviour can be explained on the basis of only limited heterogeneity in 
characteristics.
In Figure 3.11, we report labour supply by home-ownership status at each year of 
the life-cycle: home-owners work longer hours than those not owning in almost every 
period, and particularly at the time of buying, in a similar way to the evidence in chap­
ter 2 and discussed above. This effect of greater labour supply among home-owners 
is driven primarily by greater debt holdings: greater debt means lower total expendi­
ture in the current period, but when the home-owner ages and releases capital from 
the house, consumption and leisure both rise. In other words, the option of home- 
ownership raises expected lifetime utility, but it induces intertemporal substitution:
9These data are those used in chapter 2. We do not obtain statistics for age above 45 due to small
cell sizes for the group of renters
10We assume that full-time hours for the partner correspond to 40 hours per week.
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Table 3.4: Simulated Labour Supply by Homeownership status
Low Education High Education
Age 26 -35
Homeowners 0.766 0.756
N on-homeowners 0.747 0.737
Age 36 -60
Homeowners 0.742 0.743
N on-homeowners 0.704 0.718
Notes: reported fraction of time that the household allocates to labour supply.
households buy their homes, forfeiting current consumption and leisure, in order to 
profit from the fast house price growth and high consumption and leisure in the fu­
ture.11. Since the consumption elasticity intertemporal substitution is larger than the 
labour supply intertemporal elasticity, we would expect that more of the adjustment 
occurs through consumption. On the other hand, labour supply is directly affected by 
the borrowing constraint whereas consumption is not.
An alternative way of exploring the relation between labour supply and home- 
ownership is to calculate labour supply profiles over the life-cycle for the case where 
households cannot purchase a house, to compare to the baseline case where home- 
ownership is an option and labour supply is possibly constrained by home-ownership 
decisions and the associated credit constraints. In particular, we consider the average 
labour supply behaviour of home-owners in the baseline model and of the same group 
of individuals (i.e. with the same idiosyncratic wage shocks) in a model in which they 
cannot purchase a house. Figure 3.12 presents this comparison. It shows that in a 
model in which households can purchase a house, subject to borrowing constraints, the 
cross-sectional labour supply is higher than in the case in which they cannot purchase a
11 An additional motive to forfeit consumption and leisure in order to get into the housing market 
at an early age, may be that the housing asset provides insurance against future increases in its price 
- see Bemks, Blundell, Smith and Smith (2004)
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Figure 3.11: Labour supply by home-ownership status
house in the first half of the life-cycle, and lower afterwards. In other words, households 
substitute leisure inter-temporally since their expected utility from being home-owners 
and from future consumption is higher than when not being home-owners. There is, 
however, an additional effect driven by the income-related borrowing constraint. This 
is particularly evident when we compare labour supply of those households that become 
home-owners at the beginning of their life with their behaviour if they were not home­
owners, and notice that labour supply is about 10 percent higher in the scenario in 
which they purchase a house. The remaining spikes in labour supply occur when a 
high proportion of households purchases a house and when house prices spike up.
3.6 .2  S en sitiv ity  to  u tility  fu n ction  sp ecifica tion
Choosing a Cobb-Douglas utility function as the form to embed in a CRRA, means 
choosing a particular case of CES function in which the elasticity of substitution be-
3 Explaining Life-Cycle Profiles of Home-Ownership and Labour Supply 92
homeowners (baseline model)  no homeownership
age
Low education
homeowners (baseline model)  no homeownership
g <t> -
age
High education
Figure 3.12: Labour supply: baseline vs. non-homeownership
tween consumption and leisure is equal to 1. We now want to check how sensitive our 
results are to this assumption. We therefore take a general CES utility function and 
analyse profiles of home-ownership and labour supply in two alternative cases in which 
substitutability between consumption and leisure is, respectively, higher and lower 
than in the Cobb-Douglas case. The within period utility function is now specified as
0 - 7 )
u(euht<k) = e^ + f P) '  . (3 .11)
1 - 7
Figures 3.13 and 3.14 show labour supply profiles by home-ownership status for 
the cases in which p =  —0.2 and p = 0.2. This means that the elasticity of substitu­
tion between consumption and leisure is, respectively, higher (1.25) and lower (0.83) 
than in the baseline model with a CRRA/Cobb-Douglas within period utility. Labour 
supply is still higher for home-owners corresponding to the stage in the life-cycle in
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which a high fraction of the population purchases a house.12 However, the difference 
in labour supply behaviour between home-owners and non-home-owners is bigger than 
in the baseline case when substitutability between consumption and leisure is higher 
(and smaller when substitutability is lower) than in the baseline model. With higher 
substitutability between consumption and leisure, household labour supply is more 
responsive to wages. Since homeowners tend to be those who have higher wages, this 
explains the pattern that we observe. The qualitative suggestion that the labour sup­
ply of home-owners tends to increase around the time when they buy still holds.
 non-homeowners ----------- homeowners
age
Low education
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/ \
55
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Figure 3.13: Labour supply by home-ownership status, eC)/ = 1.25
1 2Home-ownership profiles are very similar to those shown for the baseline case, except for lower 
rates at the beginning of the cycle.
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Figure 3.14: Labour supply by home-ownership status, ecj = 0.83
3.7 Im plications o f Incom plete M arkets
In our baseline, the financial environment was set up to mimic the UK housing and 
capital market. In this section, we highlight the effect that changes in the capital 
market have on home-ownership patterns and on labour supply. We show first the 
effects of varying the size of downpayment needed to purchase a house, (1 — A/J . 
Second, we vary the multiple of household income that households can borrow against,
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3.7 .1  V arying dow npaym ent requirem ents
We assume households can borrow only a fraction A^  of the house value. Figures 
3.15 and 3.1613 show the effects on home-ownership and labour supply of varying 
Ah while holding other parameters at their baseline values. Reducing downpayment 
requirements (increasing A/J leads to households buying their homes earlier in the 
life-cycle but makes very little difference later in the life-cycle. Although changes 
in Ah have a small effect on labour supply, observing this can be informative about 
which constraint is binding. In particular, the low education group does not appear to 
change labour supply behaviour as the downpayment goes from zero to 50 percent and 
home-ownership changes substantially at the beginning of the life-cycle. This seems 
to indicate that the income-related constraint is not binding. On the other hand, 
the high education group increases both home-ownership and labour supply as the 
downpayment decreases, suggesting that the higher home-ownership associated to a 
lower downpayment makes the income-related constraint bind.
3.7 .2  V arying d eb t to  in com e requirem ents
We assume that there is a restriction on the debt to income ratio, Xy, that households 
can hold. This is a common institutional feature in the UK and elsewhere (Survey 
of Mortgage Lenders). Figure 3.17 shows the effect on home-ownership of varying Xy 
while holding other parameters at their baseline values. Like the case of decreasing 
the downpayment requirement, increasing the permissible debt to income ratio leads 
to earlier home-ownership, but in contrast to the previous case, it also has the effect of 
increasing the proportion of households owning their homes throughout the whole life­
cycle. The effects on labour supply are again small but peaks in labour supply are still 
associated to peaks in home purchasing. The fact that this pattern is still observed 
even with Xy = 10, suggests that peaks in labour supply at the time of purchase 
are at least partly due to smoothing consumption while meeting the downpayment 
requirement.
13This figure and figure 3.18 have been magnified to show the region where there are the biggest 
differences relative to the baseline model.
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Figure 3.15: Homeownership varying downpayment requirements
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Figure 3.16: Labour supply varying downpayment requirements
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Figure 3.17: Homeownership varying the maximum debt-toincome ratio
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Figure 3.18: Labour supply varying the maximum debt-to-income ratio
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3.8 W elfare im plications of wage uncertainty
One important feature of the model introduced in this chapter is the existence of an 
eaxnings-related constraint for homeowners. We now want to analyse the implications 
of earnings uncertainty on household welfare. In particular, we want to ask how welfare 
changes in scenarios with different wage uncertainty, and how this translates in terms of 
consumption, labour supply, and home ownership choices. The first step for answering 
these questions is to illustrate which method to adopt for measuring welfare.
3.8 .1  W elfare criterion
The welfare measure that we adopt is given by expected lifetime utility. That is, the 
welfare associated to a scenario with wage variance equal to cr*,, is given by:
where V\(Aq = 0, Hq = 0,pi, u>i) is the value function at the beginning of life, given 
zero initial endowments of financial assets and house, as assumed throughout this 
chapter, and p and w are the initial distributions of the house price and of wages, 
assumed to be independent one another, w is distributed log-normally with variance 
erf,. As remarked by Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), one way to interpret this function 
is in terms of the welfare of a typical household through the veil of uncertainty (i.e. 
before uncertainty is realised). In particular, our household knows whether it belongs 
to the high education group or to the low education group, and that its initial financial 
assets are zero and it has no house. However, it does not know what initial wage and 
house price it will draw. Since the value function at the beginning of life is the expected 
discounted lifetime utility, we can rewrite welfare as follows:
H0,pi,wi)dpdw
= Ei Ptu(ct> ht , h)
,t=i
where E\ indicates expectations at the beginning of period 1, before uncertainty is 
realised.
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In a model where utility is only a function of consumption, a way of measuring 
the welfare cost of different degrees of uncertainty is to compute the compensating 
variations in consumption, that is, the percentage change in consumption that has to 
occur at every period in order to keep welfare the same under two alternative scenarios. 
This is, for instance, the approach taken by Attanasio and Davis (1996). Hugget and 
Ventura (1999), as well as Heathcote et al. (2005), adopt this approach also in a model 
in which utility is a function of both consumption and labour supply. This is correct as 
long as it is possible to derive an intra-temporal allocation rule between consumption 
and leisure, so that the change in consumption takes account of the associated change 
in leisure. If we abstract for a moment from the additional choice of home-ownership 
that is present in our model, the condition that gives the compensating variation in 
consumption is as follows:
in the baseline scenario with wage variance <75, and c, h and I are household’s choice 
of consumption, home-ownership, and leisure in the alternative scenario with wage 
variance cr0. 7r is the compensating variation in consumption, i.e. the per-period 
percentage change in consumption, relative to the baseline scenario, that makes welfare 
the same under two alternative wage processes with different variance.
3.8 .2  W elfare w ith  C R R A /C o b b -D o u g la s  preferences  
Consumption-based welfare m etric
When the felicity function is CRRA/Cobb-Douglas, welfare in the baseline scenario 
takes the following form:
If we assume that households choose an interior allocation of leisure,14 we can use the
Ei ]P/?*u(cf,/i*,Zt) = Ei ^ /? * u (( l  + 'K)ct ,ht,k)  (3.12)
_ t= i .t=1
where c, h and I are household’s choice of consumption, home ownership, and leisure
intra-temporal optimal allocation rule between consumption and leisure, It =
14We will deal later with the case in which they chose a corner allocation of leisure
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so that equality between welfare in the two scenarios (equation (3.12)) requires the 
following:
Ei
t = l
tgQht Ct
( 1 = 3 .)
\  TfWt )
1 - 7
1 - 7 = Ei
f i h t .
(1 +  7T) c t ( M )
1-771 1 - 7
t = 1
1 - 7
(3.13)
or
V<rt =  (l +  TT)1"7^ .
It follows that the consumption-based welfare metric, 7r, is obtained as a function of 
welfare in the two wage variance scenarios:
7r ci i _ x
a Oa
(3.14)
Note that this closed form solution for the consumption-based welfare metric is 
obtained under two assumptions: that households always choose the interior solution 
for labour supply, and that home ownership decisions are not affected by the change 
in consumption given by 7r. This is in fact not true in our model, where home owner­
ship is non-separable from consumption and leisure in the utility function and where 
labour supply cannot become negative and is affected by the explicit income-related 
borrowing constraint for homeowners. We will address both these issues in the next 
section (“Compensating variations in assets”) but in this section we will maintain the 
two assumptions in order to obtain the consumption-based welfare metric, 7r.15 In 
this way we will be using a standard approach adopted in the literature (see Hugget 
and Ventura (1999), Krueger and Perri (2003) and Heathcote et al.(2005)) and we will 
be able to compare the predictions produced by this approach with the predictions 
obtained in the next section (where the assumptions are relaxed).
Table 3.5 reports the compensating variations in consumption, computed according 
to equation (3.14), in a model in which households are subject to an income-related
15The computation of welfare in each scenario will take into account the constraints specified for the 
model being analysed, and the non-separabilities between consumption, leisure and home-ownership. 
What does not take these features into account is the way in which the consumption-based welfare 
metric, 7r, is computed as a function of the welfare measures.
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borrowing constraint (“Endogenous income constraint”) as well as in a model in which 
they are not subject to it. The first row in the table deals with a model in which house­
holds decisions are not subject to an endogenous income constraint. Labour supply is, 
however, still subject to a time allocation constraint. Assuming interior labour supply 
when computing 7r, is as if we were obtaining compensating variations in consumption 
for households that are never at a corner solution. Alternatively, we could compute 
the compensating variations in consumption for households assumed to be always at 
a corner solution given by the total time available, It = 1, or equivalently (with Cobb- 
Douglas utility function) assumed not to change their labour supply behaviour across 
the two scenarios. This would give us an upper bound for the consumption-based 
welfare metric.16 Results for this case are reported in the Notes to Table 3.5.
The second row of Table 3.5 considers instead a model in which households make 
their decisions subject to an income-related borrowing constraint. The presence of 
the constraint affects households decisions through their expectations, since they are 
aware that they may become constrained at some point in time; therefore, it affects 
welfare and ultimately the consumption-based welfare metric, ir. Given the way we 
compute 7r, the fact that the consumption-based welfare metric is different depending 
on whether or not there is an income-related borrowing constraint, means that welfare 
in the baseline scenario and in the alternative scenario have changed differently in the 
two models. The change is between 1.2 and 0.8 percentage points for the two education 
groups, which respectively amount to 8.5% and 5.5% increases.
Recalling that , the wage process in the model presented in this chapter is of the 
16In this case, equality between welfare in the two scenarios (equation (3.12)) requires the following:
with
1 if corner solution
if unvaried leisure across two scenarios
which implies
Under our parameter’s choice, r] =  0.74 and 7  =  1.58, n >  n.
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Table 3.5: Compensating variations in consumption 
Baseline scenario: deterministic wage. Alternative scenario: stochastic wage, <r| = 0.018
Low education High education
No income constraint 14.05% 14.34%
Endogenous income constraint 15.25% 15.12%
Notes: These are the compensating variations in consumption obtained according to equation (3.14). If, 
alternatively, we assumed that households were always at the corner solution It =  1, or that they would not 
change their labour supply between the two scenarios, in a model with no income constraint the low education 
group and the high education group would need, respectively, a 19.45% and a 19.85% increase in consumption 
every period.
form
\nwt = at + vt where vt = vt-i + £t, & ~  N  ^
if we considered a scenario with cr| =  0.018 (the value estimated for the UK and for 
which the model is evaluated) versus a baseline scenario with deterministic wages (i.e. 
wages follow the deterministic trend at over time), we would obtain the compensating 
variations in consumption reported in Table 3.5. That is, to make a high education 
household in a scenario with stochastic wages (as given by <j|) as well off as a household 
in a scenario with deterministic wages, the household facing stochastic wages would 
need to consume 14.34% more at every period when the household is not subject to 
an income-related constraint and 15.12% more at every period when it is subject to 
an endogenous income constraint.
Given that a crucial feature of our model is the endogeneity of labour supply choices 
in relation to home-ownership decisions, via the income-related constraint, it is actually 
important to include households at a constrained solution in leisure when obtaining 
measures of the welfare cost of wage uncertainty. Moreover, since our utility function 
is non-separable in home-ownership, consumption and labour supply, it is important 
to allow home-ownership decisions be different across two scenarios of wage variance.
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We therefore turn to an alternative measure of welfare that is based on the change in 
initial asset allocations in the section below.
Compensating variations in assets
We now want to think what change in the financial asset endowment (at the beginning 
of life) would make a household as well off in two scenarios with different wage variance. 
The condition that sets the welfare equal in the two scenarios is the following:
/  /  V\(Aq, Hq,p \ , w\) dpdw = /  /  Vi(A0}H0,pi,wi)dpdw  (3.15)
Jw Jp JwJp
We therefore want to find AAo = Aq — Aq, where Aq is the level of initial assets under
the baseline scenario with wage variance Ob, assumed to be equal to zero, and Aq is
the unknown level of initial assets under the alternative scenario with wage variance
cra. The solution is found numerically and the results are reported in table 3.6.
We ask what the change in initial assets should be in two different economies: one 
economy where households were subject to an income-related constraint when owning 
a house (“Endogenous income constraint”), and another economy in which this con­
straint did not exist. We perform this exercise under different scenarios with respect 
to the wage variance. First, we ask what the compensating variation in asset would be 
if =  0.018 (i.e. the estimated UK log-wage variance) as compared to a scenario with 
deterministic wages (rows 1 and 5 for, respectively, low and high education). Recalling 
that initial wages are 1, and that “normal hours worked” are 0.74, we can translate 
these changes in assets in terms of “normal earnings” by dividing them by 0.74. For 
example, a high education household would need a change in assets at the beginning 
of life approximately equal to six and half times his earnings in period 1. We then 
ask what the compensating variation in assets would need to be if the log-wage vari­
ance were half its current value (cr| =  0.009) as compared to a case with no variance. 
Finally, we compare two scenarios with different log-wage variances: the current one 
in relation to half its value (cr| = 0.018 vs. <j |  =  0.009), and twice the value of the 
current one in relation to the current one (<r| = 0.036 vs <j |  =  0.018), as if to a^k what
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was the welfare loss in halving the log-wage variance and what would the welfare loss 
be were the current log-wage variance to double.
Table 3.6: Compensating variations in assets
Endogenous
income
constraint
No
income
constraint Difference
Low education
a ) cr| = 0.018 vs. D e te r m in is t ic  w a g e 4.24 4.02 0.22
b) = 0.009 vs. D e te r m in is t ic  w age 2.23 2.05 0.18
c ) cr| = 0.018 vs. = 0.009 1.66 1.60 0.06
d) c \  = 0.036 vs. a \  = 0.018 2.42 2.43 -0.01
High education
a ) cr| = 0.018 vs. D e te r m in is t ic  w a g e 4.80 4.61 0.19
b) cr| = 0.009 vs. D e te r m in is t ic  w a g e 2.25 2.16 0.09
c ) o-| = 0.018 vs. a\ = 0.009 1.89 1.78 0.11
d ) <r| = 0.036 vs. a\ = 0.018 3.18 3.11 0.07
Notes: The table reports absolute changes in initial assets ( A A q) that make household welfare equal under two 
scenarios.
The compensating variations in assets contained in Table 3.6 show that the high 
education group needs higher compensations than the low education group in any sce­
nario (as expected, given that the time trend in the wage profile is higher for the more 
educated). For the low education group, what seems to matter most towards welfare 
is whether there is any variance at all, rather than how much variance there is. Case 
d), which compares a scenario having log-wage variance cr| =  0.036 with a baseline 
scenario having log-wage variance cr| =  0.018, requires nearly half the compensation in 
assets that is required in case a), which compares a scenario having log-wage variance 
cr| = 0.018 with a baseline scenario having deterministic wages. This seems to be less 
the case for the high education group, for which the difference between case a) and case 
d) is much less marked. Both education groups require the highest compensation when 
a scenario with the current log-wage variance (<r| =  0.018) is compared to a baseline
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scenario with no wage uncertainty. Also the difference between the compensation re­
quired in an economy where households are subject to an endogenous income-related 
constraint and the compensation required in an economy where there is not such a 
constraint is highest when comparing a scenario with <r| =  0.018 to a scenario with 
deterministic wages. This difference is positive, meaning that being subject to an 
income-related constraint makes households want a higher compensation than when 
not being subject to it. The pattern of this difference, however, does not seem to 
be monotonic with the level of the log-wage variance. For the low education group 
there is some evidence that the additional compensation required in an economy with 
an income-related constraint is decreasing with the level of the log-wage variance (see 
column 3, cases b) to d)) but this is not the case for the high education group.17
We now want to translate the compensating variations in assets in terms of con­
sumption, labour supply and home-ownership choices. In order to do this, we simulate 
economies of 10,000 individuals and compare the average behaviour in a case with 
baseline wage variance and zero initial assets to a case with a different wage variance 
and the level of initial assets that makes welfare equal in these two scenarios (the 
“compensating variation in assets”). In other words, we simulate different cases corre­
sponding to those reported in Table 3.6 and compare a case with higher variance and 
the level of initial asset reported in the table to a case with lower (or zero) variance 
and zero initial assets. For instance, in connection with row 1 of Table 3.6, we first 
simulate an economy in which households are subject to an income-related constraint 
(“Endogenous income constraint”) and obtain the average behaviour for low educa­
tion households under two scenarios: one in which wages are deterministic and and 
initial assets are zero (baseline scenario), and another in which the log-wage variance 
is <j|  = 0.018 and initial assets are 4.24. We then simulate a different economy in 
which households are no longer subject to an income-related constraint (“No income 
constraint”) and obtain the average behaviour again under the baseline scenario and
17In any case, we are only evaluating three different scenarios and drawing inferences about inter­
mediate cases would require assumptions such as that the relationship is monotonic.
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under an alternative scenario in which the log-wage variance is =  0.018 and ini­
tial assets are 4.02. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 3.7 (row 1, in 
this particular case) and Figures 3.19 - 3.24 (top panels of Figures 3.19 - 3.21 for this 
example). Figures 3.19 - 3.24 only illustrate the cases corresponding to rows 1, 3, 5 
and 7 of Table 3.7 (log-wage variance cr| =  0.018 vs. deterministic wage and log-wage 
variance cr| — 0.036 vs. log-wage variance cr| =  0.018) since the other cases have very 
similar profiles and the same implications.
Table 3.7: Compensating variations in consumption, labour supply and home-
ownership
Endogenous No
income income
constraint constraint
Ac A Is Aho Ac A Is Aho
Low education
cr| = 0.018 v s .D e te r m in is t ic  w a g e 8.37% -4.48% 10.62% 7.26% -4.23% -5.18%
cr| = 0.009 v s .D e te r m in is t ic  w a g e 4.56% -2.31% 8.50% 3.66% -1.99% -3.94%
= 0.018 vs. &£ = 0.009 3.21% -1.90% 21.21% 2.31% -1.65% 3.21%
cr| = 0.036 vs. cr| = 0.018 4.93% -4.69% 29.79% 3.59% -1.20% 8.90%
High education
cr| = 0.018 v s .D e te r m in is t ic  w age 6.70% -3.85% -13.81% 6.89% -4.13% -8.78%
cr| =  0.009 v s .D e te r m in is t ic  w age 3.83% -1.92% -9.58% 4.03% -2.12% -5.93%
a \  =  0.018 vs. a \  = 0.009 2.21% -1.70% -1.38% 1.84% -1.52% 0.09%
cr| = 0.036 vs. =  0.018 3.72% -3.42% 7.30% 3.48% -3.36% 0.74%
Notes: The table reports percentage changes in consumption (Ac), labour supply (A Is) and home ownership 
(A h o ) that correspond to the increases in initial assets reported in Table 3.6 that allow households in a high 
wage variance scenario to achieve the same welfare as under a lower wage variance scenario with zero initial 
assets. The changes in behaviour are expressed in relation to a baseline scenario with zero initial assets and 
lower wage variance.
Table 3.7 displays the percentage change in consumption, labour supply and home-
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ownership over the life cycle under the alternative wage variance scenario with com­
pensating variation in initial assets relative to the baseline wage variance scenario with 
zero initial assets, for each economy type. For instance, we find that in an economy in 
which households are subject to an income-related constraint, providing low education 
households with compensating variations in initial assets in a scenario with log-wage 
variance cr| = 0.018 allows them to choose on average, and over the lifetime, 8.37% 
more consumption, 4.48% less labour supply and 10.62% more home-ownership than 
in the baseline scenario with deterministic wages and zero initial assets. In general, we 
find that in the alternative scenario with compensating variation in assets and higher 
variance than in the baseline scenario, consumption is always higher and labour supply 
is always lower. Figures 3.20 and 3.23 show that the biggest drops in labour supply in 
a scenario with compensating variations in assets takes place at the beginning of life. 
This type of inter-temporal substitution is not unexpected, given that the wage trend 
is concave, and that the initial lump-sum in assets allows them to purchase the house 
without making the income-related constraint bind.
As for home-ownership, Table 3.7 shows that it can be either higher or lower in the 
scenario with compensating variation in assets, relative to the baseline scenario with 
zero assets and lower (or zero) variance. However, this is the overall change across the 
life cycle and it can be difficult to understand the underlying mechanism that generates 
this effect. Figures 3.21 and 3.24 shed some light on this. Homeownership appears 
to be no lower, and generally higher, in the first part of the life cycle in the scenarios 
with high variance and compensating variations in assets than in the scenario with low 
(zero) variance and zero assets. This behaviour early in life is consistent with the fact 
that the compensating variation in initial assets relaxes the explicit borrowing con­
straints (downpayment and income-related borrowing constraint) that in the baseline 
scenario bind and initially prevent households from buying. In the second part of the 
life cycle home-ownership can be lower in the scenario with compensating variations 
in assets. This happens predominantly in those cases in which the baseline scenario is 
one with deterministic wages and home-ownership is almost 100% until the end of the
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life cycle. This kind of home-ownership behaviour in the second part of the life cycle in 
the two scenarios is related to the existence of an implicit “no-bankruptcy” constraint 
in our model, whereby the extent of a household’s debt must be less than the minimum 
possible flow of income plus the minimum house price. Towards the end of life, the 
minimum flow of future income is much lower in the scenario with stochastic wages 
than in the one with deterministic wages, so that with stochastic wages the constraint 
binds for some households, forcing them to sell the house.
A comparison between Table 3.7 and Table 3.5 gives us an idea of the importance 
of measuring welfare by allowing all of our choice variables to vary across different 
scenarios and by taking into account the income-related constraint for home-owners. 
In an economy where households are subject to an income-related constraint, when 
comparing a scenario with log-wage variance cr| =  0.018 to a scenario with determin­
istic wages, the compensating variation in consumption throughout the life cycle for, 
say, the high education group is 6.70% instead of 15.12% when we take into account 
changes in labour supply and home-ownership as well as potential constraints on labour 
supply due to the endogenous income constraint. Home ownership has a two-part role 
in determining these differences. Since owning a house directly increases both utility 
and (through its high return) wealth, the fact that the compensating variation in assets 
allows households to buy a house earlier, is an important determinant of the reduction 
of the compensating variation in consumption.
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Figure 3.19: Low education: Change in consumption
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Figure 3.20: Low education: Change in labour supply
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Figure 3.21: Low education: Change in home-ownership
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Figure 3.22: High education: Change in consumption
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Figure 3.23: High education: Change in labour supply
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Figure 3.24: High education: Change in home-ownership
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3.9 C onclusions
In this chapter we have built a structural life-cycle model of consumption and saving, 
labour supply and home-ownership decisions. We were motivated by two main goals. 
First, given empirical evidence suggesting a positive relation between labour supply 
and mortgage debt, as well as an institutional earnings-related borrowing constraint 
when taking out a mortgage to purchase a house, we wanted to analyse household 
behaviour within a set-up that would allow us to conduct experiments for analysing 
responses to changes in the economic environment. In particular, the existence of the 
institutional earnings-related constraint, makes labour supply and home-ownership 
decisions jointly determined. We therefore wanted to try and disentangle these choices 
by analysing labour supply behaviour of a home-owner (with mortgage-debt) in the 
counterfactual world in which he were not such. The second, connected, goal was to 
analyse home-ownership decisions over the life-cycle.
The model investigates the behaviour of households that differ ex-ante in the ed­
ucation level, and ex-post also in wage realisations. Their decision to purchase a 
house is subject to common institutional features, such as a downpayment constraint, 
an earnings-related constraint and transaction costs of buying and selling the house. 
Borrowing is only allowed for home-owners since the house serves as collateral. We 
calibrate the model to average life-cycle home-ownership profiles in the UK and ob­
tain predictions for labour supply behaviour. We find that labour supply is higher 
for home-owners (borrowers), although the effect on labour supply is lower than data 
suggests, and that labour supply peaks at times of house purchase, when behaviour is 
constrained.
Investigating the consequences of changes in the institutional borrowing constraints 
produced the expected effects on home-ownership. However, whereas increasing the 
downpayment constraint only delays home purchase, decreasing the debt-to-income 
ratio reduces home-ownership at all ages. The change in labour supply is again small 
but consistent with the findings in the rest of the chapter.
Welfare implications of wage uncertainty have also been analysed. In particular, we 
wanted to examine to what extent a change in earnings uncertainty would affect house­
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hold welfare not only through labour supply but also through home-ownership. Talcing 
compensating variations in assets as a measure of welfare cost of wage uncertainty, we 
find that, particularly for the low education group, a higher compensation needs to 
be introduced in a case in which a scenario with wage variance is compared to a sce­
nario with deterministic wages relative to a case in which the wage variance is doubled. 
Moreover, low education households subject to an income-related borrowing constraint 
would translate the compensating variation in assets into higher lifetime consumption, 
higher home-ownership and lower labour supply. This would not necessarily be true 
when the same households are not subject to an income-related borrowing constraint. 
In particular, home-ownership could be lower, despite the compensating variation in 
assets, in a scenario with stochastic wages than in a scenario with deterministic wages. 
This is a consequence of the extremely high home-ownership profile that results when 
wages are deterministic and there are no endogenous borrowing constraints.
The computational-intensive nature of the analysis associated to the model pre­
sented in this chapter forced us to make a number of simplifying assumptions, which 
are to be relaxed in future research. In particular, the assumption of a single earner in 
the household makes it hard to compare simulated profiles of labour supply to those 
observed in data, such as that analysed in chapter 2. A not-too-costly addition to our 
model would be to include a full-time worker as well as a second earner who decides 
how much labour to supply.
A second strong limitation was assuming the absence of a mortgage repayment 
schedule. Although we imposed that the income-related borrowing constraint would 
hold at every period, interpreting this as a proxy for a mortgage repayment scheme, 
we cannot be sure that labour supply responses in a model with such a scheme would 
be the same as those that we have examined.
A further extension would allow for more than one type (size) of housing. This 
would give an opportunity to investigate what parameterisations lead to households 
initially purchasing relatively small homes in order to circumvent constraints on labour 
supply, and trading up later in the life-cycle, even when fixed costs are present. How­
ever, this extension would add substantially to the computational burden.
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3.10 A ppendix  to  chapter 3
3 .10.1  C om pu tation a l m eth od s
We solve our model via value function iteration, the main reason for this being the 
non-convexity of the value function.18 The solution for consumption, labour supply 
and home-ownership is found recursively from the last period of life, T, backwards. 
Since there is no bequest motive in our model, and since households axe subject to the 
constraint of zero or positive assets at the end of life, they spend all that it is available 
to them in the last period and allocate this optimally between consumption and labour 
supply, given the optimal choice of home-ownership. Given the optimal choices at i + 1, 
t < T , they then need to choose home ownership, consumption, leisure and saving that 
maximise period t ’s value function, subject to the borrowing constraints.
In order to compute the solution, we discretise the grids for the wage, the house 
price and the interest rate processes. Moreover, we choose a finite number of points 
for the asset grid. The wage and the house price processes are modeled as finite- 
state Markov chains that mimic the underlying continuous-valued AR(1) processes, as 
described in Tauchen (1986). Each of them is represented by 8 nodes. The interest 
rate is represented by 3 nodes, which are chosen by Gauss-quadrature rule. The asset 
grid contains 100 nodes for each home-ownership status at previous period (i.e. we 
have two conditional asset grids, particularly in relation to the fact that we only allow 
for collateralised borrowing and so only those owning a house at period t — 1 can enter 
period t with negative financial assets). Points are more dense in the lower range of the 
asset grid, to make sure that non-convexities in the value function are not overlooked 
in the maximisation process.
We store optimal decisions and value functions at grid points but households choices 
are not restricted to coincide with these points. We do linear interpolation in all the 
cases in which choices lie between points.
The profiles of behaviour reported in the chapter are obtained by simulating, for
1 8Non-convexities in the value function arise from having transaction costs associated to buying and 
selling the house.
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each education group, an economy with 10,000 individuals. Within education group, 
households differ according to the wage shock that they face at each period, given that 
both the house price and the interest rate are common across households.
3.10.2  E stim ation  o f  w age variance
We estimate the variance of the wage process for the UK by drawing on the method­
ology developed in Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2004) for estimating the variance 
of the permanent and transitory shocks to income. Blundell et al. (2004) adopt the 
following income process for household i:
where a and t index age and time respectively, Y  is real income, Z  is a set of observ­
able characteristics, H  and v are, respectively, a permanent and a transitory income 
component. They then assume that the permanent component Hi>a,t follows a martin­
gale process: -I- %a,t and that the transitory component Vi>a,t follows
an MA(q) process: ViA,t = J2j=o 8j€i,a-j,t-j, (#o = 1)- They can therefore obtain an 
expression for “unexplained” income growth as follows: Ayi>a,t = %a,t + AVijU,t, where 
y i  a  t = logT i a f  — Z'ia t (real income net of predictable individual components), and 
derive covariance restrictions in panel data, as follows:
where var(-) and cov(-) denote cross-sectional variances and covariances. In the partic­
ular case of serially uncorrelated transitory shocks, var(<ra,t) becomes only a function 
of “unexplained” income growth:
Recalling that we only allow for permanent shocks in our wage process (equation 
(3.9)), and assuming that in our data the transitory shocks are uncorrelated, we base 
the estimation of the variance of permanent shocks on equation (3.16). In particular, 
we need to obtain real wages net of predictable individual components and xise their
logY i ^ a , t  — %i , a , t  4” H i , a , t  T  V i , a , t
cov(Aya,t , Aya+s,t+s)
var(<;ajt) + var(Ava>t) for s = 0
cov(Ava>t, A va+s,t+s) for s ^  0
var(fcft) = cov(Aya>t, Aya_i>t_i + Ayajt -I- Aya+i,t+i) (3.16)
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lags to construct the covariance between a one-period lag and a three-period lag, as 
follows:
where w is the logarithm of real wages net of predictable individual components, ob­
tained as the residual from a regression, for each education group, of individual log-real 
wages on year, cohort and region dummies, a dummy for being married, household size, 
and number of children in the household.
3 .10 .3  Labour su pp ly  w ith  b in d in g  in com e-rela ted  borrow ing con­
strain t
Let us consider our model (equations (3.1)-(3.5)) in the case in which a household owns 
a house in period t (ht — 1) and the income-related borrowing constraint (3.5) binds. 
The constraints (3.2)-(3.5) boil down to the following constraint:
The Lagrangian for this problem is the following
=  [u (Ct, h t , It) +  PEVt+i  (A f+ i , h t , p t + i , w t + i )] -f p[At  +  w t ( L  — lt) — ct +  \ yw t (L  — It)] 
and the first-order conditions for consumption and leisure are therefore
tween consumption and leisure (when leisure is not at the corner solution It = L):
var(£ai*) =  cov(A wa,u Au)a_ ijt_i + A wa,t + Ar2}a+i,t+i)
A t  —  X y W t ( L  I t )
or
At -I-  wt(J It) —  XyWt(L It) 
At -  PthtO- + F) if buy house 
At if ht = ht-1 = 1.
where A
(3.17)
From the first order conditions we then obtain the intra-temporal allocation rule be-
du(ct,ht ,lt)/dlt
du(ct,h t,lt)/dct = (1 + X)wt. (3.18)
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When the within-period utility function between consumption and leisure is Cobb- 
Douglas, as in our baseline model, the intra-temporal allocation rule (3.18) takes the 
form:
= +
m
giving
ct =  T T - ^ 1 +  AW < - (3-19)(i - v )
Combining (3.19) with constraint (3.17), we then obtain the labour supply function 
for constrained households:
Chapter 4
R etirem ent Expectations, 
Pension Reforms, and Their 
Im pact on Private W ealth  
Accum ulation
4.1 Introduction
In all industrialized countries pension benefits represent a major component of retire­
ment income, and therefore social security arrangements can have important effects 
on households’ intertemporal choices. One of the most important issues in this area 
is to what extent individuals perceive and react to changes in pension legislation. Do 
people increase their saving and labor supply in response to a reduction in pension 
benefits? Is private wealth a good substitute for mandated accumulation in the form 
of social security contributions?
Answers to these questions usually proceed in two steps. In a first step, researchers 
estimate expected pension wealth, that is, the expected present discounted value of 
future benefits that workers are entitled to. In a second step, expected pension wealth is 
related to discretionary wealth and/or labor supply behavior. Difficult methodological
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problems axe encountered at each of these steps. The first step requires a model of 
the way in which individuals form expectations about future pension legislation. The 
second step requires to control for the possible endogeneity of expected pension wealth, 
and specifically of labor supply and retirement decisions, with respect to discretionary 
wealth accumulation decisions.
Even in the simplest scenarios, estimating future pension benefits is a difficult task. 
For the working population, expected pension wealth depends, among other variables, 
on the age at which workers expect to retire and on the expected ratio of pension 
benefits to pre-retirement earnings (the replacement rate). The standard approach 
taken in the literature is to estimate these variables from current and projected legis­
lation on pension eligibility rules, accrual rates of contributions, productivity growth 
and mortality projections. The estimated pension wealth is then used for simulation 
analysis, to project the future path of social expenditures, or for estimating the impact 
of pension wealth on retirement decisions and private accumulation. Feldstein (1974) 
pioneered the analysis of the displacement effect of pension wealth on national saving 
using U.S. time series data. Since then, a growing literature has used individual level 
data to provide evidence on the degree of substitution between discretionary accumula­
tion and pension wealth in the U.S. and other countries imputing pension wealth from 
legislation. Recent attempts include Gale (1998), Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003), 
and Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) who use, respectively, U.S., Italian and U.K. 
microeconomic data and find that pension wealth crowds out discretionary saving, but 
at a rate of considerably less than one-for-one.1
A different approach to analyzing the impact of social security on individual deci­
sions relies on subjective expectations of retirement ages and benefits (Bernheim, 1990; 
Gustman and Steinmeier, 2001). This literature has been concerned with a rather dif­
ferent set of issues, which are, to a large extent, preliminary to the analysis of the effect 
of pension wealth on private wealth accumulation. Specifically, it analyses the degree 
of workers’ information about the retirement benefits they are entitled to, the relation
1 Gruber and Wise (1999) use estimates of pension wealth to calculate the effects of pension ar­
rangements on the retirement decision and on the labor force participation of the elderly.
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between planned and actual retirement age, and the determinants of the probability 
distribution of expected retirement age (Disney and Tanner, 1999; Dominitz, Manski 
and Heinz, 2002).
The Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), a large representative survey 
of the Italian population carried out by the Bank of Italy, elicits retirement age and 
replacement rate expectations from 1989 to 2002. This is not the only survey eliciting 
such expectations but, to our knowledge, it is the only survey in which this information 
is available for an extended period spanning a set of intense pension reforms. During 
the period, the Italian government enacted three reforms (in 1992, 1995, and 1997), 
whose ultimate effect was to reduce the replacement rate of young workers relative 
to older cohorts. This chapter attempts to estimate the impact of these reforms on 
people’s perceptions about their future replacement rate -  a convenient summary index 
of the generosity of the pension system.
The analysis then focuses on the relation between expected pension wealth and 
private wealth. The reforms differently various cohorts and employment groups, pro­
viding an exogenous source of variability in pension wealth and an ideal instrument to 
estimate the offset between private and pension wealth.
Our framework calls attention to the fact that the effect of pension reforms on 
individual decisions depends on the extent to which people understand and react to 
the changes implied by the reform. The standard life-cycle hypothesis posits that a 
reduction in expected pension benefits should increase private wealth during the work­
ing life one-for-one. This offset is what Feldstein calls the substitution effect - pension 
wealth crowds out discretionary wealth. There are several potential counter-effects to a 
complete crowding out. Bequest motives, short-sightedness, liquidity constraints, risk 
associated with future reforms, and non-marketable future benefits are among the most 
cited reasons to explain why the offset between private and pension wealth might well 
be less than one-for-one. But there is another element that is potentially important: 
when pension reforms represent a permanent shift, individuals might not change their 
behavior, or adjust only partially to the new economic environment, because they are 
not informed, do not understand how the reform will affect their benefits or because
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changes in expectations occur slowly. This is one of the elements that we investigate 
here.
In doing this we answer two relevant policy questions. First, to what extent do 
pension reforms affect workers’ expectations? Second, provided that expectations are 
revised, how do these revisions affect retirement decisions and discretionary wealth 
accumulation? Previous literature does not distinguish between these two questions, 
and looks directly at the link between pension arrangements and saving decisions. 
Answering the first question is quite important in understanding to what extent people 
offset reductions in pension wealth after major pension reforms. As we shall see, 
answers to the first question also provide important empirical tools to address the 
second question.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 illustrates the Italian pension re­
forms of the last decade and discusses previous evidence. Section 4.3 presents the 
data on expectations on retirement outcomes available in the 1989-2002 Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth, providing the ground for our instrumental variables 
approach. Section 4.4 estimates the impact of pension reforms on the expected replace­
ment rate exploiting the ample variability in the effects of the legislation on different 
demographic and economic groups. The main finding is that workers have revised 
expectations in the direction suggested by the reform, but the adjustment is far from 
complete. Section 4.5 relates discretionary wealth to expected pension wealth, using 
the variations in the effects of the reforms over time and across demographic groups, 
to construct an instrument for pension wealth. The empirical estimates suggest an 
offset between private wealth and expected pension wealth of about 50 percent.
Although the estimated substitution coefficient is on the high side of current esti­
mates, we find that so far the Italian pension reforms of the 1990s had limited impact 
on private wealth accumulation, because people have revised only in part their ex­
pected pension wealth after the reform. Section 4.6 concludes by drawing attention 
to the crucial role of financial information and suggesting that in the coming decades 
a problem of inadequate savings could emerge for the cohorts most affected by the 
reforms.
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4.2 T he Italian pension system : a decade o f reforms
Until recently, the Italian social security system featured high replacement rates, 
earnings-based benefits, indexation of pensions to real earnings and cost of living, 
generous provisions for early retirement, and a large number of social pensions (i.e. 
old-age income assistance). These features of the social security system were gradually 
implemented and extended during the post-war period, and especially between 1967 
and 1975. The result was that the ratio of pension benefits to GNP reached almost 16 
percent in 1992, the highest value among industrialized countries.
The late eighties and early nineties saw increasing alarm over the growing imbal­
ance of the social security system expressed not only by economists and in official 
government documents, but also in the media. In the second half of 1992 the Amato 
government presented a fiscal package containing a major reform of the social security 
system. In 1995 Italy underwent a second major reform of the social security system, 
known as Dini reform. Social security legislation was further refined in December of 
1997 by the Prodi government.
The main features of the reforms were an increase in the retirement age and min­
imum years of contribution for pension eligibility, abolishment of seniority pensions 
for all those who started working after 1995, a gradual reduction in pension benefits, 
and indexation of pension benefits to prices rather than to wages. The three reforms 
maintained the generous provisions of the pre-1992 regime for the relatively old work­
ers, who in 1995 had at least 18 years of contributions, and different rules for private 
employees, public sector employees and self-employed.
Although the current regime combines some features of each of the three reforms, 
we do not detail their specific aspects.2 In fact, we compare pension regimes and 
individual expectations before the 1992 reform and after the 1997 reform, omitting 
the transitional years between the Amato and Prodi reforms (1992-1997). Our data 
set allows us to observe workers in two regimes, one with generous provisions (before 
the Amato reform, or simply the pre-reform period) and one -  ten years later - with
2Brugiavini (1999) provides ample details on the specific features of the sequence of the three Italian 
pension reforms.
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much lower benefits (after the Prodi reform, or the post-reform period), at least for 
some categories of workers. We regard the availability of low frequency microeconomic 
data as a major improvement with respect to previous evidence.
The top panel of Table 4.1 compares statutory retirement ages in the pre-1992 
regime with the post-1997 regime. For brevity we refer to workers with more than 
18 years of contributions in 1995 as the “old”, to those with less than 18 years of 
contributions in 1995 as the “middle aged”, and to those who started working after 
1995 as the “young”. In the new regime the young are entitled to a flexible retirement 
age (from 57 to 65), subject to incentives. For those already working in 1995 (the old 
and the middle-aged), the reform raises minimum retirement age for old age pensions of 
private sector employees (65 for men and 60 for women), but not for public employees 
and self-employed. For the old and middle aged, the reform raises minimum years of 
contributions for both seniority pensions and old age pensions; for the young, whose 
pension award formula is entirely contribution based (see below) the minimum years 
of contributions is just 5 years.
The shift to the new regime dramatically altered the pension award formula for 
new cohorts, but retained the main features of the pre-1992 formula for older workers. 
As indicated in the lower panel of Table 4.1, for the young the reform introduced 
contributions-based pension benefits. Specifically, in the new regime the pension is 
proportional to contributions, capitalized on the basis of a 5 years moving average 
of GDP growth. Since the contribution rate is 33 percent for private and public 
employees and 20 percent for the self-employed, in the new regime the self-employed 
will receive substantially lower pensions than employees. Actuarial equilibrium of the 
system is guaranteed by multiplying the sum of the contributions by a coefficient that 
takes into account life expectancy at retirement. The contributions-based model has 
identical minimum retirement age for males and females, in both old age and seniority 
pensions. However, the new regime applies only to the young cohorts, who entered the 
labor market after 1995, and will presumably start to retire after the year 2030.
For older workers, pensions are still computed using the earnings model. For the 
private sector, for instance, the pension is obtained as the number of years of con-
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Table 4.1: Retirement age and pension award formula after the Italian pension reforms
R ETIR EM EN T AGE
Old age pensions
Minimum retirement age Minimum years
Private sector Public sector Self-employed of contributions
Pre-1992 regime
All workers 60(55) 65(60) 
Post-1997 regime
65(60) 15
Progressively Progressively
Old rising to 65(60) 6 5 ( 6 0 ) 65(60) rising to 20
Progressively Progressively
Middle-aged rising to 65(60) 6 5 ( 6 0 ) 65(60) rising to 20
Young Subject to incentives: 57-65 5
Seniority pensions
Minimum years of contributions
Pre-1992 regime
All workers 35 20 35
Post-1997 regime
40 before age 57 40 before age 58
Old 35 after age 57 35 after age 58
40 before age 57 40 before age 58
Middle-aged 35 after age 57 35 after age 58
Young Abolished
PEN SIO N  AWARD FORM ULA
P rivate  sector Public sector Self-employed
Pre-1992 regime
All workers 2% of 2.33% of 2% of
(Earnings model) N con trib  * V—5 N contrib  * V— 1 N contrib  * U—10
Post-1997 regime
Old Gradually to 2% of Gradually to 2%of Gradually to 2% of
(Earnings model) N con trib  * 2/—10 N contrib  * V—10 N contrib  * D—15
Middle-aged Earnings model before 1995, contribution model after 1995
(Pro-rata model)
Young Contributions capitalised at 5-yr moving average of GDP growth.
(Contribution model) Capitalised sum multiplied by otRetAge
Notes: Old, middle-aged and young refer, respectively, to workers with more than 18 years of contributions in 
1995, less than 18 years of contributions in 1995, or started working after 1995.
In the top panel, female retirement age is in brackets when different from males.
Ncontrib =  number of years of contribution. y_t =  average of the fineil t  years of earnings. aR etAge =  coefficient 
that is a function of retirement age, to take into account life expectancy.
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tributions, times 2 percent of the average of the last 10 years of salaries. For the 
middle-aged (less than 18 years of contributions as of 1995), pensions axe computed 
according to a “pro-rata model”: earnings-related for working years before 1995, and 
contribution-related afterwards. The Appendix (section 4.7.1) provides further details 
on pension award formula before and after the reform, and of the specific provisions 
for public and private employees and self-employed.
While Table 4.1 provides a qualitative assessment of the pension reform, in order 
to show the magnitudes involved, in Table 4.2 we compute statutory replacement 
rates of before and after the reform of a worker retiring at 62 years, after 37 years 
of contributions. The example posits that the growth rate of individual earnings is 
2 percent, and that the aggregate GDP growth rate is 1.5 percent. We distinguish 
between three categories of workers (private, public, self-employed), three cohorts (old, 
middle-age, young) and two periods (before and after the reform). The replacement 
rate is defined as the ratio of the first year’s pension to the last year’s earnings.3
In the pre-reform regime the replacement rates were the same for old, middle-aged 
and young workers, because the earnings model applied to all. However, in that regime 
replacement rates did differ considerably across occupational groups: 71.1 percent for 
private employees, 86.2 percent for public employees and 67.8 percent for the self- 
employed. The higher rates for public employees reflect more generous accrual rates 
(see Table 4.1) and pension award formulas (pensionable earnings were just the last 
salary).
After the reform workers are distinguished according to the number of years of 
contributions in 1995. In our example we still posit that each worker plans to retire 
after 37 years of work, but distinguish between an old worker with 27 years of con­
tributions in 1995, a middle-aged with 10 years of contributions in 1995, and a young 
person who starts working in 1996. After the reform, the replacement rates of old 
private employees and self-employed axe practically unaffected (-1 and -0.9 percent), 
while that of the old public employees falls by 5 percentage points. This differential
3We do not distinguish here between males and females, because the same pension accrual formula 
applies to both groups.
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Table 4.2: The statutory replacement rate before and after the pension reform
Pre-reform Post-reform Difference
Private employees
Old 71.1 70.1 -1.0
Middle-aged 71.1 64.0 -7.1
Young 71.1 61.7 -9.4
Public employees
Old 86.2 81.2 -5.0
Middle-aged 86.2 66.9 -19.3
Young 86.2 61.7 -24.5
Self-employed
Old 67.8 66.9 -0.9
Middle-aged 67.8 45.2 -22.6
Young 67.8 37.4 -30.4
Notes: In the post-reform period, for middle-aged and young the replacement rate is based on the assumptions 
that the growth rate of earnings is 2 percent per year and the growth rate of aggregate GDP is 1.5 percent. In 
all cases the retirement age is 62, and each worker contributes for 37 year before retiring. In the post-reform 
regime the example considers an old worker who contributes 27 years before 1995 and 10 years after, and a 
middle-aged worker who contributes 10 years before 1995 and 27 years after.
effect is largely due to the reduced accrual rate of public employees (from 2.33 to 2 
percent).
In contrast, middle-aged and especially young workers experience a much more 
dramatic reduction in replacement rates due to the reform. For private employees the 
change is -7.1 points for the middle-aged and -9.4 for the young; for public employees, 
-19.3 and -24.5 percent, respectively; and for the self-employed -22.6 and -30.4.
In summary, Table 4.2 shows that the reform has reduced pension benefits for the 
middle aged and the young, and for all cohorts of public employees. The implied 
magnitudes of change are substantial, because for some of the categories involved the 
replacement rate falls by over 20 percentage points. On the other hand, old private 
employees and old self-employed workers were basically unaffected by the reform. The
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Italian pension reforms therefore provide a quasi-experimental framework to analyze 
the impact of reforms on individual expectations. Since the reform affects some pop­
ulation groups (the middle-aged, the young, and public employees) more dramatically 
than others (old private employees and old self-employed), we can study the impact of 
the reform by comparing the changes in the behavior of different groups of individuals 
before and after the reform.
4.3 E xpectations o f retirem ent outcom es
A recent strand of literature has analyzed the role of expectations in determining 
retirement outcomes in the U.S. and Europe. In general, the literature finds that 
expectations are reasonably informative about retirement outcomes, but also uncovers 
substantial heterogeneity across the population and reveals that many workers lack 
knowledge about the details of their pension plans. The earliest paper is Bernheim 
(1990), who compares retirement expectations and realizations in the U.S. Retirement 
History Survey and finds that men and wealthier individuals make more accurate 
plans. Disney and Tanner (1999) analyze expectations of retirement age in the U.K. 
Retirement Survey, and find that marital status and education have a significant effect 
in explaining systematic deviations of expectations from outcomes. The focus of the 
paper is on the distribution of actual retirement age, conditional on a given expected 
retirement age, rather than on the overall distribution of expectations and realizations. 
Gustman and Steinmeier (2001) use data from the U.S. Health and Retirement Study 
to analyze the degree of information about social security and private pensions. They 
find only a weak relation between expected retirement benefits and benefits estimated 
on the basis of social security earnings records and employers’ descriptions of pension 
plans.
In this chapter, like most of the recent studies, we use point expectations.4 How-
4Some studies focus on the subjective probability distribution of retirement outcomes, rather than 
on point expectations of retirement age and benefits. Hurd and McGarry (1995) analyze the subjective 
probability distribution of the chance of working full-time past age 62 and of living to age 75 in the 
U.S. Health and Retirement Study. Dominitz, Manski and Heinz (2002) use the Survey of Economic
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ever, while the focus of previous literature is mainly on expected retirement age, we 
focus on expected replacement rate, defined as the expected ratio of the first pension 
to the last salary. For any given expected retirement age, the replacement rate is a 
convenient summary measure of the generosity of the pension system and therefore 
a good proxy for expected pension wealth. Our data are repeated cross-sections, as 
opposed to the longitudinal data provided by the Health and Retirement Surveys in 
the U.S. or the U.K. The main advantage of the data used in the present study is that 
the sample spans a period set of intense pension reforms, which deeply changed the 
social security system.
The survey -  the SHIW - is a large random sample of the Italian population drawn 
by the Bank of Italy every two years. Sample design, interviewing procedure, re­
sponse rates and a comparison between sample and population means are reported in 
the Appendix (section 4.7.3). The survey covers several important topics related to 
retirement and pensions and collects data on the subjective assessment of expected re­
tirement age and replacement rate. All workers (public employees, private employees, 
self-employed) are asked the following questions:
• When do you expect to retire?
• Think about when you will retire, and consider only the public pension (that
is, exclude private pensions, if you have one). At the time of retirement, what fraction 
of labor income will your public pension be ?
In Italy only about 5 percent of the workers are covered by occupational pension 
schemes, so for the overwhelming majority the social security replacement rate coin­
cides with the overall replacement rate. The first question is posed in each survey year 
from 1989 to 2002; the second question only in 1989, 1991, 2000 and 2002. Since we 
are interested in studying workers’ expectations about retirement income, we focus on 
the group aged 20 to 50 years. This implies that we include in our sample individuals 
born between 1939 (who were 50 years old in 1989) and 1982 (20 years old in 2002).
Expectations, which elicits the subjective probability distributions of eligibility for social security 
benefits and of the level of benefits. They report a high degree of uncertainty about future benefits 
even for people only ten years from retirement.
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The composition of the sample of older workers is likely to reflect self-selection into 
higher expected retirement ages, and so these workers are dropped from the analysis. 
A small number of individuals younger than 20 are also excluded (less than 1 percent 
of the sample). We focus on how expectations change after the reform and therefore 
drop workers that are interviewed in the transitional years.
We define as the pre-reform period the pooled 1989-91 sample, while the post­
reform period is the pooled 2000-02 sample. Finally, we consider only workers who are 
employed or self-employed in the survey year, excluding the unemployed, retirees and 
other individuals not in the labor force. Overall, we have valid responses on expected 
replacement rate for 9,766 males and 5,955 females.
As explained in Section 4.2, the pension reform has different effects depending on 
whether workers had contributed for more or less than 18 years at the end of 1995, and 
different again for those who started working after 1995. The SHIW records the age at 
which individuals started working. This allows us to compute the years of contribution 
at the end of 1995 for each worker and to define our groups accordingly.5
As a preliminary step, we compare the replacement rate that people expect with the 
rate that they should expect, given the relevant pension legislation at the time of the 
interview and the declared expected retirement age (henceforth “statutory replacement 
rate”). Pooling all observations, we find that for 75 percent of the sample the expected 
replacement rate is higher than the statutory rate. Expectation errors are higher for 
private employees, for the better educated and for females (for brevity, these regressions 
are not reported). These findings are in line with previous research, which generally 
concludes that there is considerable heterogeneity in expectations, and that many 
workers lack precise knowledge about their public pensions.6 What is most interesting,
5 Our imputation procedure assumes no unemployment spells during the working life and is therefore 
subject to a certain amount of measurement error. As a sensitivity check, we assume that each 
individual starts working and contributing at age 2 0  (or 2 2 ) and define years of contribution as current
age less 20 (or 22). These alternative definitions do not affect any of our results.
6 Other surveys confirm that predictions of pension-related variables are not accurate. Boeri, Brsch-
Supan and Tabellini (2001) analyze the results of a recent European survey on 1,000 households 
showing that only two thirds of individuals give the correct answer when asked about the social 
security contribution rate.
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however, is to compare the replacement rate of specific employment groups and cohorts 
before and after the reform.
4.4 The effect o f the pension reform on expectations
We use a difference-in-difference framework to study how the expected replacement 
rate has been affected by the three pension reforms. As with other studies that use 
a quasi-experimental framework, our tests rely on the assumptions that the pension 
reform is exogenous with respect to individual decisions -  in particular, with respect 
to retirement age -  and changes in sample composition. As far as the first assumption 
is concerned, we believe that the possible endogeneity of the reform can be safely ruled 
out. The reform was not implemented in order to offset different paths of retirement 
ages by different cohorts or employment groups. Rather, the 1992 reform was part of a 
major deficit-reduction package, prompted by a severe political crisis coupled with the 
dramatic devaluation of the lira; and it was followed shortly by the deepest recession 
of the post-wax era. The 1995 and 1997 reforms were prompted by the huge projected 
deficits of the social security system and the attempt to meet the Maastricht criteria.
The second assumption posits that shifts in sample composition are exogenous 
with respect to pension expectations. Cohorts and gender axe obviously determined 
at birth. As fax as employment gxoups are concerned, we require that mobility across 
various sectors (for instance, from public to private employment or self-employment) 
axe independent of pension expectations, i.e. that workers did not switch jobs as a 
result of the pension reform itself. Since the SHIW has a rotating panel component, we 
can check the validity of this assumption by computing the transition rates across the 
three employment groups between each pair of adjacent survey years from 1989 to 2002; 
the Appendix (section 4.7.4) reports the transition rates for 1989-91 and 2000-02. We 
find that, in each period, the probability of not changing sector is about 90 percent for 
each of the three groups. Furthermore, we do not reject the hypothesis that the degree 
of sector mobility is the same before and after the reform for each of the estimated 
transition matrices.7 Although we cannot test directly the hypothesis that workers 
rAs an example, consider the Shorrocks mobility index in 1989-91 (12.5 percent) and 2000-02 (13
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did not change sector as a consequence of the reform, we take this as indirect evidence 
that the pension reform has not changed the overall pattern of workers’ mobility across 
sectors.
4.4 .1  D escrip tive  analysis
Table 4.3 reports the expected replacement rate of males and females in the various
employment groups and cohorts considered. On average, the rate is high for all groups,
for both males and females, reflecting the generous provisions of the Italian social
security system. The expected rate ranges from 65.3 to 81.8 percent before the reform,
and from 57.3 to 79.9 percent afterwards, and attains the highest value for public
employees (between 74 and 82 percent for males, and between 69 and 74 percent for
females). On the other hand, the self-employed report the lowest replacement rates.
The expected replacement rates decrease after the reform, for both males and
females, and for all employment groups. For males, the reduction of the middle-aged
is stronger than for the old, particularly for private employees (-8.4 percentage points)
and self-employed (-12.2 points). Replacement rates also fall for females, but the
difference between the old and the middle-aged is not as large as that for males.8
Qualitatively, the reduction in the expected replacement rate is consistent with
several features of the reform. However, for most groups the magnitude of adjustment
is not as large as implied by the reform. This can be seen by comparing the expected
replacement rates with the statutory rates after the reform. For this purpose, we cannot
use the example of,Table 4.2, where we keep retirement age and years of contributions
fixed. The reason is that the pension accrual formula relates the replacement rate
to years of contributions, and therefore workers could offset part of the reduction in
pension benefits by raising retirement age after the reform. As a result, the statutory
percent). The statistical test does not reject the hypothesis that mobility is the same in the two
periods (the associated statistic is 0.12 and is normally distributed with mean zero and variance equal
to one). The same test can be performed for each of the transition matrices (1991-93, 1993-95, 1995-98,
1998-2000), and in all cases we do not reject the hypothesis that mobility is constant.
8 In Table 3, no comparison is possible for young workers because this group is not observed before
the reform.
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Table 4.3: Expected and statutory replacement rate: descriptive statistics
Males
Expected S ta tu to ry
Pre­
reform
Post­
reform Difference
Pre­
reform
Post­
reform Difference
Private employees
Old 79.2 74.9 -4.3 71.2 71.5 0.3
Middle-aged 79.2 70.8 -8.4 71.2 66.8 -4.4
Young 67.9 67.0
Public employees
Old 81.8 79.9 -1.9 86.2 80 -6.2
Middle-aged 80.6 76.6 -4 83.9 69.2 -14.7
Young 73.9 66.2
Self-employed
Old 69.0 61.2 -7.8 71.5 69.9 -1.5
Middle-aged 71.2 59.0 -12.2 69.6 49.2 -20.4
Young 61.8 41.1
Females
Private employees
Old 77.2 71.1 -6.1 67.3 71.5 4.2
Middle-aged 76.9 70.0 -6.9 67.3 62.1 -5.2
Young 67.2 61.2
Public employees
Old 78.3 74.0 -4.3 79.2 79.5 0.3
Middle-aged 78.3 72.8 -5.5 76.9 65.4 -11.5
Young 69.1 55.3
Self-employed
Old 65.3 57.3 -8 67.8 69.9 2.1
Middle-aged 69.7 58.9 -10.8 62.3 45.2 -17.1
Young 57.4 35.5
Notes: Data are drawn from the 1989-2002 SHIW. The pre-reform period is 1989-91, the post-reform period is
2000- 02 .
rates after the reform would reflect not only differences in pension rules across groups 
and pension regimes, but also the increase in retirement age.
To compute the statutory replacement rate, we therefore need information on re­
tirement age after the reform. We indeed find that expected retirement age increases
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after the reform (about 2 years for males and 3 years for females), which in turn entails 
higher replacement rates. It follows that the reduction in the statutory rates in Table
4.3 is lower than in Table 4.2, although the pattern is similar: the largest reductions 
in the statutory rates are for middle-aged public employees and self-employed.
We now compare the expected and the statutory rates in Table 4.3, focusing on 
the middle-aged, the group that is most affected by the reform. For males, the two 
groups that face the largest reductions in the statutory rates (public employees and 
self-employed) are also those whose expected replacement rates after the reform are 
furthest away from the statutory rates. For example, although self-employed have 
revised their expectations down by 12.2 percentage points after the reform, they should 
have further reduced them by 9.8 percentage points to reach the statutory level of 
49.2. Similarly, the post-reform expected replacement rate is above the statutory 
one by 7.4 and 4 percentage points for, respectively, public employees and private 
employees. For females, the difference between post-reform expected and statutory 
replacement rates is similar for private and public employees (7.9 and 7.4 percentage 
points, respectively) and larger for the self-employed (13.7). Overall, the comparison 
indicates that expectations move in the direction suggested by the reform, but that 
the magnitude of the revision in expectations is not as large as implied by the reform.
4 .4 .2  R egression  estim ates
The drawback of looking at differences in the expected replacement rate over time is 
that this depends not only on the pension reforms, but also on other economy-wide 
phenomena. To control for other factors potentially affecting the expected replacement 
rate, we turn to a difference-in-difference framework. We can identify the effect of the 
reform on the expected replacement rate because there is one group of individuals 
(old private employees) that was unaffected by the reform, while other groups (public 
employees, self-employed, the young and the middle-aged) were affected and should 
have revised their expectations downward. Therefore to disentangle the effect of the 
reforms on expectations from other effects, such as common trends in determinants 
of labor supply and business cycle effects, we compare the difference over time in the
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replacement rate of the middle-aged with the same difference for the old.
It is important to notice that our approach does not require panel data. What we 
need to observe is a representative sample of the various groups in each of the two 
periods and therefore rely on repeated cross-sectional data. The young cannot be used 
to evaluate the effect of the reform because they entered the labor market after 1995. 
Since they were sampled only after the reform was in place, they are dropped from the 
analysis.
We pool all data from pre- and post-reform periods and specify a reduced form 
for the expected replacement rate cr. We assume that before the reform o is a linear 
function of socio-demographic variables X , employment status (private, public, self- 
employed) and depends on whether the years of contributions of 1995 are more or less 
than 18:
= Xij3 -b Qio ~b PUBiai -b SELFiOi2 4" MiSi -b Mi * PJJB{52 -b Mi * S ELFi53 +  £i (4.1)
The reference group in the regression equation is the group of old, private employees; 
the dummy variable M  equals 1 for the middle-aged (less than 18 years of contribu­
tions as of 1995). The a coefficients capture the different rules applying to public 
employees (PUB)  and self-employed (SELF)  relative to private employees, whereas 
the 6 coefficients measure the potential differences between middle-aged and old of 
the three employment groups. After the reform cr potentially shifts for all groups, 
so we augment the previous equation with terms that interact the cohort (M), the 
post-reform period (POST,  where P O S T  equals one for the post-reform period) and 
the employment status (SELF, PUB):
Oi =  X t f  +  a 0 +  P U B ia i +  SELFia2 +  M{81 +  M{ * PUB,iS2 +  Mi * SELFi83 +
+  POSTi<f)i +  POSTi * PUBi<t>2 +  POSTi * SELFifo  +
+  POSTi * M i* P U B a i  +  POSTi * M i* SELFil2 +  POSTi * M{ * PRIVm  -b e*
(4.2)
The (f) coefficients capture the change in a after the reform for the three employment 
groups: 4>i measure the change for old private employees and <j>2 and (f>3 the additional
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effects for public employees and self-employed. The 7  coefficients measure the change 
in <t for the middle aged due to the reform, and are our main parameters of interest. 
We expect the reform to reduce the replacement rate (71 <  0,72  <  0,73  <  0) ,  and 
that this reduction is smallest for private employees and largest for the self-employed, 
as shown in Table 3 (73 >  71 >  72).
The model is estimated separately for males and females, omitting the transitional 
1993-1997 period. Table 4.4 reports the results. In the first specification we drop the 
control vector X , and regress cr on a set of group dummies. The results confirm the 
descriptive analysis. The coefficient estimates indicate that after the reform there is a 
reduction in the replacement rate of private employees by 4.2 percentage points (the 
estimated 73). The coefficients 71 and 72 for public employees and self-employed are 
both negative, but only 72 differs statistically from zero.
To benchmark the estimated 7 ’s, recall from Table 4.3 that cr should change by -4.4 
percentage points for middle-aged private employees, -14.7 for public employees, and 
-20.4 for self-employed. Subtracting from these numbers the corresponding differences 
for the old, the appropriate benchmark for the difference-in-difference estimates is -4.7 
for private employees, -8.5 for public employees, and -18.9 for the self-employed. Ac­
cording to the estimates in the first regression of Table 4.4, the difference-in-difference 
estimates are -4.2 for private employees, -2.0 for public employees and -4.3 for the 
self-employed. The coefficient for private employees is close to the benchmark, but the 
other two coefficients imply considerable underestimation of the effect of the reform.
The second regression adds to the basic specification regional and educational dum­
mies and annual earnings (in thousand Euro). Working in the South and the level of 
income are positively related to cr. The effect of the education dummies is positive for 
high school, negative for university degree but never statistically different from zero. 
The 7 ’s are qualitatively unchanged, confirming partial adjustment of the expected 
replacement rate in the new pension regime.
The regressions for females uncover an across-the-board reduction in cr after the 
reform by 6.1 percentage points, but the employment dummies interacted with M  and 
POST  signal no differential effect by employment groups or cohort after the reform.
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Table 4.4: The effect of the reform on the expected replacement rate: regression results
Males Females
Private, middle-aged, after -4.202 -4.552 -0.718 -0.796
(0.960)** (0.957)** (1.427) (1.411)
Public, middle-aged, after -2.046 -2.585 -1.182 -1.476
(1.357) (1.353) (1.336) (1.324)
Self-e., middle-aged, after -4.291 -4.298 -3.118 -2.868
(1.511)** (1.504)** (2.375) (2.350)
Public employee 2.689 2.501 1.077 -0.483
(0.696)** (0.699)** (0.960) (0.974)
Self employed -10.046 -5.956 -12.020 -6.733
(0.839)** (0.965)** (1.405)** >—1 Ul © 00 * *
Middle-aged 0.109 0.916 -0.421 -0.251
(0.684) (0.689) (1.027) (1.022)
Public, middle-aged -1.357 -1.603 0.414 0.695
(1.148) (1.144) (1.385) (1.371)
Self-e., middle-aged 1.968 1.096 4.959 4.267
(1.341) (1.339) (2.074)* (2.053)*
Post-reform -4.289 -3.961 -6.110 -5.735
(0.716)** (0.715)** (1.136)** (1.124)**
Public, after 2.325 2.453 1.797 2.317
(1.226) (1.221)* (1.532) (1.518)
Self-e., after -3.632 -3.874 -1.735 -2.188
(1.317)** (1.313)** (2.110) (2.089)
Central Italy 0.724 0.362
(0.431) (0.526)
Southern Italy 1.249 2.569
(0.370)** (0.517)**
Earnings 0.235 0.413
(0.027)** (0.045)**
High school degree 0.622 1.587
(0.356) (0.486)**
University degree -0.429 0.775
(0.586) (0.708)
Constant 79.182 74.249 77.215 70.683
(0.425)** (0.673)** (0.737)** (0.956)**
Observations 9766 9766 5955 5955
R-squared 0.16 0.17 0.11 0.13
Notes: All explanatory variables are dummy variables, except earnings (expressed in thousand euro). Young 
workers, who started working after 1995, are excluded. Standard errors robust to unknown form of heteroskedas- 
ticity are reported in parentheses. Two stars indicate statistical significance at the 1% confidence level, one 
star at the 5% level.
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The corresponding coefficients axe not statistically different from zero, while Table 4.3 
implies a large reduction in cr for each employment group.
In summary, the regressions of Table 4.4 suggest that most groups have revised 
their expectations in the direction and magnitude implied by the reform. But the 
revision to the new pension rules has been far from complete. Two interpretations of 
the results axe possible: an anticipation effect, or lack of information. If the reform had 
been anticipated, people would have adjusted downward the expected replacement rate 
even before the reform. This explanation clashes with the fact that, on average, the 
1989-91 expected replacement rates were quite close to - or even overestimated - the 
statutory rates. Furthermore, the anticipation effect should be stronger in the years 
immediately before the reform; however, dropping 1991 and defining the pre-reform 
period as just 1989 does not change the results with respect to estimates in Table 
4.4. Therefore, the most likely explanation for our findings is that, as of 2002, many 
workers did not fully understand the implications of the new pension regime and had 
not yet updated their pension expectations accordingly.
4.5 The offset betw een  pension w ealth  and private w ealth  
accum ulation
So far our analysis suggests that people reacted to the pension reform by raising ex­
pectations of retirement age and reducing perceived replacement rates and pension 
wealth. However, the magnitude of the expectation revision is considerably lower than 
the actual magnitudes implied by the reform. This is an important first step in eval­
uating the effect of pension reforms on individual behavior. The next important step 
relates perceived pension wealth to private accumulation. Since the reform provides 
an exogenous source of vaxiation in pension wealth across socio-economic and demo­
graphic groups, we are in a good position to assess the extent to which the revision in 
retirement age and replacement rate leads to changes in private wealth. In this section 
we therefore estimate the offset between pension wealth and private wealth using the 
reform as an instrument for pension wealth.
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Our empirical specification relates private wealth to pension wealth, and to a set 
of observable variables potentially correlated with private wealth. More specifically, 
we estimate the following equation:
WYit = ot + SSW YitS + X it7 + 0t +  s it (4.3)
where WYn is private wealth of household i at time t , scaled by household dispos­
able income, SSWYit is the ratio of expected pension wealth at retirement to earnings 
(evaluated at time t), Xu  is a vector that includes age of the household head,9 dispos­
able income, employment group dummies, education dummies, and region dummies;10 
6t represents time effects. Age, income, education and employment sector are proxies 
for lifetime earnings, while year dummies capture macroeconomic effects. Sensitivity 
analysis is performed to check, among other aspects, for the inclusion of an additional 
vector of demographic characteristics such as family size and number of family workers.
Total net worth is defined as financial assets plus real assets (real estates and busi­
nesses) minus financial debt. As for the ratio of expected pension wealth at retirement 
to earnings (evaluated at time t), in order to keep its computation as simple and as 
tailored as possible to elicited expectations on the replacement rate and the retirement 
age, we use the following proxy for each worker’s pension wealth:
/ l i _  \ N t —t  1 t  / 1 I \  r - N t
SSW Yt = P (A r W _ ± ^ )  ot J 2  p (r\Nt) ( y ^ )  (*■*)
' J T=Nt
where ot is the expected replacement rate and Nt the expected retirement age elicited 
at time t,n  T  the maximum length of life, p(r\N) the probability of surviving to age 
t , conditional on being alive at age N, gu the growth rate of earnings for group u, r 
the real interest rate, and the growth rate of pension benefits during retirement - 
assumed to be the same for all groups.
In the survey we observe at and Nt for each individual. Survival probabilities are 
taken from the Italian life tables, by age and gender, for the years 1990 and 2000, so
We define the head of the household as the partner with higher earnings.
10In the regressions, the reference group is private employees with less than 13 years of education
and living in Northern Italy.
n t=1989, 1991, 2000, 2002, the survey years in which the expected replacement rate is elicited.
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that the change in life expectancy over time, and in particular before and after the 
reform, is accounted for.12 The growth rate of earnings (gu) is estimated from our 
data at 0.015 for individuals with university degree and at 0.008 for individuals with 
less than university degree.13 We assume that after retirement pensions are constant 
in real terms (gpj = 0) and that the real interest rate is equal to 2 percent.
Armed with this information, we can compute the expected ratio of pension wealth 
for each individual in the sample. In households with more than one member, we define 
the household expected pension wealth-to-income ratio at retirement as the weighted 
sum of both partners’ expected pension wealth-to-income ratio, where each partner is 
given her relative weight in terms of her income in relation to the income of the couple.
The individual expected pension wealth-to-income ratio is adjusted by the factor 
suggested by Gale (1998). This factor allows to adjust expected pension wealth for the 
number of years people have contributed to their pension plan as well as for when in 
their life cycle they have experienced some shock that should have made them revise 
their consumption and savings plans (the reforms, in our case). Omitting to adjust for 
this factor would produce an underestimate of the offset between pension wealth and 
private wealth, i.e. the estimates for the pension wealth coefficient would be biased 
towards zero. The adjustment depends on the utility function that is chosen for the 
underlying life-cycle model and on the values for the discount rate, the interest rate 
and the time preference rate (see Appendix, section 4.7.2, for further details). We 
use the adjustment developed in Gale (1998) for a CRRA utility function and set the 
discount rate and the interest rate equal to 2 percent. Sensitivity analysis is then 
performed on these values.
4.5 .1  R egression  estim a tes
Table 4.5 presents the results obtained from, respectively, OLS (col. 1-2) and median 
regressions (col. 3-4). To further characterize the distribution of the wealth-income
12Data source: Italian Statistical Annex (Rome: ISTAT, 1990 and 2000).
13The growth rates were obtained from a median regression of log-earnings on sex and employment 
dummies and full interaction of age with a college dummy. Data source: SHIW, years 1989-2002, 
individuals with age 20-60.
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ratio, we rely on estimates based on least absolute deviations, which are consistent and 
asymptotically normal in the presence of thick tailed error distributions.14
Table 4.5: The offset between private wealth and pension wealth: OLS and LAD 
estimates
OLS LAD
SSW/Disposable Income -0.403 -0.167 -0.474 -0.254
(0.043)** (0.044)** (0.035)** (0.032)**
Year 1991 0.641 0.754 0.596 0.580
(0.187)** (0.182)** (0.150)** (0.132)**
Year 2000 1.384 1.464 0.804 0.851
(0.183)** (0.180)** (0.147)** (0.131)**
Year 2002 1.700 1.784 0.752 0.909
(0.190)** (0.187)** (0.152)** (0.135)**
Age 0.134 0.101 0.161 0.114
(0.011)** (0.011)** (0.009)** (0.008)**
High School Degree 1.018 0.643
(0.133)** (0.097)**
University Degree 0.855 0.454
(0.206)** (0.150)**
Disposable Income 0.012 0.034
(0.003)** (0.002)**
Self-employed 3.574 1.974
(0.159)** (0.115)**
Public employee 0.279 0.345
(0.154) (0.112)**
Central Italy 0.092 0.319
(0.160) (0.116)**
Southern Italy -0.279 -0.065
(0.141)* (0.102)
Constant -0.990 -1.869 -2.543 -3.202
(0.410)* (0.409)** (0.328)** (0.297)**
Observations 9462 9462 9462 9462
R-squared 0.04 0.10
Notes: Standard errors robust to unknown form of heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses. Two stars 
indicate statistical significance at the 1% confidence level, one star at the 5% level.
14We also perform trimmed legist squares, discarding the top and bottom 1 percent of the private 
wealth-income ratio distribution. The results are qualitatively unchanged.
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In columns (1) and (3) we report the results of a specification that includes only the 
pension wealth to income ratio, time dummies and age, whereas in columns (2) and (4) 
we report the results of the full specification as in equation (4.3). The offset between 
private wealth and pension wealth is, respectively, 40 percent and 47 percent, and 
statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level, for the OLS and LAD baseline 
specifications. The full specification gives an offset of, respectively, 17 percent and 25 
percent, again significant at the 1 percent level.15
The estimates indicate that the wealth-income ratio increases with age during the 
working span (recall that individuals over 50 are excluded), in agreement with the life­
cycle model. The extended specifications further signal that private wealth increases 
with labor income. The latter should not affect the wealth-income ratio if preferences 
are homothetic. The regression coefficient, on the other hand, can hardly be interpreted 
as evidence in favor or against homothetic preferences since other variables (education 
or residence in the South) may also proxy for lifetime earnings. Residence in the South 
reduces wealth accumulation; education has an opposite effect. These variables are 
obviously related to household resources. But they may also capture other effects. For 
instance, there is evidence that the better educated are more likely to report financial 
assets (Brandolini and Cannari, 1994); households with higher education may have 
easier access to capital markets and to better investment opportunities; thrift may be 
correlated with schooling.
The results in Table 4.5, however, understate the offset between pension wealth 
and private wealth if pension wealth and private wealth are positively correlated. This 
might be the case if thrift and hard work are correlated tastes, and people with these 
traits choose to save more and to retire with higher pension wealth. Since the pension 
reforms provide us with an exogenous source of variation for pension wealth, we can 
perform instrumental variable estimation and remove this source of bias from our 
estimated offset.
In particular, in equation (4.4) there are two potential sources of endogeneity: the
15Without the adjustment factor for pension wealth, the offset would be, respectively, 13 percent 
and 17 percent for OLS and LAD regressions.
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subjective replacement rate and the subjective retirement age. In a first IV regression 
we use as instrument the “statutory pension wealth”, computed by replacing only the 
expected replacement rate with the statutory rate (derived from legislation before and 
after the reform as explained in the Appendix, section 4.7.1). In a second IV regression 
statutory pension wealth is computed in relation to the statutory replacement rate and 
to the sample median expected retirement age, by gender, before and after the reform.16
The validity of these instruments rests on the fact that the rules for computing 
pension wealth change exogenously for the middle-aged after the reform, depending on 
employment group membership. It also depends on the assumption that the middle- 
aged did not switch jobs after the reform to offset the impact of the pension reform on 
their retirement wealth. Under this reasonable assumption, which is corroborated by 
the evidence on employment transition matrices discussed in Section 4.4 and reported 
in the Appendix (section 4.7.4), the instruments are also exogenous with respect to 
private wealth accumulation decisions.17
Results reported in Table 4.6 indicate that the offset between private wealth and 
pension wealth is considerably higher than the one resulting from OLS regressions, 
confirming the idea that the previous estimates are biased toward zero. The estimation 
with all the controls gives an offset of 31 percent and 52 percent, respectively, depending 
on the definition of statutory pension wealth used.18 We check the sensitivity of the 
results against the inclusion of family size and number of income recipients or a dummy 
for whether the number of family workers is greater than one among the vector of 
observable characteristics as in equation (4.3). We also introduce a quadratic term in 
age and show that the results are not sensitive to any of these changes in specification.
Another set of sensitivity checks relates the interest rates, the discount factor and 
the coefficient of relative risk-aversion that the computation of the Gale adjustment
16Median retirement age is set at 60 for males and at 55 for females before the reform and at 65 and
60, respectively, after the reform.
17Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) use similar employment-group instruments for pension wealth in
their study of the impact of the 1992 Italian pension reform on the household saving rate.
18We also run a regression of private wealth on statutory pension wealth (the instrument). The
estimated offset in the baseline specification is -0.669 (with a standard error of 0.051) and -0.459 (with 
a standard error of 0.052).
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Table 4.6: The offset between private wealth and pension wealth: instrumental variable 
estimation
IV ! IV2
SSW/Disposable Income -0.542 -0.309 -0.761 -0.525
(0.049)** (0.050)** (0.058)** (0.059)**
Year 1991 0.630 0.740 0.614 0.718
(0.187)** (0.182)** (0.188)** (0.183)**
Year 2000 1.216 1.288 0.953 1.020
(0.186)** (0.183)** (0.190)** (0.188)**
Year 2002 1.512 1.587 1.218 1.288
(0.193)** (0.190)** (0.197)** (0.195)**
Age 0.153 0.121 0.182 0.152
(0.012)** (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.013)**
High School Degree 1.016 1.013
(0.133)** (0.134)**
University Degree 0.826 0.782
(0.206)** (0.207)**
Disposable Income 0.010 0.007
(0.003)** (0.003)*
Self-employed 3.489 3.360
(0.160)** (0.161)**
Public employee 0.292 0.312
(0.154) (0.155)*
Central Italy 0.060 0.011
(0.161) (0.161)
Southern Italy -0.322 -0.388
(0.141)* (0.142)**
Constant -1.328 -2.156 -1.856 -2.594
(0.414)** (0.413)** (0.422)** (0.419)**
Observations 9462 9462 9462 9462
R-squared 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.09
Notes: In the first two regressions the statutory pension wealth-to-income ratio is constructed using the statu­
tory replacement rate and the expected retirement age. In the other regressions the statutory pension wealth- 
to-income ratio is constructed using the statutory replacement rate and median retirement age before and after 
the reform (60 for males and 55 for females before the reform and 65 and 60, respectively, after the reform). 
Standard errors robust to unknown form of heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses. Two stars indicate 
statistical significance at the 1% confidence level, one star at the 5% level.
factor involves. In particular, we check the sensitivity of the results to changes of x = 
[(r — 6)/p]—r, where r, 5 and p axe, respectively, the interest rates, the discount factor
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and the coefficient of relative risk-aversion. We have assumed earlier that x = 0.02, 
which is consistent, for instance, with r = 6 = 0.02. Setting x = —0.04 or x = —0.06 
gives smaller offsets, as expected. For instance, the offset in the full specification 
is, respectively, 13 percent and 12 percent for the OLS estimates; the first set of IV 
estimates gives, respectively, an offset of 25 percent and 23 percent for the two values of 
x, whereas the second set of IV estimates gives an offset of 42 percent and 35 percent.
Previous literature provides some evidence on the effect of the 1992 Italian pension 
reform on household saving. Using SHIW data for the years 1989-95, Attanasio and 
Brugiavini (2003) exploit the changes in pension wealth across cohorts and employment 
groups due to the 1992 reform to estimate the crowding out effect of pension wealth 
on the household saving rate. They find that a reduction in pension wealth of 1 euro 
prompts an increase in private saving of between 30 to 40 cents. Although these point 
estimates are not far from ours, we must bear in mind that there are at least three 
crucial differences between these two studies: we look at the combined impact of three 
pension reforms (1992, 1995 and 1997), focus on private wealth, rather than on saving, 
and rely on a different estimate of pension wealth, based on the expected retirement 
age and expected replacement rate, rather than computed from legislation.
4 .5 .2  Im plications
The estimated coefficient for the offset between pension wealth and private wealth 
means that, on average, there is fax from full crowding out of private accumulation in 
our sample of Italian households. Combining this information with our findings that 
people have revised their expectations on replacement rate and retirement age less 
than they should have following the reforms, makes the question of whether people are 
saving enough for their retirement of central interest.
To provide a sense of the magnitudes involved, let us look at the following case: a 
female aged 40 in the year 2000 (and belonging to the so-called middle-aged group with 
respect to the reform), single, public employee, with 13 years of education (i.e. non­
university graduate), after the reform expects to retire at age 60 with a replacement 
rate of 75 percent. Using equation (4.4), and applying the survival probabilities for a
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female of her age in 2000, her pension wealth-to-income ratio at retirement would be 
10.351. Setting her statutory retirement age at 60 and statutory replacement rate at 68 
percent,19 would give a statutory pension wealth-to-income ratio of 9.386, which would 
mean that her expectations overstate her pension wealth by 26,050 euro (at the annual 
median disposable income of 27,000 euro). Using the most optimistic estimates of 
-0.525 for the offset between pension wealth and private wealth, this would mean that 
this single household would adjust private wealth by 13,677 euro upon an unexpected 
change in pension wealth of 26,050 euro.
The results have also interesting implications for evaluations of how pension reforms 
affect private and national saving. On this front, one may be puzzled by the observe 
tion that over the past decade the Italian national saving rate has remained roughly 
constant, despite deep pension reforms reducing considerably pension wealth.20
The aggregate effect of the reform on national saving depends on the reaction of the 
old, the middle-aged, the young and those already retired, weighted by the respective 
shares of these groups in total population. The comparison between the statutory 
and the expected pension wealth reveals that the middle-aged have perceived only two 
thirds of the reduction in statutory pension wealth; furthermore, from the IV estimates 
in Table 4.6 only 50 percent4.5 of the reduction in perceived pension wealth has been 
offset by an increase in private wealth. The effect for the old is small, because for this 
group the change in actual and perceived pension wealth has been far more limited 21 
On the other hand, our regressions cannot predict the effect of the reform on those 
that retired before the reform, nor on those that entered the labor market after 1995
19This would still be 2.6 percent points higher than the statutory replacement rate for a female in
her employment and cohort group, as indicated in Table 3.
20In 1981-1990 the average gross national saving rate was 22.3 percent, while in 1991-2000 it was
21 percent (20.4 percent in 2000-01). Clearly pension reform is just one of the main determinants 
of national saving, so the figures do not rule out that the reduction in pension wealth has increased 
national saving, with offsetting effects from other sources. But the figures are suggestive of a limited
aggregate saving impact of the reform.
21Recall from Section 4.2 that pension reforms reduced pension of the elderly, particularly of public
employees, through changes in the pension award formula and indexation of benefits to cost of living 
rather than wages.
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(which are not included in the estimation). We speculate that for the former group 
there should be little effect, because the reform has mainly affected working cohorts 
and future generations, rather than the retired. As for the young, the effect might 
be more substantial, but as of today their weight in the total working population is 
still limited, and therefore an impact on the aggregate wealth and saving might not 
be visible. Overall, this might explain why the Italian saving rate has not increased 
despite the decade of pension reforms.
In summary, we find robust evidence that expected pension wealth is a substitute 
for private wealth. However, we also find that the pension reforms of the last decade 
did not have a large impact on the household private wealth and, consequently, on 
national saving. Two factors account for this result. First, the substitution between 
the two forms of wealth is only imperfect, with offset rates in the order of 0.5. Second, 
some households do not yet seem to have fully internalized the implications of the 
reform into their expectations of social security pensions or their retirement plans.
4.6 C onclusions
The Survey of Household Income and Wealth, a large representative sample of the 
Italian population, elicits expectations of replacement rates from workers interviewed 
in the years between 1989 and 2002, a period of intense pension reforms. The re­
forms reduced the replacement rate and increased retirement age, and had different 
impact on different cohorts and employment groups, providing exogenous variations in 
replacement rates to study the effect of pension reforms on expectations.
We find that pension reforms indeed affected expectations of retirement benefits. 
However, the revision in expectations is limited, and many individuals have not yet 
updated completely their expectations. For instance, while the perceived replacement 
rate of the self-employed falls by about 10 percentage points between 1989-91 and 
2000-02, in reality the rate falls by about 20 points. Moreover, we find that the offset 
between pension wealth and private wealth is only partial, in the order of 50 percent. 
This suggests that the effect of pension reform on individual behavior depends critically
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on the extent of the knowledge and information that individuals have about the social 
security system and changes to it, and has three important policy implications.
First, the descriptive and econometric analysis implies that current workers lack 
crucial information to fully understand the implications of the new pension regime, 
thus making a clear case for investing public resources in the dissemination of infor­
mation about pension rights, especially during periods of intense reform. Campaigns 
to increase financial literacy and the understanding of pension rules, and to provide 
individuals with regular statements of their expected retirement income, are impor­
tant steps in this direction. Second, this chapter suggests that if one wants to use 
observations of past pension reforms to make predictions about likely responses to 
new reforms, then one needs to estimate how responses in the past were limited by 
inaccurate updating of expectations, and how the new reform will affect expectations. 
Finally, given the dramatic reduction in replacement rates implied by the pension re­
form, combined with an incomplete offset between pension wealth and private wealth, 
it is likely that some individuals, especially the younger cohorts most affected by the 
reform, might not be saving enough for their old age. This might have a long-term 
impact on the well being of future retirees in the coming decades, when the generations 
affected by the pension reform will start to retire.
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4.7  A ppendix  to  chapter 4
4.7 .1  T he p en sion  award form ula before and after th e  reform
In the pre-reform regime social security benefits were computed according to an earnings- 
based formula:
pNwR
where p, N  and u j r  are, respectively, the accrual rate, the years of contributions and 
the average of the last R years of salary. The accrual rate is 2 percent for private 
employees and self-employed, and ranges from 2.2 to 2.5 percent for public employees, 
depending on the years of contribution; R  is 5 for private employees, 1 for public em­
ployees, and 10 for the self-employed.
In the post-reform regime pensions are computed distinguishing between three 
cases: earnings model for the old (more than 18 years of contributions in 1995), con­
tribution model for the young (started working after 1995), and pro-rata model for the 
middle-aged (less than 18 years of contributions as of 1995). In each case, different 
rules apply to public employees, private employees and self-employed.
For the old, benefits are the sum of two components. The first component is 
paq 2w r , where <292 is the number of years of contributions at the end of 1992. The 
second component reflects a gradual increase of R  to 10 for private and public employees 
and to 15 for the self-employed. Namely, for years of contributions between 1992 and 
1995, R is increased by 1; for years of contributions between 1995 and the year of 
retirement, R  is increased by the minimum of 5 and 2/3 of the years of contributions 
between 1995 and the year of retirement. For instance, for those retiring in 2000 R  is 
increased by 3; for those retiring in 2005 it is increased by 5. The second component 
is therefore:
p{oc 9 5  — (X92)wr' + p{N — a$s)wRii 
where <295 is years of contribution at end of 1995, R' = R  + 1 and
2
R" = R  4- min(5 , int(-(7V — 0:95))).
o
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Therefore, the pension for the old is:
/  R \  ( R R \  R a 92^ l - - j + a 95^ - - — j  N — WR
In practice, for realistic earnings growth rates, the second component has a small 
impact on the final pension with respect to the pre-reform regime.
For the young, benefits are computed according to a contribution model:
77- ^ 2  wtil + g)**-1-* 
t = 0
where r  is the contribution rate (0.33 for private and public employees and 0.20 for self- 
employed) and g a 5-year moving average of the GDP growth rate. Contributions are 
therefore proportional to earnings, capitalized on the basis of a 5-year moving average, 
and then transformed in flow benefits using a coefficient (7 ), set by legislators, that 
depends on retirement age and life expectancy. Currently, 7 increases from 4.720 
percent for somebody retiring at 57 to 6.136 percent for somebody retiring at 65.
For the middle-aged, benefits are computed using the earnings model for years of 
contributions before 1995, and the contribution model for years of contributions after 
1995. The pension is then equal to:
N - 1
p a 92w R  +  p { a 95 -  a 92) w N  P ' j r  wt( 1 + g)N~l~l
f=0!95
4.7 .2  T he a d ju stm en t factor for p en sion  w ealth
As in Gale (1998), we adjust pension wealth multiplying each individual’s expected 
pension wealth by a factor that takes into account people’s position in the life cycle and 
years of service in the pension as well as the position in people’s life cycle when a change 
in pension benefits takes place (the reforms, in our case). The underlying idea for the 
simplest theoretical model is that people plan their consumption at the beginning of 
their working career, and consumption is a function of total lifetime resources, that is 
earnings and pension benefits. Since decisions are based on total lifetime resources, the 
true offset between pension wealth and private wealth is 100 percent (coefficient of -1). 
However, as pointed out by Gale (1998, pp. 708-710) an estimate of the coefficient of
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pension wealth in a regression of private wealth on earnings to date, lifetime earnings 
and pension benefits, would not produce the true offset. The pension wealth coefficient 
would instead be between -1 and 0, and a function of the years of service in the pension 
and of the expected life horizon. In particular, in the case of a CRRA utility function, 
the coefficient would be as follows:
_  exp(xS  — 1) _  exp(xS — 1) 
exp(xT — 1) exp (x(le + S) — 1)
where x = Ly-  — r, and r ^interest rate, S =time preference rate, p coefficient of 
relative risk aversion, S  =years of service in the pension, T  =life span, and le =life 
expectancy.
Therefore, one would need to adjust pension wealth by this factor in order to re­
cover the true offset in the regression. Intuitively, this factor adjusts pension wealth to 
account for the fact that a change in pension wealth that takes place at the beginning 
of one’s career translates into a change in the consumption plan (and therefore in non­
pension wealth) over the life span. At time S, the reduction in non-pension wealth 
is captured by Q, and Q increases with S  to reflect the fact that the later in life we 
observe individual’s decisions, the more of the initial plan has already taken place.
A further aspect to be taken into account is given by the time at which the change 
in pension benefit is realized. For a generic time t*, Gale’s adjustment factor is:
q * _ exp(x{S -  t*) -  1) 
exp(:r(/e + S  — t*) — 1)
This accounts for the fact that individuals had to revise their plans at time t* and the 
remaining horizon over which they can realize their plans is shorter.
In our setting, we assume that r = 6 = 0.02 and apply different adjustment factors 
according to which group the individual belongs to. In particular, the so-called “Old” 
group is not affected by the reform, and therefore we apply a version of Q, corrected 
for the fact that individuals start contributing to the pension system at different ages
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(we observe this in the data), i.e.:
_  exp(—r(age — agew) — 1) 
exp(—r(le -f age — agew) — 1)
where age = age at which observed and agew = age at which started working. The 
adjustment factor for the group affected by the reform (“Middle-aged”) instead needs 
to take into account of the year in which the reform took place and is therefore a 
version of Q*. We assume that the year of the reform is 1995 and adjust pension 
wealth of individuals belonging to this group, and observed after the reform, by the 
following factor:
G* = exp(~r (Qfle ~ a9eref )  ~ 1)
exp(—r(le +  age — ageref) — 1)
where ageref = age at which the individual faced the reform.
4.7 .3  T he Survey  o f  H ou seh old  Incom e and W ealth
The SHIW is a representative sample of the Italian resident population. Sampling 
is in two stages, first municipalities and then households. Municipalities are divided 
into strata defined by regions and classes of population size (less than 20,000, 20,000 
to 40,000, more than 40,000). Households are then randomly selected from registry 
office records, see Biancotti et at. (2004) for details. From 1987 onward the survey 
is conducted every other year and covers about 24,000 individuals and 8,000 house­
holds, defined as groups of individuals related by blood, marriage or adoption and 
sharing the same dwelling. Interviews are conducted by a specialized agency with 
professional interviewers, and axe preceded by extensive training and meetings with 
Bank of Italy representatives. Interviews take place in person, by visiting the residence 
of the household. Because of its sample design and its collection of detailed wealth 
statistics, the SHIW is similar to the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which 
is representative of the U.S. population. The English version of the questionnaire, 
data and survey documentation can be downloaded from the Bank of Italy web site: 
http : / / www.bancaditalia.it
Table 4.7 compares the population and sample means of selected demographic 
variables (age, gender and region) in 1989,1991, 2000 and 2002. The population means
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axe obtained from the Italian Statistical Annex (Rome: ISTAT, 1989, 1991, 2000 and 
2002). Sample statistics are computed using the SHIW population weights, defined 
as the inverse of the probability of inclusion in the sample. Overall, the comparison 
indicates that the sample reflects fairly well the demographic characteristics of the 
Italian population and is stable over time.
Table 4.7: Population and sample means of selected variables
1989 1991 2000 2002
Popul. Sample Popul. Sample Popul. Sample Popul. Sample
Males 48.6 48.7 48.6 48.9 48.5 48.6 48.6 48.5
Females 51.4 51.3 51.4 51.1 51.5 51.4 51.4 51.5
Age <24 32.7 32.9 32.0 31.6 26.2 26.3 25.8 25.7
Age 25-44 28.6 28.8 29.2 28.7 30.8 30.7 30.9 29.1
Age 45-64 24.1 26.1 24.0 25.9 25.0 25.0 25.1 27.1
Age >65 14.5 12.3 14.8 13.8 18.0 18.0 18.2 18.1
North 44.3 46.5 44.8 44.3 44.6 44.6 44.7 44.7
Center 19.1 18.9 19.1 19.0 19.2 19.2 19.3 19.3
South 36.6 34.7 36.1 36.5 36.2 36.2 36.0 36.1
Notes: Sample statistics are computed using SHIW population weights, defined as the inverse of the probability 
of ample inclusion. Sources: Survey of Households Income and Wealth, Bank of Italy, and Italian Statistical 
Annex (Rome: ISTAT, 1989, 1991, 2000 and 2002).
4 .7 .4  E m ploym ent tran sition  m atrix
The rotating panel component of the SHIW allows us to compute sector transition 
matrices in 1989-91, 1991-93, 1993-95, 1995-98, 1998-2000, and 2000-02. Table 4.8 
reports two such transition matrices and shows that mobility across sector is stable 
over time. All elements on the main diagonal are close to 90 percent. The Shorrocks 
mobility index is 12.5 percent in 1989-91 and 13 percent in 2000-02. The hypothesis 
that the mobility index did not change after the reform cannot be rejected at the 1 
percent level (the statistic associated to the difference test is 0.12 and is distributed
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as a standard normal). Comparison with mobility matrices for other years confirms 
this result. We interpret the stability of the employment transition matrix as indirect 
evidence that the pension reform did not change the pattern of mobility across the 
three sectors.
Table 4.8: Transition matrix among employment groups
1991
1989 Private sector Public sector Self-employed
Private sector 0.89 0.09 0.02
Public sector 0.07 0.92 0.01
Self employed 0.05 0.02 0.93
2002
2000 Private sector Public sector Self-employed
Private sector 0.88 0.08 0.03
Public sector 0.08 0.91 0.01
Self employed 0.00 0.03 0.97
Notes: The upper left cell in each panel reports the probability of working in the private sector in years t  and 
t  +  1. The other cells have similar interpretation. The generic cell i, j  gives the probability of working in sector 
i in year t and in sector j  in year t +  1.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis has focussed on some open issues within the life cycle framework. Chapters 
2 and 3 dealt with home-ownership decisions and their relation to labour supply, the 
former in an empirical analysis, and the latter in a structural lifecycle model. Chapter 4 
took up the theme of how expectations should be incorporated in an empirical analysis, 
and provided some evidence that relates to the so called “retirement-consumption 
puzzle”.
More specifically, chapter 2 presented empirical evidence for the UK of a pos­
itive relationship between female participation in the labour market and mortgage 
commitments. This relationship is seen to persist even after controlling for family 
characteristics and unobserved heterogeneity, although the negative effect on female 
participation of having a young child can outweigh the positive effect due to mortgage 
commitments. The evidence of a positive relationship between female participation 
and mortgage commitments is in line with previous international research. A test 
of endogeneity of the mortgage choice with respect to labour supply, rejects the null 
hypothesis.
Chapter 3 studies the implications of a structural life cycle model of household 
consumption, labour supply and saving together with home-ownership decisions. The 
empirical motivation is provided by chapter 2 but theoretical implications, particularly 
for labour supply, appear to be smaller than in the data. One potential reason why the 
scale of effects in the model, particularly for labour supply, appear to be smaller than
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in the data, is that education is the only source of observed heterogeneity in the model. 
Natural extensions of the model would allow for a richer consideration of demographics 
over the life cycle. In particular, introducing a second earner in the household could 
prove fruitful for explaining variability in the labour supply of the household; the two 
earners would face separate wage rates each one with an idiosyncratic component, 
rather than the single wage rate that is assumed in the current version of the model. 
A second observable demographic characteristic that it would possibly be important 
to introduce is the presence and arrival of children, particularly given that fertility, 
home-ownership and labour supply decisions are thought of as being interrelated if not 
simultaneous. As well as including other dimensions of observable heterogeneity, it 
would be important to include a mortgage repayment schedule for home-owners with a 
mortgage. This would track widespread UK “repayment mortgage” scheme that seem 
to be a more common institutional feature found in the data.
Chapter 4 analyses expectations over retirement outcomes to try and answer two 
questions: first, to assess how accurate individuals’ expectations are, by examining 
changes across various changes in pension legislation; second, to estimate the offset 
between expected private wealth accumulation and (state) pension wealth. Individual’s 
expectations are found to overestimate the expected ratio of pension benefits to pre­
retirement income. Expectations following changes in pension legislation are found 
to respond to the effects implied by the reforms but the adjustment is not complete. 
Further years of data will clarify whether expectations are adjusting slowly and so will 
adjust more fully with time. Our findings on the offset between private wealth and 
expected pension wealth suggest that this is far from complete.
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